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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objectives and Need for the Study 
Hindu Metaphysics and Ethics have for centuries developed and evolved with 
the purpose of guiding human thought and actio::1. In this regard, S. 
Radhakrishnan notes in his book, Basic Writings of S. Radhakrishnan, that 
Indian philosophy has its interest in the haunts of men, and not in a 
supra-lunar solitude. It takes its origin in life, and enters back into 
life after passing through the schools (McDermott (ed) 1970: 69). 
Radhakrishnan together with other contemporary scholars such as Dasgupta, 
Aurobindo etc. have attempted to construct the Indian Metaphysical discourse 
with practical and social relevance and have developed an initial framework in 
which such an hermenuetical trend could be raised. However, their contribution 
of Hindu metaphysics and ethics to the global ethical discourse has been 
limited. This is perhaps the most serious gap in Hindu metaphysical and ethical 
studies. It is further noted that the world is rapidly becoming a global village. 
With the increase in communication and technology, political economies and 
social philosophies are in active dialogue with each other; religious traditions 
and spiritual philosophies are brought into closer contact with secular interests 
and socio-political worldviews. Societies and communities are no longer in 
social, political, cultural or religious isolation. They are expressing tendencies 
to mature and develop through assimilation and influence lOW global 
institutions with global relevance. 
Moreover, it is assumed that the dialogue between different socio-political and 
ethical worldviews and philosophies of life, being based on contradicting 
conclusions, are bound to cause tensions with each other and are also obliged to 
progressively influence each other, consequently shaping modernistic 
ideological trends and approaches that stand in need of demonstrating its 
universal relevance to the human condition and its destiny. However, it is 
inevitable that tensions that arise between ideological systems may ultimately 
stimulate fanaticism and fundamentalism and therefore threaten and disrupt 
world peace and security. Notwithstanding this, the world is in need of peace, 
co-operation and security, which can be produced through a global ethic, which 
should be developed by the global community. 
In the light of the postmodern processes of globalization, there are growing 
concerns about the challenges that face not only the human condition, but also 
the planet as a whole. Statistics reveal that the world population is rapidly 
growing more than ever before and therefore poses several challenges to the 
planet. This rapidly growing world population is bound to put a strain on the 
world 's resources viz. on landownership, agricultural yields and food 
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distribution, genetic and energy resources, and the environment. The issues of 
fertility and natural mortality are bound to arise. These issues do impact on the 
fundamental value systems of communities. Furthermore, the social issues of 
abortion, cloning, sterilization, euthanasia, sexual morality, animal rights, 
environmental ethics, racism and affirmative action, poverty and distributive 
justice etc. do present challenges to the ethical foundations of individuals and 
societies. In the evolving post - modern society these issues put traditional 
ethics and legal rules into tension. 
The concomitant challenges of poverty, violence, racism and sexism are bound 
to impact on global peace and security and a better quality of life for all. The 
current land crisis in Zimbabwe, the poverty in many parts of the developing 
world, the war in Iraq, the political violence in Palestine and Israel, the increase 
in the threat of nuclear weapons (Korea, India, Pakistan), the poisoning of the 
global atmosphere and environment by increased industrialization are 
challenges of our age. Many of these challenges reflect a fundamental ethical 
crisis that the global community faces . Therefore, the world stands in need of a 
global ethic that is influenced by the ethical values of all religious and cultural 
traditions. Furthermore, the evolution of a global ethic needs to be 
contextualised against the backdrop of the challenges that face the human 
condition and the planet as a whole in order for it to be of global relevance. 
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Ethics has formed a central part of religion and over the centuries it has largely 
been confined to the realm of faith systems. The foremost source of religious 
ethics are the spiritual texts of the various faith systems. Traditional ethics have 
been largely structured on a sectarian and provincial b.nis. Its aS~'J ·;\!1tion with 
metaphysics and theology cannot be denied nor overlooked. Under 
uncontrolled circumstances, traditional religious ethics have declined to strict 
and compulsive dogmas. Being based on Divine authority, traditional ethics 
have largely being grounded on the vision of an individual or a specific group 
of individuals. It has mostly been articulated in mystical or metaphorical 
language and has played a pivotal role in connecting the empirical reality with 
the ultimate destiny. 
It must be noted that against the backdrop of global change and challenges, 
there is a need for a conceptual global ethical framework, which cOuld govern 
and guide human action at the global level. It is necessary that the global 
ethical discourse be based on the principle of inclusivity and should include 
political, economic, social, religious, and scientific dimensions. In order for this 
to emerge, traditional philosophy and ethics must be made, to some degree, 
compatible with socio-political ideologies through a global dialogue. It is also 
necessary to construct, through this global dialogue, a conceptual paradigm as a 
foundational framework for a global ethic. There is also a compulsion to 
formulate concepts that have universal relevance in their application and to 
compose ethical theories that will encompass a multi-disciplinary 
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interpretation. I further believe that there is a need to develop a post-
modernistic methodological approach in constructing a global ethic that can be 
significantly rooted in a multi-disciplinary paradigm. It is obvious that the 
methodological approach of traditional ethics have been limited in many 
respects. Moreover, there is a need for a neo-hermenuetical framework of 
principles to be produced in order to interpret and understand traditional 
philosophy and ethics in the context of multi-disciplinary reality. 
The mam purpose of this study is to explore the nature and character of 
Brahman, Alman, the individual and the World in the context of Hindu 
metaphysics and the nature and character of the notion of Dharma and Karma 
in the context of Hindu ethics and to evaluate its contribution towards 
developing a theoretical, methodological and hermenuetical framework, for a 
contemporary global ethic. It must be noted that Hindu metaphysics covers a 
wide range of approaches viz. the Samkhya, the Yoga, the Vaiseshika, the 
Mimamsa (the Uttara Mimamsa and the Purva Mimamsa), and Nyaya. 
However, for the purposes of this study, the focus will mainly be on the 
Vedanta of the Vedanta Sulra, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gila and the 
interpretations of Shankara, Ramanuja and Madh1'2 This study will not 
attempt to prove which one of these traditional scholars is best suited for the 
modern global ethical discourse. On the contrary, it will survey the general and 
specific principles articulated by them which will be evaluated for the purposes 
of constructing and developing the global ethical discourse. 
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This study is also an inquiry into a historical-hermenuetical process, a search 
for the patterns of change in metaphysical and ethical notions in a particular 
context. As the notions of Brahman, Alman, the world, Dhqrma and Karma are 
the essence of Hindu Metaphysics and Ethics, changef' in the understanding of 
these notions in the Vedanta Sulra, Upanishads, and Bhagavad Gila will be 
closely connected to the way in which they can be interpreted in different 
contexts. The specific focus will be the way in which these traditional ideas can 
contribute to the development of a post-modern global ethical discourse. 
It must be noted that the age of globalization is underpinned with the ideas of 
collectivism, universalism and integration. The focus of the global mind is no 
longer on the humanistic trend, it is expanded to include transcendental and 
natural categories ego Universal divine space and the planet as a natural 
environment. Therefore, Hindu metaphysical and ethill; thought must develop 
to incorporate as well as expand the principles of integration, collectivism and 
universalism and not be treated as isolated systems of thought. As much as the 
history of Vedantic hermeneutics demonstrates the clear distinctions that 
formulate itself between the various Vedantic schools, such distinctions need 
not be sustained within the context of the global discourse. Given the different 
standpoints of Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva, they collectively have a role 
to play in constructing the global ethical discourse. This thesis proposes that 
Hindu metaphysics, limited to the Vedanta of the Vedanta Sutra the , 
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Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gita and the intenretations of Shankara, 
Ramanuja and Madhva, and together with the Hindu traditional and 
contemporary ethical discourse, can integrate itself with the trends in the 
western ethical discourse in order to collectively contribute a foundational 
framework for the global ethical discourse to evolve a global ethic. 
1.2 Literature Survey 
The notions of Brahman, Atman and the material world are deeply rooted in 
Upanishadic thinking and continue into the Bhagavad Gila over an expansive 
period of time. These notions constitute the bedrock of Hindu m~taphysics . 
Although these concepts have been interpreted over the ages hy both traditional 
and contemporary thinkers such as Shankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, 
Radhakrishnan, Das Gupta, Aurobindo and Gandhi, they have not been 
dialogued with global ethical issues. It must be noted that the notions of 
Brahman and Alman are dealt with in the Upanishads from two very divergent 
positions, viz. from the absolute and relative point of views. Both these 
viewpoints provide a significant basis for the interpretation of global ethics. 
The notion of Brahman is transformed from an Absolute abstract idea in the 
Upanishads into a purely Personal Supreme God in the Bhagavad Gita. This 
adequately reveals the flexible nature of the notion of Brahman, which is of 
significance to the construction of the character of global concepts. All these 
ideas collectively need to formulate themselves into a conceptual paradigm that 
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will reflect the integration of global thought for the purpose of constructing the 
global ethical discourse. The global ethical discourse cannot be sustained by a 
singularist position but must reflect a pluralistic and an all inclusivist trend if it 
is to have influence and relevance on the global community. Therefore, this 
study will not attempt to demonstrate which Vedantic school is best suited for 
this purpose, but will attempt to illustrate the collective contribution that all 
Vedantic thinkers can make to the global ethical discourse. Furthermore, Hindu 
metaphysical and ethical ideas need to positively contribute w expanding and 
interpreting global thought systems that can contribute towards the global 
ethical discourse. 
• Dr S. Radhakrishnan, in "Indian Philosophy ", Vols. 1&2, 1999, surveys the 
notions of Brahman, Alman and Material World as well as the general nature 
and character of Hindu ethics within the Upanishads and the Gila. He also 
deals with these concepts in the context of the Advaita and Visisadvaitic 
traditions of Shankara and Ramanuja. His analysis is purely limited to the 
way in which these concepts have been interpreted and the way in which 
they can be systematized for modern day scholasticism. However, these 
concepts have not been dialogued with contemporary western ethical 
discourse and the global ethical discourse. 
• William Beidler, in his book "The Vision of Self;n Early Vedanta", 1975, 
does a detailed analysis of the Self in two main Vedantic scriptures viz. the 
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Upanishads and the Gila. He examines the notion of self in the context of 
the traditional concepts of Purusha, Atman and Brahman. This analysis is an 
important one in that it surveys the notion of the Self from a comparative 
perspective and it is easy to see the development of this notion. However, 
this study has concentrated on the analysis of the notion of the Self and it 
does not develop this analysis into the ethical discourse. 
• Surendranath Dasgupta, in "A History of Indian Philosophy", Vols1-5, 
1941 , deals with these metaphysical concepts very briefly in the Upanishads 
and Gila. In his presentation of the Upanishads he does not raise the issue of 
ethics, however, in dealing with the Gila he raises the issue of ethics in 
conjunction with Buddhist ethics. He deals witl" Shankara' s school of 
Advaita Vedanta very extensively but focuses very briefly on the theories of 
world appearance, Atman, Jiva, Ishvara and Vedanta ethics. He also deals 
with Ramanuja, Madhva, and Nimbarka in a similar way. This analysis is 
significant in that a systematic development of philosophic thought can be 
discerned but a clear construction of the influence of metaphysical concepts 
on ethical notions are absent. 
• Paul Deussen, in his book, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, 1906, deals 
very extensively with the no~ion of Brahman and Brahman in relation to the 
universe and the Atman in the context of the Upanis.i.:.ds. Deussep. also gives 
consideration of the issue of ethics in the Upanishads but deals with it in the 
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context of the traditional ethical institution of Varna. Here also it is evident 
that Hindu metaphysical and ethical concepts have been confined and 
interpreted in the context of the Hindu world view and very little was done to 
construct a framework for it to participate in a global ethical discourse. 
• Another Western scholar, Gough Edward, in his book, Philosophy of the 
Upanishads: Ancient Indian Metaphysics, Vol.4, 1882, ventures to explore 
the notions of Brahman, Maya, the Self and the Wodci in the UpJrJishads . A 
detail analysis of the Mundaka, Katha, Brihadaranyaka ~nd Svetasvatara 
Upanishads is undertaken to construct an understanding of the metaphysical 
concepts. A dialogue of the Upanishadic worldview with the western 
metaphysical and ethical worldview is absent. 
• Dr Priti Sinha in his book, The Philosophy of Advaita - A transition from 
Shankara to Sri Aurobindo, 1986, presents a comprehensive analysis of the 
concepts Brahman, Alman and the nature of the world as it is interpreted in 
the philosophies of Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva. This analysis deals 
with the precise interpretations of these concepts within the respective 
schools. Although, he does raise very briefly a few ethica~ issues, it is clear 
the emphasis was more on Vedantic metaphysics than on ethics. 
• W.S Urquhart, in his book, The Vedanta and Modern Thought, 1986, does 
raise the issue of the place of ethics in Vedanta and deal with this issue in 
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the context of the destiny of the soul. However, his approach was confined 
to examining the place of ethics in the context of the Advaita tradition and 
it left little room to really understand the extent to which ethics evolved 
within the Vedantic tradition. 
It is quite evident that Hindu metaphysics and ethics were largely examined and 
analyzed to further the understanding of the traditional conceptual and 
hermenuetical frameworks rather than to assess the contribution they can make 
towards developing a global ethical discourse. Noting this serious gap, this 
study will venture to explore the way in which Hindu metaphysics, within the 
context of the Vedanta of Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva, and Hindu ethics, 
in the context of the traditional and modern discourse, can collectively 
contribute to the global ethical discourse. 
1.3 Key Critical Questions 
This study will venture to explore how the metaphysical notions of Brahman, 
Atman, and concept of World, are understood in the traditional philosophy of 
Vedanta, viz. the Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gila and how these 
notions have been interpreted by traditional thinkers such as Shankara , 
Ramanuja and Madhva and modern day eastern and western scholars. 
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Furthermore, this study will also explore the way in which the ethical notions 
of dharma and karma have been understood in the traditional philosophy of 
Vedanta, viz. the Vedas, Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gita, and how these 
notions have been interpreted through time. It will also explore trends in 
contemporary Hindu ethical discourse. 
Thirdly, this study will examine the major ethical ideological trends In 
globalization and what challenges they present. 
Finally, this study will explore what kind of contribution traditional Vedantic 
metaphysics and ethics can make towards the construction of a conceptual, 
methodological and hermenuetical framework for the development of the 
global ethical discourse in which the principles for a global ethic can be 
established. 
1.4 Research Approach and Methods 
This study will attempt a conceptual analysis of the Metaphysics of the Vedanta 
Sutra, Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gila through the interprc'tations of 
western and eastern scholars to construct a theoretical framework for the 
concepts of Brahman, Alman and the World. This will be followed by an 
analysis of these concepts within the traditional schools of Shankara , 
Ramanuja and Madhva and modern day thinkers of Vedanta. A critical 
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evaluation of the suitability of these metaphysical concepts will be made and an 
assessment of how they relate with modern day ethical trends based on the 
criteria of relevance. It will also explore the main theoretical assumptions of 
these concepts and establish the hermenuetical principles that inform the 
interpretation of these concepts. It must be noted that Shankara 's interpretation 
of the Vedanta is one of the dominant schools that are felt strongly even to date, 
and it will be important to explore how Shankara dealt with these metaphysical 
concepts. The rationale to include the contribution of Ramanuja and Madhva is 
that they stand as formidable opponents of Shankara 's approach. The modem 
day scholars such as Radhakrishnan, Aurobindo, Surendranath Dasgupta, Paul 
Deussen, William Beidler have been grouped as " insiders" and "outsiders" and 
it is vital to explore, in the context of the cultural and academic differences 
between them, the variety of trends that deal with key concepts in Indian 
thought. The combination of ancient and modem interpretations is an 
invaluable contribution to the expansion of philosophic studies. A full analysis 
will be made of the way in which the ancient and modern day culturally 
diversified scholars handled ethical problems in Indian thought. However, this 
study will not limit itself to anyone school but explore the full contribution of 
the three schools viz. Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva. 
Secondly, a detailed analysis of the notions dharma and karma will be 
undertaken in the Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads, and Bhagavad Gila through the 
interpretations of western and eastern scholars. A construction of a theoretical 
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basis for these concepts will be pursued and a cntical evaluation of the 
suitability of these traditional ethical concepts will be undertaken to assess how 
these ideas relate to modern day ethical trends. 
Finally, this study will survey contemporary literature, from both a western and 
eastern perspective, and identify socio-ethical ideological trends in 
globalization and examine proposals made towards constructing a global ethic. 
This study will also critically · examine some of the challenges that face 
globalization and possible solutions to them. 
One of the central problems to any study dealing with concepts from an 
individual world view is that of linguistic difficulties. This study must take into 
cognizance the difficulty in translating Sanskrit concepts from the Hindu 
world view to English, which is largely dominated by referents from the Judaic-
Christian tradition. For the purpose of enhancing the objectives of this study, an 
attempt will be made to demonstrate the possibility of linking traditional Indian 
metaphysical concepts to western notions with the objective of establishing a 
globalized vocabulary. 
1.5 Background To Primary Scriptural Sources 
The conceptual framework for this study is largely based on the ideas derived 
from the Prasthana Traya, viz. the Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads, and Bhagavad 
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Gila. It must be noted that there is a vast array of scriptural sources in the 
historical development of Hinduism and it is very difficult to cover this 
plethora of material. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the discussion is 
limited to key texts which acquired, over time, canonical status within the 
metaphysical discourse. The Prasthana Traya, in the hands of Vedanta 
scholars, medieval and contemporary specialists, acquired the status of primary 
sources reflecting the metaphysical ideas. Vedanta, unlike many other Hindu 
philosophic systems attained more popularity and a dominant status in 
contemporary Hindu metaphysical thinking. I have therefore taken these three 
texts viz. the Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gila, as having the 
dominant position in Hindu metaphysics and hence my decision to limit myself. 
1.5.1 Date of the Primary Scriptures 
One of the important considerations for this study is the ascertaining of the date 
of these scriptures. One must admit that any attempt to date these primary 
scriptures have generated several problems that have not been completely 
resolved. For instance, there are some western scholars who suggest that the 
Bhagavad Gila was written after Jesus Christ (Swami Gambhirananda 1991 : 
xiii). Swami Gambhirananda, who quotes the Encyclopaedia of Religion and 
Ethics, notes that the Bhagavad Gila is not only pre-Christian in origins, but 
also, it is pre-Buddhistic (ibid. 1991 : px1 iii-xiv). In support of this position he 
notes the views of scholars such as Telang, R. J Bhandarkar, S.Radhakrishnan 
15 
and Dasgupta and all of them agree that the Gila arose between 300BC and 
500BC (ibid. 1991 : xiv). Furthermore, Radhakrishnan observes : 
From its archaic constructions and internal references we may infer 
that it is definitely a work of the pre-Christian era. Its date may be 
assigned to the 5th century BC though the text may have received 
many alterations in subsequent times (Radhakrishnan 1948: 14). 
Similar differences exist even in dating the Vedanta Sutra and the Upanishads. 
Given these various proposals it is, it is safe to simply say that the primary 
scriptures viz the Vedanta SUlra, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gila are of pre-
Christian origins and this suggests an independent Hi'1du orthodox context to 
their socio-ethical principles. 
1.5.2 The Upanishads 
The Upanishads occupy a central position in the history of Indian philosophy 
and have been described as the "kernel of the whole of post-vedic Indian 
philosophy" (Urquhart, 1986: 21). The Upanishads . have had a tremendous 
influence and is still having a colossal predominance in the minds and hearts of 
people all over the world. Dasgupta notes one western scholar who had this to 
say about it : 
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From every sentence deep, original and sublime thoughts arise and 
the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit .... In 
the whole world there is no study, except that of the originals, so 
beneficial and so elevating as that of the Upanishads. It has been 
the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death (in Dasgupta, 
1941: 40) 
Noting the above, it is firstly necessary to probe into r:>w the different scholars 
went about analyzing the Upanishads. In this regard, a survey of the methods 
of Paul Deussen (a western scholar) and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan (an eastern 
scholar) will be reviewed. Thereafter, an examination of the notion of 
"Upanishad" is undertaken to form a critical reflection of the chronology and 
methodology of the Upanishads that is used in arranging the historical 
sequence of the Upanishads. It will also be meaningful to explore the major 
texts that constitute the traditional authority of the Upanishads, their subject 
matter and the pattern of interpretation they have been subjected to . This 
reflection is necessary to inqllire into the suitability of the Upanishads as 
source material for the study of Hindu metaphysics an<.t ethics. 
Paul Deussen, in dealing with the overview of the Upanishads assembles the 
following issues that he dealt with viz. (1) the Upanishads in the context of the 
Vedas (ii) the meaning of the word Upanishad (iii) the earliest origins of the 
Upanishads (iv) the extent of the Upanishads (v) the Upanishads of 
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Badarayana and Shankara (vi) the most important collection of Upanishads 
(vii) the fundamental conceptions of the Upanishads and their significance 
(viii) the Upanishads in relaticr. to Philosophy and Religion (Deussen 1906: 5-
44). Radhakrishnan, on the other hand, deals with the general phi~ow?hy of the 
Upanishads and takes up the following issues for discussion (I) the concept of 
Upanishad (ii) the teachings of the Upanishads (iii) number and date of 
Upqnishads (iv) the problems discussed in the Upanishads (v) the nature of 
reality (vi) Brahman (vii) Brahman and Alman (viii) creation (ix) the 
individual Self and (x) karma and ethics in the Upanishads (Radhakrishnan, 
Vol. 1, 1923: 137-267). It is explicit that both Deussen and Radhakrishnan 
approached the study of the Upanishads in almost similar ways, though there 
are also marked differences between them. Notwithstanding this, it is 
conclusive, from the study of the overview of both Paul Deussen and 
Radhakrishnan that the Upanishads can serve as an imp~rlant sourc~ reference 
in terms of undertaking an analysis of traditional Hindu metap:lysics and ethics. 
1.5.3 The Conception of "Upanishad" 
Paul Deussen, in examining the concept of Upanishad submits that this concept 
refers to the secret and mystical teachings that are transmitted from a learned 
and spiritually realized teacher to an "ethically deserving student" (Deussen 
1906: 12-13). Dasgupta also notes that the significant point about the secrecy 
that surrounded the teachings of the Upanishads is that they were supposed to 
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be taught to pupils who practiced supreme moral restraint (D(I,sgupta 1941 : 38). 
Dasgupta, likewise, quotes MaxMuller's analyses of the word Upanishad and 
notes that the concept Upanishad refers to the act of sitting down near a teacher 
and submissively listening to him (Dasgupta 1941 : 38). Radhakrishnan is in 
complete agreement on this meaning of the term Upanishad However, he adds 
that the term Upanishad is also known as the " Vedanta". (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 
137). To Shankara, the word Upanishad refers to that which destroys inborn 
ignorance and leads to the liberation of a soul through pure knowledge 
(Dasgupta 1941 : 38). It is apparent that the Upanishads are very confidential 
teachings that are aimed at providing spiritual insight into metaphysical matters 
to the morally pure minded. Notwithstanding this, it can serve as an essential 
source material to guide the construction of a global ethical discourse through 
its metaphysical and ethical reflections. This will serve as a means to lift the 
Upanishads from the levels of secrecy and engage them in the public discourse. 
This means that the Upanishads need to be removed from their traditional 
ethical setting and placed within the context of the global ethical setting. 
Therefore, there is a need to develop new methods of engaging the meaning 
and purpose of Upanishadic teachings and provide a much greater space for 
their interpretation. For the purpose of developing a global ethical discourse, 
the collective system of Upanishadic thought needs to be considered and not 
any single stream. However, it is not the purpose of this study to focus on a 
particular hermenuetical trend or standpoint of the Upanishads but to establish 
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the contribution that their metaphysics and ethics can make to the global ethical 
discourse in general. 
1.5.4 Subject Matter of Upanishads 
It must be noted that the period of the Upanishadic development spanned 
between 100BC to the current era and the orthodox position mentions that there 
are 108 texts belonging to this genre. Deussen notes that the primary subject 
matter of the Upanishads revolves around two fundamental conceptions viz. 
Brahman and Atman (Deussen 1906: 38). In this regard he says : 
If we strip this thought (Brahman and Alman) of the various forms, 
figurative to the highest degree and not seldom extravagant, under 
which it appears in the Vedanta texts, and fix our attention upon it 
solely in its philosophical simplicity as the ident :t)' of God and the 
soul, the Brahman and the Atman, it will be found to possess a 
significance reaching far beyond the Upanishads, their time and 
country, nay, we claim for it an inestimable value for the whole 
race of mankind (Deussen 1906: 39). 
Deussen deals with the conception of the Upanishads strictly in its relation to 
philosophy and religion, but he leaves out correlating it to the ethical discourse. 
Furthermore, his suggestion that the notion of Brahman and Alman may have a 
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far wider relevance than just being confined to the philosophic context of the 
Upanishads, raises the hope of the positive contribution these concepts can 
make to the global ethical discourse. Dasgupta notes that many of the 
Upanishads are linked with the older portion of the Vedas (Dasgupta 1941 : 30). 
This is very significant because the Upanishads form part of a larger religious 
tradition and it provides direct evidence of the continuity and development of 
metaphysical and ethical thought from the Vedic period to the Upanishadic 
period itself. In fact, Radhakrishnan confirms that the Upanishads contain the 
essence of Vedic teachings (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 130>. He strongl.y suggests 
that the philosophy of the Upanishads can be accosted from two fundamental 
approaches (I) metaphysics and (ii) ethics (ibid . 1923 : 151). Although the 
subject matter of the Upanishads does not deal with the relationship of 
metaphysics and ethics in terms of the objectives of this study, it will be 
possible to establish key ideas from it in order to establish a post-
hermenuetical relationship between them and to forward a contribution from 
them for the purpose of a global ethical discourse. The deep dialectic method 
on which the subject matter of the Upanishads has modeled itself into is an 
important method to take into the global ethical discourse which can be used to 
substantiate the framework for the formulation of a global ethic. 
1.5.5 Interpretation of Upanishads 
One of the mam challenges to understanding the Upanishads is its 
hermeneutics. Dasgupta makes a very interesting observation about the 
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interpretation of the Upanishads, where he notes that on the matter of ultimate 
truths it is very difficult to arrive at objective conclusions just based on 
individual reason and opinion (Dasgupta 1941 : 41). This means that reason, as 
the Kantian and western ethical schools may propose, is insufficient to interpret 
and understand the truths of the Upanishads. This snifts the content of the 
Upanishads from a pl,lrely empirically objectivist position intc. a meta-objective 
area. Dasgupta also observed that the traditional schools of Vedanta, in order 
for them to be heard, went to great lengths to show that the Upanishadic texts 
supported them. They interpreted the Upanishads to demonstrate that they 
alone represented the true Vedantic doctrines (ibid. 1941 : 41). This is further 
confirmed by Radhakrishnan who noted that: 
Different commentators, starting with particular beliefs, force their 
views into the Upanishads and strain their language so as to make it 
consistent with their own special doctrines (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 
140) 
Dasgupta suggests that a modern interpreter of the Upanishads should overlook 
the claims of the traditional exponents and look at the Upanishads not as a 
systematic treatise but a repository of diverse thoughts (Dasgupta 1941 : 42). He 
further suggested that a modern interpreter should not agree to the claims of the 
traditional interpreters but should take the texts independently and separately 
and determine their meanings keeping a close eye on the context in which they 
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appear (Dasgupta 1941 : 42). Dasgupta being aware of the highly subjective 
nature of the content of the Upanishads attempted to project a fairly objective 
approach to it. However, the centuries of contribution made by the classical 
thinkers cannot be totally ignored. Their sectarian and school based 
hermenuetical approach need not be entrenched in the context of the global 
ethical discourse. In fact, the collective contribution of ideas must be used and 
reinterpreted for the purposes of constructing a conceptual paradigm for the 
global ethical discourse. It must be noted that this method will contribute 
positively to the objectives of this study. 
1.5.6 The Vedanta Sutra 
The Vedanta Sutra, also referred to as the Brahma Sutra, or the Sariraka Sutra 
forms part of the triple canon of Vedanta known as the Prasthana traya, which 
is the most authoritative canonical texts in Hindu orthodoxy (Urquhart 1986: 
39). It is significant to establish a general background to the Vedanta Sutra in 
order to evaluate its contribution to this study. It must be known that there is a 
notable overlap in the content of the Vedanta Sutra and the Upanishads. 
However, for the purpose of this study both these scriptures will be investigated 
to gain absolute clarity on the concepts dealt with. 
This Sulra is compiled in prose form and is served as compressed material 
which is suitable for memorizing and they also serve as lines of communication 
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between the new and the old schematic character which allows for considerable 
variety and development in interpretation (Urquhart 1986: 39-40). Urquhart 
observes that the Vedanta Sulra omits certain aspects of doctrine and it 
emphasizes others and over a period of time it acquired a distinctive character 
of its own which contributes to renewed interpretation by commentators (ibid. 
1986: 40). 
Srinivasa Chari, in his book, The Philosophy of the Vedanta Sutra, notes that 
the sutras are compiled in aphoristic sentences and are encapsulated in a few 
cryptic words which are deeply interwoven with philosophic ideas (1998: ix). 
The general structure of the Vedanta sutra is divided into four chapters 
(adhyayas) and each chapter is further divided into four parts (padas) (ibid. 
1998: xx) . The central theme of the Vedanta SUlra is the study of the Brahman 
as an ultimate metaphysical reality (ibid. 1998: xx). The first chapter (adhyaya) 
is devoted to discussing the nature of Brahman, the second chapter (adhyaya) 
concentrates on upholding the thesis of the first chapter and examines the 
nature of individual self (jiva) in its relation to Brc:izman, the third chapter 
(adhyaya) is about the nature of the universe and its causal relationship with 
Brahman, the fourth chapter (adhyaya) is about the nature of the means of 
attaining Brahman and the final chapter (adhyaya) focuses on the nature of the 
Supreme Goal (Srinivasa Chari 1998: xxi-xxiv). 
For the purpose of this study it will not be relevant to make a detailed analysis 
of each and every sutra. However, it must be noted that an examination of the 
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five main themes will be undertaken in order to establish the contribution it can 
make to the global ethical discourse. Since there are several classical 
interpretations to the Vedanta Sutra, for the purpose of this study, the 
interpretations of Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva will be focussed on. 
1.5.7 Bhagavad Gita and Vedic Literature 
The Bhagavad Gita, of 700 verses spoken by Lord Krishna to Arjuna on the 
Battlefield of Kurukshetra, has served as the foundation of Hindu philosophy 
and ethics for a large part of the modern era and has assumed greater popularity 
than any other Hindu religious text since the Vedas. It is firstly necessary to 
place the Bhagavad GUa in the context of the Hinol! literature in order to 
construct its socio-ethical principles. From the viewpoint of Hindu orthodoxy, 
the Vedas are proclaimed to be the earliest source of Hindu thought and are 
accepted as the highest authority on spiritual and ethical matters. The Vedas 
extend into the Samhita, the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas and the Upanishads. 
Swami Gambhirananda notes that the Gita ranks as one of the greatest religious 
books in the world and he suggests that it occupies a position next only to the 
Upanishads. (Swami Gambhirananda 1991 : xviii). Radhakrishnan further notes 
that the Gila has been recognized for centuries as an orthodox scripture of the 
Hindu religion possessing equal authority with the Upanishads and the Brahma 
Sutras and the three together form the triple canon (Prasthana-traya) 
(Radhakrishnan 1948-: 15-16). The Bhagavad Gita, being parl of the continuity 
25 
of the thought systems of the Upanishads and the Vedanta Sutra, can be 
submitted as an important source material for the study of Hindu metaphysics 
and ethics. 
1.5.8 Gita and Mahabharata 
One of the unique features of the Bhagavad Gila is that it is referred to as 
Gitopanishad, belonging to the Upanishad literature (Swami Prabhupada 1972: 
xxv), yet it is located in the epic literature viz. the Mahabharata and is found 
between the 23 rd and 40th chapters of the Bhismaparva (Nilkantan 1989: 21). 
There are several modern critics who have advocated the view that the 
Bhagavad Gila is a later composition than the Mahabharata (Majumdar 1989: 
21). However, some Hindu scholars, such as Aurobindo did not accept this 
assumption (ibid. 1989: 74). The presence of the Bhagavad Gita in the 
Mahabharata is significant in that it captures the socio-political and ethical 
context of it, which may serve as the basis to evaluate the principles that 
underpin the ethical system of the Gila. This issue will be taken up later on. 
1.5.9 Interpretation of Bhagavad Gita 
The Bhagavad Gita belongs to a rich ancestry of hermeneutics. Swami 
Gambhirananda identifies the classical interpreters of the Gita, such as 
Shankara, Ramanujacarya (eleventh century AD), Madhvacarya (1199-1276) , 
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Vallabhacarya (1479), Kesava Kasmiri (1162), and modern day commentators, 
such as Vijnana Bhiksu, Jnaneswar and Tukaram, BG Tilak, Mahatma Gandhi 
and Sri Aurobindo (Swami Gambhirananda, 1991: xix). One of the interesting 
features of the hermeneutic tradition of the Gila, is that, each interpreter 
forwarded one's personal position regarding its central teaching. Lokamanya 
Tilak regarded the gospel of disinterested action, as an independent and even 
primary way to God realization, to be the central teaching of the Bhagavad Gila 
(Varma 1974: 164). Aurobindo also interpreted the Gila as a "metaphysic of 
the fusion spiritualized action and supramental myst~ ~ism" (ibid. 1974: 164). 
Referring to the many schools of interpretation on the Bhagavad Gila, Varma 
concludes that none of those interpretations is the final and decisive word on 
the scripture (ibid . 1974: 165). He says that: 
I think that the vanous interpreters from Sankara downwards 
referred to above are only partially justified in their points of view 
(ibid. 1974: 165). 
Radhakrishnan observes that the: 
Commentaries on the Gila were written by the teachers in support 
of their own religious thought and metaphysics, since the author of 
the Gila suggests that the one eternal truth which we are seeking, 
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from which all other truth derives, cannot be shut up in a single 
formula (Radhakrishnan 1984: 16). 
This varied interpretation of the Bhagavad Gila reveals a kind of less rigid 
hermeneutic attached to it, and its deeply globalized nature of thought thereby 
allowing for further interpretations that would reveal the full relevance of it for 
a post-modern global ethical discourse. Furthermore, the individual 
interpretations cannot be contested against each other to establish which is best 
suited for this study, but it will be collectively used to c')nstruct the conceptual 
paradigm of the global ethical discourse. 
1.6 Conclusion 
The Pra thana Traya, viz the Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gila 
serves as an ideal cultural relic to unfold the conceptual essences of the Vedic 
tradition in order to enhance the objectives of this study. Despite the different 
periods in which they developed, their metaphysics and ethical notions seem to 
compliment each other and reveal a progressive development, which is 
essential for the global ethical discourse. Being devdoped during the pre-
Christian era discloses an individual system of thinking outside of the western 
models of thinking and it needs to be given serious consideration for the global 
ethical discourse. The subject matter of the Prasthana Traya generally 
demonstrated a development structure to the system of metaphysics and ethics 
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and it further presented itself as a deeply interwoven and synthesized system of 
metaphysics and ethics. The dialectic method, which is deeply, incorporated 
into the Prasthana Traya, forms an essential tool for furthering the dialogue of 
metaphysics and ethics, whicb can eventually be integrated into the global 
ethical discourse to synthesize the global ethical thought ~ystems . The 
hermenuetical tradition of the Prasthana Traya provides evidence of the 
individualistic ways in which global realities can be interpreted and therefore 
serves as a model for a global hermenuetical framework 
29 
CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND TO HINDU METAPHYSICS 
AND GLOBAL ETHICS 
In the last chapter, the research design for this investigation, that was outlined, 
explored the general background of Hindu primary scriptures as the sources of 
reference for Hindu metaphysical and ethical thinking. In this chapter, this 
study will present a background to Hindu metaphysics and the global context 
for ethical thinking. 
2.1 Approach to Metaphysics 
Dasgupta makes a clear distinction between the approaches of the Europeans 
and Indians to metaphysics when he says that the European mind is satisfied 
with a theoretical and rational enquiry into Reality whereas the Indian mind, 
though it depends on rational enquiry, it always demands real experience to 
verify net results (Dasgupta 1941 : 64). He maintains that the main justification 
of all metaphysical enquiry is to grasp the nature of Reality (ibid. 1941 : 64) and 
to articulate it through a consistent theoretical framework. However, he notes 
that: 
(t]here is a deeper and more or less unanalysable tendency of the 
mind to come to a truth which will not only be logically 
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unassailable, but should also be felt as an experience (ibid. 1941 : 
65) 
He establishes that in most branches of human enquiry, whether it is science or 
philosophy, there is some sort of satisfaction obtained by direct experience 
(ibid. 1941 : 66) which therefore leads him to the conclusion that an enquiry 
after Reality is not just an intellectual exercise but to be felt in experience 
(Dasgupta 1941 : 76).' He furthermore believes that an enquiry into the Ultimate 
reality should harmonize all experiences (ibid. 1941 : 68). It must be noted that 
both the notions of reason and experience have a contributory role to play in the 
development of the conceptual paradigm of the global ethical discourse. The 
global ethical discourse cannot rest solely on the rationality model, which 
advocates reason as the primary contributor. 
NK Devaraja, in dealing with the issue of an approach to philosophy, identifies 
that the main task of philosophy is posing problems and offering solutions 
which is coined in ontological and epistemological terms (Devaraja 1973 : 11-
12). He also sees the central focus of the philosophical problem concentrated 
not on the actual existence of man but on the meaning, direction and 
significance of one' s life in the universe (ibid. 1973: 12). In this regard he says: 
Philosophy, in other words, is concerned essentially with the 
phenomena of values as reflected in man 's spiritual life .... These are 
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the traditional cognitive, aesthetic, moral and religious value (ibid. 
1973, p12) 
He sees the philosophical approach to be based on an analysis of the structure 
of values, an investigation of the conditions and criteria that evolved them 
(Devaraja 1973 : 12). He also notes some of the shortfalls in the traditional 
approach to philosophy, firstly, a lack of interest in social and political 
philosophy, secondly, an absence of a clear understanding of the nature and 
scope of philosophy, therefore leaving a gap in the understanding and 
assessment of the past systems of thought and thirdly, the over concentration on 
the analysis of thought and language and lesser concerns with the normative 
problems relating to moral and religious life (ibid. 1973 : 14-22). 
Notwithstanding this, he sees the history of philosophy as being of paramount 
importance in that it relies on the relevant information of the past to construct 
and retard plans for the future (Devaraja 1973 : 20-22). K Damodaran, on the 
other hand, advocates the view that the task of philosophy is to give new 
meaning and content to man ' s life by answering the deeper questions about the 
world and his relations to it and solve the problems of a changing society 
(Damodaran 1967: 501) The inclusion of metaphysical aspects to this study, 
therefore, assumes relevance for the global ethical discourse because of its 
intent to root itself in practical life, values and the unity of the world reality_ 
32 
2.2 The Conceptual Paradigms of Metaphysics 
NK Devaraja notes that there are two central conceptual paradigms in 
metaphysics viz. the nature of reality and the metaphysics of the immanent type 
that seeks to present a general account of all forms of being (Devaraja 1973 : 
36-37) , He points out very strongly that metaphysics when compared to science 
has made absolutely no progress (ibid, 1973 : 38). He also highlights the point 
that metaphysical statements are rendered to be meaningless nonsense against 
the standpoint of the principle of verification of the logical positivists (ibid. 
1973 : 38). He also points out that metaphysical conceptions articulated by 
Aristotle, Spinoza and Leibnitz and even in Jainism, Nyaya, Samkhya and 
Vaiseshika have very little use in practice and are less favorable and fruitful 
than scientific conceptualizations (Devaraja 1973 : 40), This view only 
examines metaphysics as a directly related issue to science but fails to consider 
a mutual relationship between them. Scientific conceptualizations have a 
precise place in the factual discourse while metaphysical conceptualizations 
have a functional role in the ethical discourse. Both systems have relevance for 
the global ethical discourse and therefore cannot be compared by using a 
common set of criteria. However, he notes that the basis of metaphysical 
conceptualization lies in redefining and organizing categories and conceptions 
in the mental environment (Devaraja. 1973 : 40), But he does not state for what 
purpose. It is suggested that such redefining take place for the purpose of 
contributing to the global ethical discourse, Furthermore, he notes that while 
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the earlier analytical philosophers, including the logical atomists and 
neopositivists, conce~trated metaphysics on the determination of factual 
meanings of statements, the new conception of philosophy dissociated it 
completely from the factual discourse but concerned itself with tIle uses to 
which various kinds .of discourse were put by the ordinary man (ibid. 1973, 
p41). However, for the purpose of this thesis, metaphysics needs to be 
concentrated on contributing to the global ethical discourse for the purpose of 
integrating individualized ethical thought systems into a global ethical system. 
It must be noted that the contestation of conceptual paradigms is irrelevant for 
the global ethical discourse. Each and every perspective of life has a 
contributory role to play in the construction of the conceptual framework of the 
global ethical discourse. Therefore, the global ethical discourse is inclusive of 
science and metaphysics as they mutually relate with each other. 
One of the key conceptual frameworks postulated by traditional thought, which 
is thought that is embodied in the traditional Hindu scriptures, is the close and 
inseparable connection of man 's inner nature, society and the external world 
(Damodaran 1967: 492). This model is very significant for the global ethical 
discourse because it is proposed that the global ethic be formulated from a 
vision that is deeply integrated. The global ethic must be based on what is 
good not just for man alone but for man in an integrated relationship with 
nature and divine space. Damodaran also observed that God was transformed 
from the transcendent reality to an immanent reality, who was within the grasp 
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of the universe and a God full of beautiful attributes viz. goodness, beauty, truth 
and love (Damodaran 1967: 489). This method of the transformation of God 
from a position of transcendence to immanence is important to the global 
ethical discourse. From a metaphysical point of view, it is suggested that the 
ultimate guiding principle, while expressing itself as an abstract ethical reality 
must be able to transform itself into a practical vision that is common to the 
global community. Furthermore, one of the central criticisms that are leveled 
against Hindu thought is that it negates the reality of the world. In response to 
this issue, K. Damodaran notes that such a negation theory is a distortion of 
Indian thought and he affirmed that Indian thought was optimistic and life 
affirming (ibid. 1967: 486). It is this life - affirming background to Hindu 
metaphysics that must contribute to the global ethical discourse rather than a 
vision of world-negation. 
2.3 Modernism and Metaphysics 
K. Damodaran observes that modern ideas have a tremendous impact on 
traditional societies and social and political changes have become irresistible 
and human capabilities have expanded (ibid. 1967: 488). Globalization is one 
such process of social and political change, which ar. ~ not only extending the 
human capability but also creating expectations for a global metaphysical and 
ethical thought system. He also notes that any philosophy which is not in 
harmony with the aspirations of the people for industrialization, economic 
independence, freedom from exploitation, etc. is worthless in the present 
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context (Damodaran 1967: 489). It may be added that any philosophy, which is 
unable to contribute to the development of the global ethical discourse, is also 
worthless. On the issue of the relevance of philosophy, PT Raju is quoted as 
suggesting that philosophy should be made socially useful and traditional 
spiritual philosophies have to be modified and must cover the values of this 
world and should give it spiritual direction (in K. Damodaran 1967: 490). 
Furthermore, philosophy should be made globally useful and if there is any 
modification that is needed for philosophy, it must be focussed on generating 
global values as against particularistic values. This study is attempting to 
establish itself along the lines of this modernistic trend by suggesting that the 
traditional Vedantic systems needs to be interpreted in the context of the global 
dialogue for the purposes of contributing to the global ethical discourse. 
2.4 Challenges of Met3physics 
NK Devaraja notes that an inherent difficulty that faces metaphysics is a 
formulation of a satisfactory conception of the ultimate reality (Devaraja 1973 : 
39). It is suggested that the general aim of metaphysics should be to formulate a 
conception of the ultimate reality that is common to the world community and 
that can have ethical relevance. This redefines metaphysical purpose and adds 
greater value to its creativity. Much of the contestation in, metaphysical activity 
is hermenuetical, which can be overcome with a neo-hermenuetical vision that 
suggests a universal methodology. Also, one of the challenges facing 
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metaphysics is its synthesis with science. It must be noted that science, being 
based on empirically verifiable data and a secular-materialistic approach, 
cannot be translated into a-priori assumptions based on trans-material 
phenomena on which the entire conceptual and methodological framework of 
metaphysics rests (Damodaran 1967: 491). However, the relationship between 
science and metaphysics needs to be brought into a conceptual unity in order 
for it to make a contribution to the global ethical discourse. It is not the 
objective of this study to synthesize science with metaphysics but to search for 
a mutual relationship between them. The global ethical discourse is the 
principal basis on which such a mutual relationship can develop. This mutual 
relationship is necessary because science can ob~e-:-.tify a global ethical 
foundation through metaphysical reflection. 
2.5 Global Ethics 
2.5.1 The Nature of the Human Person 
One of the primary questions that have dominated the philosophical world is: 
what is the essence of man? It must be admitted that there are several views on 
this subject. While the Greek rationalists and Kant defined man as a rational 
being, Freud declared that man is fundamentally irrational and he is only 
superficially rational. (Pandey 1991 : 3). It is beyond doubt that the element of 
rationality exists in man; therefore the theory of ethical rationalism needs to 
evolve within the context of the global ethical discourse. The framework for 
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such a theory must be based on common and universal reason whose character 
must be negotiated. It is also noted that man is also defined as a social being 
although this tells us very little about his nature (Pandey 1991 : 3). As a social 
being man must not just be seen in the context of his own community but as 
part of the global society. It is as a global or universal social being that he can 
appreciate the need for a globai ethic. 
The existentialists held the view that man is existence and is not with an 
essence because existence is prior to essence (ibid. 1991, p4). The global 
ethical discourse cannot adopt the position of the existentialists that suggest the 
absence of "essences", as a paradigm of thought, to be integrated into ethical 
thinking. In fact, it is by the notion of "essences" that the mutual identity of 
man, the world and the divine can be incorporated into an ethical dialogue. This 
means that the conceptual-methodological framework of the global ethical 
discourse must incorporate the notion of "essences" as a part of the 
hypothetical paradigm to develop a global ethic. Furthermore, such a paradigm 
cannot rely on the methodology of the reductionists, which prescribe pure 
intellectualism, as a · means of understanding these essences but must also 
incorporate pure subjective experience as well . However, scholars such as 
Marx, Freud, Erich Fromm have attempted to construct a notion of the essence 
of human nature but their results were varied. Notwithstanding the varied 
results from this scholarship, the integration of these findings in the global 
ethical discourse is important 
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2.5.2 Science and Man 
One of the leading modern scientists Descartes, known as the father of modern 
western philosophy, proposed that space IS the fundamental reality and 
mathematics is the language that reveals it (Pandey 1991: 12) and this 
revolutionized the whole outlook of man and spirituality. What Descartes failed 
to conceptualize, due to the limitation of his methodology, is the notion of 
divine space and global ethical language. For the purpose of the global ethical 
discourse divine space and ethical language need to form a noosphere around 
empirical space and mathematical language and not one system disproving the 
other. Pandey observes that contemporary science has made an immense 
contribution to making man a superman but at the same time it has also brought 
out the inhuman in man that may lead to the ultimate destruction of humanity 
(ibid. 1991 : 19). Therefore, science cannot be isolated from the global ethical 
paradigm. The main tool of science is reason. Although scientific reason is 
limited, and it cannot grasp the infinite and arrive at final truth, the rational 
principle of science must be incorporated into the global ethical discourse 
because it can guide global ethical reflection, evaluation and judgement 
(Pandey 1991: 22). 
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2.5.3 Humanistic Trend 
Raju observes that there have been several forms of humanism developing 
ranging from the scientific, evolutionary, pragmatic and catholic, and common 
to all these forms was man and his values (ibid. 1991: 15). During the 
commencement of the modern era, after World War 2, there was a shift in 
philosophy and that is to acknowledge man and his values as primary, and the 
type of humanism that was evolving ensured that :nan cannnt be ignored 
(Pandey 1991 : 16). Raju suggests that philosophy is about the whole of human 
life and therefore science and the analytic spirit should not destroy human 
values (ibid. 1991 : 16). He notes: 
Now, there is the dire necessity of reconstructing ourselves. We 
have to understand ourselves, understand man behind all his 
activities, scientific, ethical, spiritual (ibid. 1991 : 17). 
The quest to know the nature of man is fundamental to many nations. Socrates 
declared "know thy self', the Upanishads have statt-c;. "know thy Self' and 
even Confucius in China made a similar appeal (ibid . 199) : 17). Raju also 
notes that : 
The whole world is coming together more intimately and 
consciously than ever before, the problems of each have become 
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the problems of all . It would be interesting and useful, therefore, to 
know how man, his nature, his ideals and values were under:;tood 
by each tradition ( 1991 : 17) 
Max Otto, a psychologist suggested that the essential nature of man can be 
discovered by studying monkeys and reductionism, on the other hand, proposed 
that man can be reduced into material components and can be understood from 
a purely materialistic point of view (ibid. 1991: 23). However, there is also the 
suggestion that ethics distinguishes man from animals and scientific progress 
while developing the intellect in man has ignored the ethical nature in man 
(ibid. p 1995, p23). Man is a complex being with an inward and outward nature 
and collectively can be classified as a material being, psychological being, 
social being, ethical being, religious being and a rational being (Pandey 1991 : 
24). Radhakrishnan is of the view that whether man is eastern or western and 
inspite of all the cultural differences, man ' s basic urges, instincts, desires and 
ideals are the same (ibid. 1991: 28-29). Northrop made an important suggestion 
that man is essentially the same everywhere and that man can assimilate the 
values of every part of the globe and benefit from them (Pandey 1991 : 35). 
Therefore the construction of a global ethic based on the essential features of 
. man ' s being is proposed in this thesis. The metaphysical method is best 
designed to probe and establish the essential nature of the universal 
personhood. Consequently, for the purposes of this study, the metaphysics of 
Vedanta, which is a major philosophic system of thinking of the Indians, will 
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be explored to establish the essential condition of personhood, which will be 
used as a contribution in the global ethical discourse. However, the global 
ethical discourse cannot be resting on a purely humanistic trend. It is suggested 
in this thesis that it needs to incorporate the ethical basis of the nature world 
(plant, animals, and planet) and divine space. 
2.5.4 Global Philosophies 
In this section, a general background to the conception of man within Greek, 
Indian, Jewish and Chinese thought will be presented. It is anticipated that this 
background will form the global framework against which the integration of 
metaphysical and ethical ideas will take place. The various philosophies of the 
world viz. Greeks, Chinese, Indian and Jewish suggest that the ethical activity 
of man is watched by God and each of them approach the understanding of the 
nature of man differently (Pandey 1991 : 310). However, for the purposes of the 
global ethical discourse, ethical systems that are outside the control of God and 
the different understandings of man, must be reconc,\c-;j into a u~iversalistic 
ethical system. This reconciliation allows for the development of a conceptual-
methodological framework from which a global ethic can be derived . 
2.5.4.1 Greek Thought 
The ideal man in Greek thought is the "lover of wisdom" and scholars like 
Aristotle, Plato and Socrates attach great importance to rational knowledge and 
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its cultivation (Pandey 1991 : 310). It is also noted that Plato not only 
emphasized knowledge but he also wanted the lower parts of the soul to be 
guided by reason (ibid. 1991: 310). The Greeks extended the notion of man' s 
relationship and, unlike the Chinese, they saw man not only in relationship with 
society but also with the cosmos (ibid. 1991 : 131). In Greek philosophy, man is 
one with nature neither is man above nature or nature above man, there is no , 
dichotomy between man and nature (pandey 1991: 314). The fundamental 
assumption is that nature is not opposed to man and through nature man is not 
only one with nature but is one with other men and must live according to 
nature (ibid. 1991 : 314-315). In Greek thought the central idea was that the 
individual cannot be studied apart from society because there is this conception 
that the personality of man is formed by society and grows in society (ibid. 
1991 : 319). Socrates and Plato showed that soci: ty is a reflection and 
projection of human nature (ibid. 1991 : 320). Greek philosophy also proposed 
that reason is not confined to society and therefore it transcends society (ibid. 
1991 : 320). Aristotle believed that God is the first cause of the universe and is 
of Pure form without matter (ibid. 1991 : 325). It is held that the conception of 
reason is with ethical significance because the rational is good (Pandey 1991: 
325). The Greeks proposed that a virtuous man is one who controls his lower 
nature by his higher nature, which is reason (Pandey 1991: 361). In the case of 
the Greeks, the general basis of good is not God 's commandments but human 
nature, which may even include factors that, transcends society (ibid. 1991 : 
323). 
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2.5.4.2 Indian Thought 
Among Indians it is saintliness that is emphasized, which the Greeks did not 
(Pandey 1991: 311). In the Indian way of life the recognition of the wise was 
on the basis that he is able to discriminate between the eternal and the transient 
and that his ultimate urge is for the eternal (Pandey 1991 : 311). The Indians 
differed from the Greeks in that they proposed that the essence of man is Alman 
and not reason (ibid. 1991 : 313). And one may say that if the Atman is the 
highest good then man is essentially Good (ibid. 1991: 313). Furthermore, in 
Indian thought, the social nature of man was not given due attention and there 
was a strong sense of individualism and the notion of so<.:iety extended to 
include humans, spirits, gods, and a Supreme Deity (ibid. 1991: 322). Indian 
philosophy exhorts man to rise above social virtues and to transcend society 
through the path of renunciation (ibid. 1991 : 324). The Indians separated these 
two relationships and held the view that the relationship between man and man 
eventually leads to God (ibid. 1991: 325). In Indian thought, ethical 
relationship is transcended and -transmuted into blissful communion (ibid. 1991: 
327). In Indian philosophy there is an insistence that ethics be transcended 
because of Love (ibid. 1991 : 328). The Indians accepted ethical relativity and 
ethics became the primary requirement in qualifying the search for God 
(Pandey 1991 : 329). One very important question that is raised is whether we 
can derive moral and ethical laws from a Transcendent God (ibid. 1991 : 329). 
It must be noted that it is very difficult to gain complete grasp over God ' s 
nature, therefore, it is very difficult to deduce ethical laws from his nature (ibid. 
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1991: 329). The fundamental question that dominated the minds of ethicists is: 
how is ethics derived? It must be noted that mysticism produces a disregard for 
ethical values and if religion preaches nothing but communion with the Divine, 
then it can also become a danger to ethics and to a disciplined social life (ibid. 
1991: 330). It is suggested that any religion, which is detrimental to ethical 
discipline, needs re-modeling (ibid. 1991 : 330) and perhaps re-interpretation. 
Indian philosophy holds that man can be virtuous through self-surrender and 
through non-egoity ie . becoming one with the Supreme (ibid. 1991: 361-362). 
However, non-egoity, by itself is not enough for the positive guidance of man 
(ibid. 1991: 363). PT Raju notes that: 
A truly non-egoistic man cannot be immoral; but in positive 
morality he lacks guidance. Where non-egoity is over-emphasized, 
public morality becomes weak, and even privat~ morality becomes 
infirm, irresolute and inconstant and even evasive" (Pandey 1991 : 
365). 
This non-egoity cannot be extinction or pure negation of oneself, but 
transformation of man into the universality of the spirit (ibid . 1991: 367). Non-
egoity is considered to be the completion of ethics and therefore ethical training 
is considered in Vedanta to be the prerequisite to spiritual practice (ibid. 1991 : 
368). 
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2.5.4.3 Jewish Thought 
In Jewish thought the ideal man is the ideal image of God and a person 
becomes an ideal image if he embodies the ideal of righteousness (Pandey 
1991: 311). This notion of the divine image of man is also present in Greek and 
Indian thought in one way or the other. Plato spoke of the rational part of the 
soul as being in the likeness of God and the Indians spoke of man ' s 
consciousness as the reflection or image of the Atman or the Supreme spirit 
(ibid. 1991 : 311). Judaism also insisted on man' s usefulness to society and 
emphasized the ethic of love for one' s neighbour (ibid. 1991: 312). In Jewish 
thought, man is not only the image of God but also the prl)duct of physical 
nature, however, nature is subservient to man because God creates the world 
for man to show his righteousness (ibid. 1991 : 315). It must be noted that 
righteousness is the key to Jewish ethics and it gets its meaning from God 's 
concern for man (ibid. 1991: 321). So Jewish ethics is based on God' s concern 
for man. In Jewish society morality is good because it was dictated to from God 
(ibid. 1991: 323). In Jewish thought there is no separation between man ' s 
relationship with man and his relationship with God and man ' s relationship 
with God is considered to be an intensely ethical relationship (ibid. 1991: 325). 
The Jews believed that the ideal of life was the sanctity of ).ife itself (Pandey 
1991 : 361). The Jews also believes that a virtuous man is one who accounts to 
God for his actions (Pandey 1991: 361). 
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2.5.4.4 Chinese Thought 
In Chinese thought the ideal man is a sage whose primary concern is for the 
welfare of society (Pandey 1991 : 311-312). The Chinese philosophy does not 
aim at God realization or at righteousness with reference to God but is deeply 
humanistic, its importance is only focussed in reference to man (Ibid . 1991 : 
312) . The virtue of love, human hearted ness is considered higher than 
righteousness, in fact righteousness is believed to be derived from human 
heartedness and man' s conduct (ibid . 1991: 313). The Chinese is of the view 
that human nature is fundamentally good (ibid. 1991: 313). They understood 
nature to be human nature and not the physical nature and they essentially 
considered the original nature of man as good (ibid. 1991 : 315). For them, 
virtue, although having its root in man itself, cannot be realized except in the 
context of society (ibid . 1991 : 321). It must be noted that Chinese philosophy is 
similar to the Greeks because they base their philosophy of virtue on the study 
of human nature (ibid. 1991 : 323). Virtue belongs to the original human nature 
and therefore ethics is viewed as autonomous in Chinese thought (ibid. 1991 : 
324). In China, certain philosophies did not depend on God for deriving its 
ethical relationships; it did not care for communion with Him (ibid. 1991 : 327). 
On the contrary, it projected an ultimate Good, which was beyond the relativity 
of good and evil (ibid. 1991: 327). The Chinese on the other hand wanted 
social stability, good government and virtuous men (ibid. 1991: 361). The 
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Chinese believed that a virtuous man is one who is true to his feelings and one 
who is situated in love and affection (ibid. 1991 : 361). 
From the analysis of the various philosophies of life, it becomes apparent that 
man is essentially the same all over the world. However, he is conceptualized 
in a variety of ways. It is noted that the aspirations and expectations of what is 
good generally correlate to some extent. Despite the slight variation in the 
understanding and interpretation of man's relationships, a global perspective of 
man 's nature suggests the inclusion of nature and the Divine. The elements of 
rationality, humanism, theism and non-egoity that underpin the individual 
ethical systems must be integrated into the global ethical discourse in order to 
formulate the global ethic that is common to all. Furthermore, these various 
philosophies cannot be isolated from each other because they have formed the 
bedrock of the ethical discourse within their specific communities. Therefore, 
these philosophies need to be integrated into the global ethical discourse so that 
they can participate in the dialogue to chart out the foundational principles of 
the global ethic. 
2.6 Basis for an Ethical Theory 
Furthermore, Prasad, in dealing with Hindu ethics, Makes a clear distinction 
between moral action and moral thinking although at some point both will have 
to go together (Prasad 1989: 1). In the global ethical discourse it is vital to take 
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into consideration the link between moral action and moral thinking as a 
principle underpinning global ethical theory. It is noted that moral reflection or 
thinking is central to ethical theories in general and it involves mental 
operations such as intellectual maturity (ibid. 1989: 2). In the development of 
the global ethical discourse such reflection and intellectual maturity serve as 
essential tools for the construction of the conceptual ethical paradigm. Prasad 
also notes that to form an ethical theory it requires intellectual ability and 
maturity (ibid. 1989: 3). In order to construct an ethical theory the theorist must 
do ethical evaluation, which means that he must be able to discriminate 
between right and wrong, good and bad, permissible and not permissible and 
thereafter systematize his moral judgements (Prasad 1989: 3). This method of 
ethical evaluation can be a vital contribution to the global ethical discourse. In 
the context of a variety of ethical constructs, a global ethicist that is 
constructing the global ethical discourse must be able to make effective moral 
judgements which arises from global ethical evaluation and reflection. It is also 
noted that ethics or normative ethics is largely derived through moral 
speculation or theorizing (Prasad 1989: 3). It is neceS~1fy to propose that if the 
global ethic is to be underpinned by a normative ethical basis, then moral 
speculation needs to be within the framework of a global ethical discourse 
rather than an individualized ethical system. Formulation of an ethical theory is 
an endeavor, which aims at reconstruction of values and obligations (ibid. 
1989: 4). In the context of the global ethical discourse, such a construction is 
done through the negotiation and integration process rather than through 
49 
marginalization or assimilation. An ethical theorist does not pass valve 
judgements, he simply gives the principles on which value judgements may be 
passed (ibid. 1989, p4). This is precisely the metho 1 that the global ethical 
theory requires viz. universal ethical principles to be the foundation of the 
global ethical theory on which individual moral judgements are made. 
Metaethics is not ethics and it does not aim to present an ethical system. In the 
words of Prasad: "It is a second order enquiry mainly concerned with the 
analysis of logical behavior of moral concepts, judgements, and arguments 
etc." (ibid. 1989, p5). A metaethical inquiry depends on moral language and it 
proceeds to analyze the meaning of moral expressions, their logical behavior 
and to examine the nature of rer.soning behind moral judgements (Prasad 1989: 
5-6). The model on which such Metaethics is strucLuced clearly reveals its 
individualized normative basis, however, there is a need to develop a global 
metaethical theory in which a universal moral language and moral expression 
can be subjected to analyses. Such a global metaethical model needs to analyze 
the trends within the global ethical discourse as a point of departure. 
Furthermore, an important consideration is one' s ethical theory of reasoning 
and ethical theory of meaning in the development of an ethical system. It must 
be noted that Metaethics is involved with understanding and explaining what is 
involved in doing ethics or ethical evaluation and ethics aims at presenting an 
ethical moral system (Prasad 1989: 7). In order to formulate an ethical rule or 
concept, it requires sound knowledge of the person and his environment and 
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not just the background of his moral language (ibid. 1989: 9). It must be noted 
that such a method is limited in the context of the global ethical discourse. The 
global metaethical model needs to search for the common essence in human 
nature and link this with not only the natural environment but also with divine 
space in order to construct global ethical rules and concepts. So the ethical 
methodology requires radical revision in light of the emergence of the global 
ethical theory. 
aturalism in ethics is about the moral expression of any natural or empirical 
object and supernaturalism refers to things that are metaphysical or divine and 
therefore non-natural (ibid. 1989: 19). Prasad suggests that natural things are 
those which can be known by use of normal means of experience within the 
empirical world (ibid. 1989: 19). The fundamental thesis of naturalism is that 
all moral expressions can be transformed into certain factual expressions 
(Prasad 1989: 20). Supernaturalism also maintains that moral judgements are 
factual and they are facts about the nature of ultimate reality (ibid. 1989: 21). 
Both naturalism and supernaturalism can be subjective, relative and objective 
in interpretation. Prasad suggests that natural things are those which can be 
known by use of normal means of experience within tht empirical world 
(Prasad] 989: 19). Naturalism as an ethical trend must therefore have relevance 
for the global ethical discourse. The notion of natural objects assuming moral 
value is central to the conceptual development of the global ethical discourse. 
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Supernaturalism, on the other hand, also maintains that moral judgements are 
factual and they are facts about the nature of ultimate reality (Prasad 1989: 21). 
Moral judgements can be both scientific and empirical and at the same time 
capable of being true or false on the basis of intuition (ibid. 1989: 22). So a 
theory is non-natural or intuitional if the moral features are non-natural, 
however, it can also embody subjectivist and relativist elements as well (ibid. 
1989: 23). Prasad suggests that naturalism and supernaturalism are reductive 
theories because one reduces moral expressions to expressions about empirical 
or metaphysical realities (ibid. 1989: 25). Prasad holds the view that moral 
expressions are largely cognitive because they are informational-giving (ibid. 
1989: 27). The integration of supernaturalism and naturalism with empiricism 
and ethics is the basis of the conceptual paradigm partly proposed by this thesis 
for the development of the global ethical discourse. There is a need for the 
inclusion of intuition as a contribution to the framewo'k of the epistemological 
theory of the global ethical discourse. Furthermore, the reductive method in 
ethical theory is necessary to ensure that moral value is underpinned with 
empirical significance and global relevance. 
Prasad suggests that in the ethical discourse it is important to have a concept of 
rationality (Prasad 1989: 131). He proposes that the concept of rationality must 
recognize that something can be reason for something else and that one should 
know or understand the logical liabilities and responsibilities that goes with it 
(ibid. 1989: 131). He also s:.lggests that everything is not a reason for 
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everything else and that everything may not necessarily have reason, 
notwithstanding the fact that there are things for which reason exists (ibid. 
1989: 131). To have a good concept of rationality means that one must have the 
ability to distinguish between reasons and non-reasons, weak reasons and 
strong reasons, worse reasons and better reasons etc (ibid. 1989: 131). Prasad's 
proposal for the notion of rationality to be part of ethical theory is a vital 
contribution to the global ethical discourse. However, it must be added that 
rationality also has its limitations and must be brought within the global 
framework of ethical theory development. 
Prasad also notes that the concept of God has been considered necessary in 
order to justify the morality of particular action as well as to justify the entire 
system of morality (ibid. 1989: 149). While God may have its relevance in 
individual ethical systems, within the context of the global ethical discourse, 
there is a need to identify a universal guiding principle that can justify the 
global ethical system. 
2.7 Background to Hindu Ethics 
Swami Nikhilananda of the Ramakrishna - Vivekananda Center, New York 
notes that Ethics in Hinduism is largely informed from spiritual concepts and it 
forms the basis of the Hindu spiritual way of life (.htmthanks.htm.l.lvices.htm 
vices.htm). Notwithstanding the fact that right conduct is deeply interwoven 
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legalistically, its spiritual value cannot be disregarded (ibid. thanks.htm.! 
.!vices.htm). This would imply that the global ethical discourse must attempt to 
reconcile legalistic ideals with spiritual ethics. He also observes that Hindu 
ethics is essentially different from scientific ethics, which is empirically 
characterized, and it is also diffp,rent from utilitarian ethics whose purpose is to 
secure the maximum utility for a society by e, i ~ ninating friction and 
guaranteeing for its members a harmonious existence (ibid. thanks.htm.! 
.!vices.htm). Hindu ethics is linked with an ultimate reality which is considered 
to be the highest good and therefore it assumes a subjective personal character 
in order to fulfill that ultimate destiny through the removal of impurities (ibid . 
thanks.htm.l.lvices.htm). The notion of dharma, which is the cornerstone of 
Hindu ethics, is the foundation of objective ethics in that it is based on the 
paradigm of "means-end" and therefore dharma serves as a means to the 
ultimate end (ibid. thanks. htm'/' /vices. htm). It is difficult not to apply the idea 
of universal ethics to Hinduism because Hindu ethics apply to every human 
being (ibid. thanks. htm'/'/vices. htm). As much as Hindu ethics is deeply 
spiritual and can be separated from scientific and utilitarian ethics, in the global 
ethical discourse, it needs to be integrated with science and utilitarianism. 
Furthermore, the ultimate reality must have social and individual relevance if it 
is to function as an ethical end. Such an ultimate end. cannot, in the global 
ethical discourse, be a sectarian and individual ethical end but a universal end. 
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Furthermore, it is largely maintained among Hindu scholars that Hindu ethical 
doctrines are derived from scriptures and carry with tl. em scriptl:ral authority ( 
thanks.htm.l.lvices.htm). However, such scriptures must embody universal 
relevance if they are to serve as sources of knowledge for the global ethical 
discourse. No single scripture can have absolute claim over ethical matters in 
the global ethical discourse. It is also held that ethical action defined social 
duties and responsibilities and was designed to promote social welfare ( 
thanks. htm.l.lvices. htm). This is an important contribution that Hindu ethics 
can make to the global ethical discourse. The social duties and responsibilities 
of the world cannot be formulated by a single ethical system. It must emerge 
from the framework of the global ethical discourse so that it is suited to global 
needs. There existed the concept of "paying the debt ' to the gods, rishis and 
ancestors as a means to realise the highest good (thanks.htrr..I.lvices.htm). As 
much as this may be the case, Hindu ethics was characterized as being deeply 
individualistic rather than social because it emphasized individual ethical 
striving as a means for social ethical fulfillment (thanks. htm'/'/vices. htm). The 
individualistic nature of ethics is necessary for the global ethical paradigm in 
that it can be integrated into the human rights culture. The chief disciplines of 
subjective ethics are austerity, self-control, renunciation, non-attachment, and 
concentration (thanks.htm././vices.htm). These subjective ethical elements, 
although founded rooted and in Hindu thought, is essentially universal and 
therefore ideal for the global ethical discourse because it is common to the 
global community. 
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In Hindu thought it is clearly evident that the ultimate goal for attainment is the 
supreme abode of the all-pervading divinity and one's true identity is the very 
basis and core of one's individuality (Joshi 1991 : 3). The notion of one's 
supreme abode as the ultimate destination of ethical striving needs to be a 
universal one. It is important to global ethical theory that a transcendent global 
culmination point be constructed, which is common to the global community 
and is equally recognized by them. Joshi notes that the Indian theory of ethics 
is closely related to the theory of metaphysics because the end of an ethical 
journey is a metaphysical state and this is clearly articulated in the 
Kathopanishad (1.2.24): 
One who has not ceased from immoral conduct, who is not 
composed and is not self controlled, whose mind is not quiescent 
cannot attain Him through intelligence (ibid. 1991 : 3). 
The linking of ethical theory to metaphysics is a method that needs to construct 
itself within the global ethical discourse. However, it must be based with the 
vision of universalism. Joshi also notes that Knowledge of the self is the 
highest virtue and ignorance of the true nature of the self is the root of all evil 
in the Indian perspective (Joshi 1991: 4). Joshi further notes that when one is 
the knower of Brahman one is not tainted by evil actions, therefore one is 
above good and evil (ibid. 1991 : 5). Scholars like Mackenzie concluded that the 
Hindu conception of God being attributeless, if applied logically, prevents the 
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development of ethics in terms of social service and therefore Hindu ethics is 
anti-social and lacks a philosophical basis (Joshi, 1991 : 5), However, 
Mackenzie did not take into consideration the role of an attributeless God 
serving the basis for a universal guiding principle for the development of a 
global ethical theory, Joshi further notes that Hindu ethics is based on a 
threefold scheme of spiritual life (1) social or objective morality (ii) subjective 
or psychological morality and (iii) transcendental life (Joshi 1991, p6), It is not 
the objective of this thesis to lean on anyone side of these models of ethical 
thinking, On the contrary, these three models need to be integrated into the 
global ethical discourse. This means that for the purpose of developing the 
global ethical discourse, no single ethical model can be used as a basis for 
evolving the global ethic, All streams of thinking need to be brought within a 
workable framework from which a model for global ethics can be structured, 
2.8 Conclusion 
It is clear that modernistic trends can be identifiable in traditional metaphysical 
thinking. However, the contribution of philosophy to the development of 
ethical systems must be probed. This is a vital contribution that the Hindu 
metaphysical systems can make to the global ethical theory. It is also apparent 
that Hindu metaphysics is not completely transcendent but is closely associated 
with practical life. Therefore, Hindu metaphysics assumes ethical relevance, 
The relevance of metaphysics to ethics is an important contribu~ion to the 
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objectives of this study. Although the Advaita system of Hindu metaphysics 
reveals a deeply absolutistic trend, its practical relevance may be doubted. 
However, Advaita may serve as an important theoretical model to further the 
theory of abstractness, which may have metaphysical application for the global 
ethical discourse. Furthermore, the Visistadvaita system of metaphysics may 
seem to be dialectically opposed to the Advaita system, yet its theistic notion of 
an ultimate guiding principle with moral attributes may serve as a vital 
contribution to the global ethical discourse. It is reaffirmed that the objective of 
this thesis is not to lean on Shankara, Ramanuja or M-z,ihva for :m ethical and 
metaphysical contribution but to use all three standpoints within the global 
ethical discourse. 
It also became evident that Hindu metaphysics aimed at harmonizing all 
experiences. This is a vital method of the global ethical discourse because the 
evolution of a global ethic depends on the synthesized experience of the global 
community. A further contribution that traditional Hindu metaphysics can make 
to the global ethical discourse is its ability to reconcile rational and spiritual 
elements into a holistic system. This capacity, together with its structural parts 
for achieving this, will be able to contribute towards integrating fC'.tional and 
spiritual elements in the global ethical discourse. Global ethics cannot be 
individualized on the side of rationality or spirituality but must reflect the ethos 
of both. Hindu metaphysics is clearly revealing the close connection between 
man, nature and society and this contribution is the bedrock of the global trinity 
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for global ethical discourse. Notwithstanding the challenges of defining the 
nature of ultimate reality and the relationship between science and metaphysics, 
it is quite evident that a global ultimate reality cannot be defined by any 
particular perspective and that science and metaphysics can share a mutual 
relationship for the purpose of the global ethical discourse. Aj!hough the 
category of rationalism has been emphasized, the formulation of a global 
ethical rationalism is what is needed for the global ethical discourse. This is 
based on what is reasonably good for the global community. Hindu 
metaphysics and ethics can make a vital contribution developing what is 
reasonably good for the global community. It is also concluded that the 
individual notion of "personhood" needs to develop into a global social being 
in order for one to assimilate and practice global ethics. It also became evident 
that the categories of rationalism, non-egoity, ultimate reality and humanism 
are the central parts of the global ethical systems and these must be integrated 
into the global ethical discourse for a global ethic to evolve. Furthermore, 
Hindu ethics, with its notion of dharma, which can produce individual, social 
and transcendental ethics, can make a vital contribution to the global ethical 
discourse. 
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CHAPTER 3 HINDU METAPHYSICS: CONCEPTUAL 
BACKGROUND 
The main focus of this chapter is the critical examination and evaluation of the 
notions of Brahman, Alman and World. Within the limited scope of this study 
we shall try to trace the origins and development of these concepts in the 
Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads, Bhagavad Gila and also through the 
interpretations of Shankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, and other contemporary 
western and eastern scholars. One important observation that needs to be noted 
is that methodology and philosophy are not functionally autonomous. While 
scientists are not unanimous in their formulation and choice of method, 
philosophers are divergent in their methodology (DP Chattopadhyaya 1996: 
316). The method outlined here primarily aims to analyze the central Vedantic 
metaphysical ideas for the purpose of linking these notions to the Global ethical 
discourse. 
3.1 Hindu Metaphysics 
The main focus of the Hindu scriptures is the concepts of Brahman, Atman and 
the World, which constitutes the essence of the subjert of Hindv metaphysics. 
This study will focus on analyzing the notions of Brahman, Alman and World 
from the interpretation of the texts of the Vedanta Sulra, Upanishads and 
Bhagavad Gila, the classical Vedantic thinkers viz. Shankara, Ramanuja and 
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Madhva and contemporary western and eastern scholars, with the objective of 
constructing a deeper understanding of Hindu metaphysical notions. This study 
will firstly explore the theory of the knowledge of Brahman. In this regard, this 
theory presents two fundamental problems viz. the knowability and 
unknowability of Brahman. 
Paul Deussen, in his book, The Philosophy oj Upanishad, deals with the issue 
of Brahman in the Upanishads in the following way: he takes up the following 
issues related to the notion of Brahman viz. (I) the possibility of knowing 
Brahman (ii) the definition of Brahman (iii) symbolic representations of 
Brahman (iv) the essential nature of Brahman and (v) Brahman and the 
Universe (Deussen 1906: xii) . Deussen did not take up the ethical function of 
Brahman in the Upanishads. Although this may appear to be a gap in his 
analysis, it also raises a doubt as to whether tl; ~ Upanishadic thinkers 
considered Brahman as serving an ethical function . Notwithstanding this, it 
must be noted that the traditional metaphysical construction of the notion of 
Brahman can make a contribution to the global ethical discourse. It is the 
objective of this thesis to illustrate this contribution in the context of the global 
ethical dialogue. 
3.2 Meaning and Definition of Brahman 
It is imperative to firstly trace the meaning of the term Brahman in order to 
understand it contextually in Vedantic literature and to try and outline its 
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precise nature and character. In this regard, an attempt will be made to trace the 
origins of the notion of Brahman and to further try to construct a meaning of 
the concept from an etymological standpoint and also from the import of the 
Upanishads. 
The earliest evidence of the notion of Brahman in the Vedic literature can be 
traced to the Rig-Veda. However, William Beidler notes that the notion of 
Brahman was not fully developed in the Rig-Veda and it evolved in the latter 
parts or concluding portions of the Veda, viz. the Upanishads. (The Vision of 
Self in Early Vedanta 1975: 65). During the Vedir times, the concept of 
Prajapati was fairly popular as the notion of the Ultimate Reality but scholars 
have noted that, concepts of ultimate reality were constantly changing. Beidler 
also notes that the concept of Brahman was progressively constructed into an 
ultimate reality replacing the earlier idea of Prajapati (ibid. 1975 : 65). It is 
apparent that the conception of an ultimate reality is an evolutionary conception 
in Hindu thought and no single concept is used in a definite sense to represent 
it. It is this idea of an evolutionary notion of the ultimate reality that should 
form the basis of the ultimate guiding principle in the global ethical discourse. 
The ultimate guiding principle c.annot be grounded on a fixed conceptualization 
but must allow it to constantly grow and develop with \. : r\~e . 
In most scholarships, the common methodology used in unfolding the meaning 
of Sanskrit words is by examining their root meanings or etymological design. 
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Although there are problems with such a methodology, it nevertheless provides 
some insight into the source of meaning to the concept. In this regard, Beidler 
notes that the etymology of Brahman may not present a holistic understanding 
of the concept and therefore suggests the method of surveying the Upanishads 
as a more reliable technique in order to develop a more profound meaning 
(Beidler 1975: 65). Notwithstanding this, Radhakrislln c:n uses ~hf. method of 
constructing the meaning of Brahman from the etymological contributions of 
Shankara, and the Brahmanas (Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, 1923 : 52-53). 
Moreover, Srinivasa Chari observes that the etymological method of 
interpreting the notion of Brahman was largely used by classical interpreters 
such as Ramanuja and Shankara and not by Madhva (The Philosophy of the 
Vedanta Sutra: A Study based on the Evaluation of the Commentaries of 
Samkara, Ramanuja and Madhva, 1998: 2). Although the methods used by 
scholars in approaching this problem may vary, their results seem to contribute 
to a more complex and varied comprehension of the concept. 
From an etymological standpoint, the term Brahman is derived from the root 
word "brh", which means, "to grow, to burst forth" (Radhakrishnan 1994: 52). 
Radhakrishnan further notes that Shankara (the teacher of Advaita Vedanta) 
derives the notion of Brahman from the root "brhati", which means to "exceed, 
eternity and purity" (ibid. 1994: 52). It becomes apparent that no exact English 
equivalents can be found for the notion of Brahman and secondly, it embodies 
a diverse level of meaning. Added to the problem of finding an exact English 
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equivalent for a Sanskrit term, is the problem of interpreting Sanskrit terms. 
Beidler notes that Sanskrit terms are liberally used Hl a symbolil.: way and 
therefore complicates the method of arriving at precise m~anings (Beidler, 
1975: 65). Furthermore, on the issue of the meaning of Brahman, 
Radhakrishnan observes that it demonstrates great fluidity and therefore the 
notion of Brahman is very flexible in its meaning (Radhakrishnan 1994: 52-
53). The problem with such an observation is that Radhakrishnan does not 
point out very clearly how the fluidity of meaning is derived . It is essential to 
understand the "fluidity" method because it will contribute immensely to 
expanding the meaning of the concept of Brahman to meet the needs of a 
changing society in the future . 
Beidler, on the other hand, establishes that the meaning of Brahman is related 
to the notion of "prayer" and he follows Max Muller and Deussen in attaching 
this meaning and he believes that this meaning is located to a pre-Aryan period 
(Beidler 1975 : 65). Although this meaning is radically different from the one 
established through the etymological method, it attempts to add to the 
historical development of meaning to the concept of Brahman. In following the 
method of surveying the Upanishads to establish the meaning of Brahman, 
Radhakrishnan conceptualizes Brahman as the Supreme Reality of the 
Upanishads (Radhakrishnan 1994: 52). The notion of Brahman was seen as the 
infinite, the eternally pure, sacred knowledge, as the guiding principle of the 
universe and the forming of kinship between the aspiring spirit of man and the 
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spirit of the universe (ibid. 1994: 52-53). At this point it is suggested that the 
global ethical discourse cannot do away with the notion of a transcendent 
reality. If there is to be a global transcendent reality which can serve as the 
backdrop to the sphere of the sacred then such a transcendent reality must 
assume the function of a global guiding principle. It will be the objective of this 
thesis to construct a notion of the ultimate guiding principle for global ethics 
based on the contribution made by the notion of Brahman. 
Furthermore, Radhakrishnan also observes that the reality of Brahman is based 
on spiritual experience and due to the close affinity between God, nature and 
inner life, the reality of God was established by analysis of the facts of nature 
and inner life (Radhakrishnan 1994: 53-54). Firstly, it appears that 
Radhakrishnan uses two concepts interchangeably viz. Brahman and God. In 
the Western theological discourse, the concept of God has its own level of 
meaning and whether we can equate the concept of Brahman to God may 
present challenges. Although Radhakrishnan does not clarify in what sense he 
is using the word God, it becomes apparent that the ~oncept of Brahman and 
God are treated as transcendental categories. Secondly, it is also evident that 
the notion of Brahman is rescued from its philosophic abstractness and is given 
a Cosmic personality as the "guiding principle" with ethical catergories. The 
idea of a "guiding principle" may suggest that the notion of Brahman may 
embody some kind of an ethical function. Finally, Brahman is projected as a 
Reality that is connected to "nature" and to the "inner life" of being. This is a 
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very significant interpretation because the notion of Brahman demonstrates, in 
some way, the kind of subtle unity that underpins existence itself. The idea of 
the relationship between Brahman, nature and the inner life of man is central to 
the global ethical discourse. This study will pursue to examine the precise 
nature of this relationship. 
It is quite evident that Indological scholars attempt to search for meaning of 
Brahman in two distinct ways, firstly, from the study of the earliest literary 
sources and secondly, through the method of etymological interpretation. The 
etymological method may have limitations but it serves as an essential tool to 
explore, within its framework, for extended meaning. Although there may be 
varying results on the etymological approach from that of surveying the Hindu 
literature for the purpose of interpreting the notion of PfI1hman, it is reasonable 
to follow both methods in order to get a more complete understanding of the 
notion of Brahman. It is also clear that Sanskrit words are very difficult to 
interpret directly into English because they embody very complex philosophic 
meaning. This is evident in the varied translations that the scholars attribute to 
the concept "Brahman". However, it is indisputable that the notion of Brahman 
is connected to meanings that are both transcendent and immanent and it relates 
to both abstract and practical earthly realities. This is very. significant because 
the notion of Brahman can contribute to the development of the idea of a 
transcendent global guiding principle, which must be seen to be both 
transcendent, towards which human beings can aspiJ ~ and at tr.e l1ame time 
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immanent, in which moral and ethical value can be added to the objects that it 
encapsulates. Another interesting feature that can be consummated on the idea 
of Brahman is that it has both a personal and an impersonal constituent. This is 
very notable because it integrates easily with the world' s religions, which 
mainly advocate the Personal aspect ofthe Divine as a source of moral value. 
The notion of Brahman appears to be flexible in meaning largely because it is 
very perplexing to fix it to any specific definition. It can be safely concluded 
that apart from a Cosmic function, a moral functi0n can be attributed to 
Brahman based on the general uderstanding that many functions are 
attributable to it. Although a partial meaning is attributed to the Brahman, it 
must be stated that the term Brahman seems to be beyond all definitions. It 
follows that the notion of Brahman, which cannot be fixed to a specific 
meaning, however, assumes a moral value. Therefore, the global guiding 
principle cannot be fixed to any specific meaning attributed by an individual 
community or specific time. It must embody global meaning and be suited for 
all times. 
3.3 Knowledge of Brahman 
In the last section a detailed analysis of the term Brahman was pursued and it is 
apparent that the notion of Brahman is very complex and embodies profound 
levels of meaning. In this section the key question that needs to be taken up in 
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constructing a conceptual framework of Brahman is, whether knowledge of 
Brahman is possible? This is a vital question in that it sheds light on the 
method of modeling knowledge on categories that are transcendent and beyond 
objective reality. This analysis will explore the sources of knowledge of 
Brahman, the categories of knowing Brahman within the traditional 
metaphysical discourse and the connection of ethics in knowi'1g Brahman. This 
analysis will attempt to evaluate whether the structural parts and methods of the 
knowledge of Brahman can contribute to forming a framework for the ultimate 
global guiding principle. 
It has been traditionally accepted that the Vedas are the primary source of 
knowledge of the Ultimate reality. Therefore, the Vedas were attributed an 
anomalous status and given supreme authority by the orthodox schools of 
Hindu thought. In this regard, Deussen notes that both Badarayana and 
Shankara attribute supernatural origins to the Veda thp.refore declaring it to be 
the "breath of God" and consequently making it " infallible" (Deussen 1906: 
55). Although this may represent a kind of extreme viewpoint to the objective 
researcher, it must be noted that such an attitude towards scriptures aim 
towards marking out an empirical line of authority on matters that are deeply 
subjective. However, it is suggested that the scriptures cannot be regarded as 
the ultimate source of knowledge, individual experience is also taken into 
consideration. Deussen further notes that the entire doctrine on Brahman is 
constructed on the Vedantic texts and only where the text is doubtful does one 
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resort to the aid of experience (ibid. 1906: 55). It can be concluded that 
knowledge of Brahman is accessible both through the Vedantic scriptures and 
through spiritual experience, therefore Brahman is not confined to the 
statements of the texts alone but is also verifiable by spiritual experience. 
Although this method may present problems in arriving at a precise 
understanding of Brahman, it nonetheless allows flexibility in the cognition of 
transcendent notions, which are so essential for the purpose of this study. 
While establishing that the Vedas are the primary source of knowledge of 
Brahman, the scriptures themselves reveal their limitations in expressing 
Brahman. The Mundaka Upanishad notes that t~ 'ere are two kinds of 
knowledge viz. higher and lower, with the lower knowledge being the 
knowledge of the scriptures and the higher knowledge being knowledge that 
apprehends Brahman (Radhakrishnan 1994: 627). Moreover, the lower 
knowledge also refers to the empirical sciences and the higher knowledge 
refers to the spiritual sciences. Both systems of knowledge are integrated in the 
Vedas. Furthermore, Deussen inquires into the Chandogya Upanishad (7 .1-2; 
6.1) where reference is made that the students having mastered all the 
scriptures were unable to answer the fundamental questions of the Ultimate 
reality (Deussen 1906: 57). This clearly attest to the fact that knowledge of 
Brahman is beyond any empirical or objective means. [his create:; ~hallenges 
for this study from the point of attempting to formulate a method as to how a 
conceptual framework for the ethical discourse can be derived. Therefore it is 
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suggested that the knowledge of Brahman must be positive if it is to contribute 
to the global ethical discourse. 
Beidler, on the other hand, also takes up the issue of the problem of knowing 
Brahman in Hindu metaphysics. He identifies three vital categories in respect 
of "knowing" viz. "vidya", ''jnana'', and "vijnana" and explicitly distinguishes 
between each of them (Beidler 1975 : 90). He VI~V"' S "vidyd' 'lS "sense 
knowledge" ; ''jnana'' as "wisdom" derived from the smriti and sruti; and 
"vijnana" as "direct insight into the nature of that known" (Beidler 1975 : 90). 
He further elaborates on the notion of "direct insight" (vijnana) and sees it as 
comprising of two elements viz. "effort" and "grace" He uses the notion of 
"direct insight" (vijnana) to explain the empirical unknowability of the 
Brahman in the Upanishad. (Beidler 1975: 90-91). His conclusion is that 
Brahman can only be realized through "direct insight" (vijnana) (ibid. 1975: 
91). It is definite that knowledge of Brahman is beyond "sense knowledge" 
(vidya) and knowledge of the scriptures. The method of knowing Brahman is 
trans-empirical in character and therefore is beyond any objectivist means and 
it consequently suggests an indirect assumption of Brahman, :;ince it cannot be 
known directly . In the words of Sri Aurobindo : 
It is the Highest and this highest is the all ; there is none beyond and 
there is none other than it. To know it is to know the highest and by 
knowing the highest to know all (The Upanishads, 1971 : 245-246). 
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The theory of "direct insight" (vijnana) suggests an alternative method of 
knowing or establishing knowledge of transcendent realities. In this regard, 
Deussen identifies the idea of "preparatory means" as an integral part to the 
theory of "direct insight" (vijnana which he derives from the Upanishads and 
which reads as: 
There are three branches of duty, sacrifice, study and almsgiving-
Austerity, indeed, is the first. The second is the pursuit of sacred 
wisdom, dwelling in the house of the teacher. Absolutely 
controlling his body in the house of the teacher, is the third . All 
these attain to the worlds of the virtuous. He who stands firm in 
Brahman attains life eternal (Chandogya Upanishad 23 1) 
In the opInion of Deussen, this text proposes the study of the Veda, the 
performance of sacrifice, almsgiving, penance, fasting, asceticism and living 
with one' s teacher as means of knowing Brahman (Deussen 1906: 60-61). This 
is considered to be true knowledge. To Aurobindo, the knower of such 
knowledge is one who sees the lower things in the light of the Highest, the 
finite from the view of the infinite (Aurobindo 1971 : 248). Moreover, this text 
also reveals that there is some association between ethical behavior and the 
notion of Brahman. It is apparent that ethical behavior is the means to knowing 
Brahman, which is described in empirical language, as the world of the 
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virtuous. It must be noted that the knowledge of Brahman is not regarded as the 
means to knowing Brahman but is regarded as an ultimate object in itself and it 
can be assumed that ethical behavior serves as the means to knowing Brahman. 
The knowledge of Brahman cannot fall into the category of the empirically 
objective sciences of knowing. Because the notion of Brahman is beyond all 
forms of objective examination, it can be concluded that the idea of Brahman is 
trans-empirical and therefore beyond any form of objective interpretation. The 
notion of "knowledge of Brahman" is not a category of means but a category of 
an end in itself. Therefore normative ethics, in the context of the Upanishadic 
speculations, are the means to the end of knowing Brahman. Notwithstanding 
this, the notion of Brahman, as an ultimate category, can be subjected to a 
philosophic inquiry and analysis for the purpose of understanding the nature of 
the ethic that is connected to it. 
Furthermore, the notions of supreme authority and supernatural ongms of 
specific scriptures are a challenge to the global ethical discourse. The global 
guiding principle cannot constitute itself from specific scriptural authorities or 
on supernatural origins. It must arise from the common experience of the global 
community. The global guiding principle cannot be objectified into a defining 
framework of a specific community but must allow itself to be objectified in a 
universal sense. Therefore, to structure it on a trans-empirical foundation, 
allows it to be interpreted for specific global purposes. The global guiding 
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principle must be seen as an ethical end for the global community and must be 
visited as the transcendent end of empirical global ethics. 
3.4 The Essential Nature of Brahman 
In the last section a detailed analysis of the notion of knowledge of Brahman 
was taken up. It became evident that the knowledge of Brahman is not based on 
methods of the empirical world nor can any form of knowledge adequately 
capture its essential nature. However, it does make an essential contribution to 
constructing the discourse on the global guiding principle. Notwithstanding 
this, this study will pursue to examine the ontological nature of Brahman and 
the nature of Brahman in relationship with the world and Atman. This analysis 
is necessary because this study aims to establish the extent to which the nature 
of Brahman can contribute to the Global ethical discourse and in developing a 
Global Guiding Principle. Furthermore, this study will also venture to analyze 
the meaning and purpose of the world order in relationship to the Brahman in 
order to establish the foundation for a global moral and ethical discourse. 
Finally, this analysis will venture to explore the relationship between the Atman 
(the individual) in relationship with the Brahman in order to establish the extent 
to which the notion of individual can serve as a basis of being part of a global 
morality. 
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3.4.1 The Reality of Brahman . 
In taking up the issue of the essential nature of Brahman it will be meaningful 
to reflect, firstly, on the reality of Brahman in the context of the notions of 
"sat" and "asaf' . Is the nature of Brahman a reality or non-reality and what is 
the significance of this to the global ethical discourse? This analysis will 
examine the scriptural contradictions on the nature of Brahman and through the 
interpretation of classical and modern scholars be able to define in a clearer 
way the nature of the reality of Brahman. Furthermore, the intent of this 
analysis is to establish the nature of the reality of Brahman and explore the way 
in which such a reality can underpin the global ethical discourse. 
In the Upanishads, the following texts can be cited which deals with the issue 
of the reality and non-reality of Brahman: 
The Sun is Brahman-this is the teaching. An explanation thereof (is 
this). In the beginning this (world) was non-existent. It became 
existent. It grew. It turned into an egg (Chandogya Upanishad: 
3.19.1) In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone, one only 
without a second. Some say in the beginning this was non-being 
alone, one only, without a second. From that non-being, being was 
produced (Chandogya Upanishad: 6.2.1) Non-existence, verily, was 
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this (world) in the beginning. Therefrom, verily, was existence 
produced. That made itself a soul (Taittiriya Upanishad: 2.7.1) 
It is evident that these texts contain contradictory statements on the original 
source of existence. These contradictory statements simply reflect the opposite 
ways in which reality can be projected and interpreted. However, it is not the 
purpose of this study to explore the debate that underpins this contradiction but 
to establish a justification for the nature of Brahman. 
Furthermore, this study will attempt to examine the notions of "reality" (sat) 
and "non-reality" (asat) in the context of Advaitic interpretation and its relation 
to the Brahman. This analysis will also examine the association of the notion of 
"reality" (sat) as a moral value; the connection of "reality" (sat) to Brahman 
and Alman; the concept of "non-reality" (asal) ; Ramanuja's and Madhva 's 
conception of reality. 
It is noted that the notion of "reality" (sat) is used in a wide sense to 
incorporate the ideas of goodness, praiseworthy action, steadfastness In 
sacrifice, austerity and charity (Arapura 1986: 5-6). Although the notion of 
"reality" (sat) is illustrated as an absolute reality, it is also depicted as a moral 
reality with values of "goodness" and "righteousness" . The association of the 
notion of "reality" (sat) with Brahman is the principal character and objective 
of the Upanishads and this clearly suggests that Brahman as "reality" (sat) is a 
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moral reality. A moral reality illustrates a reality in which "good" and "evil" 
can be discerned through association with transcendental phenomena. One of 
the perceptible methods employed by the Upanishads is to link up every 
important concept with Brahman and the notion of "reality" (sat) being 
connected to Brahman is no exception. Arapura notes that the notion of 
"reality" (sat) shares an equivalent position to the concept of Brahman and 
Atman in the Upanishads (Arapura 1986: 7) and there are cases where it stood 
for phenomenal reality not covered by the concept Brahman (ibid. 1986: 8). 
The incorporation of the transcendent and phenomenal reality with the notion 
of "reality" (sat) suggests that both these realities are moral realities. The 
establishment of the link between the transcendent and phenomenal moral 
realities is essential for the conceptual paradigm of the global ethical discourse. 
He also notes that the notion of "reality" (sat) is used ambiguously, it is 
sometimes used in the sense of Brahman with or without the totality of 
phenomenal things and sometimes in the sense of the world, with or without 
Brahman (Arapura 1986: 9). It is explicit that the notion of "reality" (sat) 
represents a reality that is definable in terms of certain characteristics viz. 
goodness, sacrifice, charity etc, notwithstanding the apparent ambiguity that is 
attached to its application. If Brahman is linked to the notion of "reality" (sat) 
then it would be safe to link Brahman to the notion of Goodness even if this is 
not the dominant position of the Upanishads. 
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The notion of asal, "not being", on the other hand, was viewed by Shankara as 
being a condition that denqted Brahman and it was not a state of absolute void 
(Damodaran, 1967: 249). This suggests that the notion of Brahman is both 
"reality" (sal) and "non-being" (asal) in nature. Although Shankara 's 
construction of real ity is supersensible and independent, without needing the 
support of anything to be in existence (Radhakrishn~n 1923 : 533), he does not 
isolate such a reality from the apparent empirical nature of phenomenal reality. 
Notwithstanding this, Shankara understood Brahman as a reality that was 
beyond the phenomenal, the spatial and the temporal ; it is a reality, which is not 
a cause of phenomenal reality (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 534-535). It is apparent 
that Shankara' s reality was beyond the objective of a moral reality. 
Ramanuja, on the other hand, conceptualizes the ultimate reality as a 
determinate whole, which is not bereft of the empirical variety (Sinha 1986: 
166). He sees reality as a loving God and not an absolute metaphysical 
Absolute (ibid. 1986: 167). Ramanuja sees this reality as one and it is qualified 
by the conscious soul and the non-intelligent matter (ibid. 1986: 167). So both 
conscious realities and non-conscious realities (matter; ~eem to find themselves 
within the commonness of divine space. It must be noted that this paradigm is 
clearly distinguished from philosophic materialism, which isolate the conscious 
and emphasize the material. The principle of the association of the conscious 
and non-conscious within the sphere of divine space is an important 
contribution to the global ethical discourse. 
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Furthermore, Madhva conceptualizes reality as an object of knowledge and he 
believes that those things that are an object of valid experience can be ordained 
as real (Sinha 1986: 199-200). On this basis, he accepts God, soul and matter as 
being equally real (ibid. 1986: 200), therefore suggesting that all three are an 
object of valid experience and consequently are real. Furthermore, Madhva 
advocates two primary concepts as part of his dualistic philosophy, viz. 
svatantra (independent) and paratantra (dependent). Madhva sees God as the 
independent reality while soul and matter are dependent realities (ibid. 1986: 
201). He also suggests that the highest ontological status of Brahman is 
dependent on the principle of independence (ibid . 1986: 201). He observes that 
both soul and matter are dependent on God for existence, knowledge, and 
activity (ibid. 1986: 201)' Madhva, created an ideal notion of reality, through 
the principles of dependence and independence, "-rat could explain the 
relationship between the individual personhood with the global guiding 
principle. 
It is apparent that these classical thinkers approached the notions of "reality" 
(sat) and "non-being" (asat) very positively. Their views range from the 
absolutist position to the deeply theistic position. If Brahman is constructed as 
a positive reality on which the world categories are dependent then the 
understanding of it serving as a guiding principle for the construction of a 
global ethic becomes a prospect. Furthermore, the interpretation of the Vedantic 
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notion of "reality" sat as symbol of moral values is very significant because its 
connection to the Brahman suggests that even the Brahman itself as an ultimate 
reality is a moral reality. 
Based on the analysis of these texts, Radhakrishnan proposes that the ultimate 
reality is "being" and not "not-being" (Radhakrishnan 1994: 954). He also 
contends that the notion of "not-being" as the first principle, as may be 
assumed by certain Upanishads, is not absolute but is a relative position (ibid. 
1994: 54). However, Beidler analyses these verses (Taittiriya Upanishad 2.7.1) 
and compliments the view of Radhakrishnan that the r..otion of "reality" (sat) 
may be used as an "empirical being" or "existent reality" and the notion of 
"non-being" (asat) may refer to "not-being" as a reality prior to existence or 
creation or in reference to an empirical reality but not in any absolute sense 
(Beidler 1975 : 68). It is quite evident that both Radhakrishnan and Beidler have 
failed to view the nature of "reality" (sat) as an ethical reality, however, they 
related the Vedantic notion of "reality" (sat) as an empirical reality. 
Notwithstanding this, the general association of the Vedantic notion of "reality" 
(sat) as a moral value is still upheld, and both Radhakrishnan and Beidler have 
allowed for the connection of (sat) as an empirical reality with (sat) as a 
transcendent reality. The central purpose for such a .:;~nnectioh ia the global 
ethical discourse is for moral accountability. It is suggested by this thesis that 
moral accountability at both the empirical and transcendent levels be an 
integral part ofthe conceptual paradigm of the global ethical discourse. 
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Radhakrishnan concludes that the reality of God (Brahman) is based on the fact 
of spiritual experience and it can only be justified in spiritual experience 
(Radhakrishnan 1994: 53). This view may hold strongly within the religious 
worldview but is bound to present challenges for a global worldview. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the reality of the ultimate guiding principle, 
which is central to the global ethical discourse, be justified by a negotiated 
metaphysical system, which can be accommodated, by both the secularist as 
well as the world religions. Furthermore, it must be noted that the idea of a 
"divine being" as the basis of the first principle or the first cause is significant 
because it attests to a Conscious, Intelligent Cosmic Reality underpinning the 
foundation of existence and not an abstract Cosmic Vacuum. It is much easier 
to attribute to such a "being" a moral or an ethical role. This suggests that there 
may be a metaphysical basis for ethical thinking and moral action. However, it 
is not the objective of this thesis to uphold the conception of "being" above 
"non-being", but to demonstrate the contribution of all metaphysical notions to 
global thinking, since the principle of global thinking incorporates all thought 
systems. Furthermore, Radhakrishnan also notes that some of the Upanishadic 
speculations relate the principle of reality to naturalistic elements, which have 
their source from being (Radhakrishnan 1994: 55). This affirms in a positive 
way that there is some relationship between the created order and the 
Transcendent Being, an issue that will be taken up in the next section. 
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It is quite evident that the classical and modern day thinkers projected a very 
positive image of the ultimate reality, an image that has positive empirical 
relevance. This principle of "moral empirical relevance" needs to be 
contributed to the notion of global guiding principle within the global ethical 
discourse. The global guiding principle must assume the image of a global 
moral ideal with empirical relevance. For such a purpose, Shankara's notion of 
an absolute reality beyond empirical aptness may appear to be irrelevant. 
Furthermore, the global guiding principle cannot be seen as a principle that is 
transcendent to the empirical phenomenal reality, it must add moral value to 
both the conscious and unconscious categories of phenomenal reality. While 
the global guiding principle may substitute the place of a Per~onal God, it must 
not assume a position of independence from phenomenal reality but must 
demonstrate interdependence. Such a global guiding principle must be justified 
through a profound metaphysical system that is negotiated by the global 
community, viz. all those that live on this planet. 
3.4.2 Brahman and the World Order 
In the last section an analysis of the Vedantic notions of "reality" (sat) and 
"non-being" (asat) were pursued and it became apparent that while there was 
justification for interpreting the ultimate reality as an ethical reality, the 
hermenuetical tradition seems to have concentrated on the feature of a 
metaphysical reality. Furthermore, it is established that the global guiding 
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principle can be a moral reality with empirical relevance. Notwithstanding this, 
if it is assumed that Brahman is an abstract absolute which is independent and 
unconnected to a world reality, then such a conception may present challenges 
for evolving a Transcendent Reality as a Guiding Principle for the evolution of 
a Global Ethic. However, the notion of ab5tractness may have relevance for the 
global ethical discourse. It is suggested that the notion of abstractness produces 
greater freedom in the interpretation of the ultimate reality than any fixed 
meaning attached to it. Therefore, the notion of abstractness need not be 
unconnected to a world reality but may have empirical relevance from a 
hermenuetical point of view. Furthermore, this challenge of the notion of 
abstractness that is beyond the world reality may raise one fundamental 
question: does the world reality have any meaning in relation to this 
abstractness? In response to this, Albert Schweitzer once said: 
The ethics of action is hard hit by the assertion that the world has 
no meaning. Man cannot engage in ethical action in a world with no 
meaning. His ethical life in such a world must be limited to keeping 
himself pure from it. But if, further, the reality of the world is 
denied, then ethics altogether ceases to have any importance (in 
Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, 1962: 204). 
In light of this, the notion of abstractness must not be constructed with the 
intent of denying meaning to the world. On the contrary, it must serve as a 
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qualifying principle for the global guiding principle from a hermeneutical point 
of view. Furthermore, it will also be necessary to establish the precise 
relationship between the notion of Brahman and the created world in order to 
develop meaning for the world. The leading question is whether there is a link 
or connection between Brahman and the created world order and what is the 
nature of this link in the context of traditional thought and how can that 
contribute to the global ethical discourse? Firstly, this analysis must probe into 
Upanishadic theories that explain the relationship between God and world. 
Secondly, the Vedanta Sutra text will be examined to establish the relation 
between Brahman and the world. Thirdly, the Bhagavad Gita will be 
considered in determining a view on the issue of the relationship between 
Brahman and the world. Finally, this analysis will probe into the method and 
interpretation given by classical Vedantic teachers and contemporary Eastern 
and Western scholars to explain this relationship. Because this study seeks to 
establish the contribution of metaphysics to developing a global ethic, a 
comparative study of the different philosophic positions will not be attempted. 
This study will probe the verses of the Upanishads to establish the precise way 
in which Brahman is related to the world and the ethical status of the world. It 
is the objective of this thesis to establish that the world (including the nature 
world and the planet) has a moral status based on its rdationship with divine 
space. It will also examine the theories postulated by Paul Deussen based on 
the Brahman-world relationship. In this regard, the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 
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(1 .2.1) states that in the beginning there was nothing whatsoever and 
everything was covered by hunger (Radhakrishnan 1994: 151). Then Brahman 
exercised his Cosmic mind and willed, through worship, the created order (ibid. 
1994: 151). This hymn also notes that Brahman actually divided Himself as a 
Supreme Person into the different aspects of the Cosmos (ibid. 1994: 152). 
Again in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (1.4.1) we are told that in the 
beginning, this world was only the self in the shape of ~ person (Radhakrishnan 
1994: 163). This hymn goes on to say that the Brahman divided itself and 
transformed into different parts of the created order (ibid. 1994: 165). 
It is clear that the Upanishads did not in a direct way suggest that the ultimate 
reality had an ethical status or not. However, it must be noted that the 
Upanishads are generally submitted as primary relics of thought on the nature 
of Brahman and its relationship with the world as a metaphysical discourse 
rather than an ethical discourse. Beidler, on the other hand, noted that the 
Brihadaranyaka Upanishad features very little discussion on the relation of 
Brahman to creation, however, it is in the later Upani:. ~:r.ds that thig discussion 
is pursued (Beidler 1975 : 76). He notes that it is in the theory of involution 
rather than the " substrata evolution" theory that the relation of Brahman with 
the world can be clearly analyzed and in the theory of involution, the world is 
seen literally as Brahman (ibid. 1975 : 77). He also observes that Brahman is 
linked to the world through the conception that Brahman is found as the self of 
the heart as is stated in the Katha Upanishad (4.12; 6.17). If it is assumed that 
84 
the Brahman is a moral Being, then the world and individual also presumes a 
moral status on account of its association with Brahman. 
Furthermore, in examining the Upanishads, Deussen establishes 4 principal 
positions in general that explain the relation between God and the Universe viz. 
(1) realism - which advocates that matter exists independent of God and is the 
creative power of the world (ii) theism - which proposes that God is the creator 
of the Universe out of nothing (iii) pantheism - which promotes the idea that 
God creates the universe by transforming himself into it and finally (iv) 
idealism - which suggests that God alone is real and the universe is just a mere 
illusion (Deussen 1906: 160). He adds that all these positions are found evident 
in the Upanishads (ibid. 1906: 161). Although the Upanishads do not present a 
single vision for the relationship between Brahmcn and the universe, it 
however affirms through its speculative method that there is a deep connection 
between Brahman and the Universe. This connection attributes Divine meaning 
and purpose to the created order and fu rther serves to justify the ethical basis to 
this order. 
Besides, in attempting to establish a relation between the Brahman and the 
world, a fundamental question must be raised viz: what is the purpose of 
creation? There are many answers to this question. Beidler observes that 
creation has the purpose of hea1ing towards Brahman because it is the ground 
of its existence (Beidler 1975: 82). Brahman is pi ejected a::, th~ ultimate 
85 
substratum of creation, being its source and its ultimate destiny. There are some 
that believe that the creation of the universe is cyclical and eternal, therefore 
there is no real need for a rational justification for its purpose. If the world 
order has a moral substance then it is inevitable that we must assume that there 
is a moral destiny. The return of the world order into Brahman is the 
culmination of the ethical destiny. In the context of the global ethical discourse, 
the notion of ethical destiny needs to be included into the global conceptual-
methodological paradigm. This would mean that moral action is connected to 
this ethical destiny. It cannot be accepted that the w)rld order is without an 
ultimate purpose and is merely by chance. 
Now this study will venture to examine the Vedanta sulra in order to establish 
the nature of the relationship between Brahman and the world. This reflection 
will focus on Brahman as the first cause, and the notions of "all pervading self' 
(sarvatman) and "Inner controller" (antaryamin) to justify the relationship 
between Brahman and the world. 
In the Vedanta Sutra, clear reference is made to account for the origin of the 
world in Brahman. Srinivasa Chari uses Sutra (1.1.5), ~o charactt:iz~ Brahman 
as the Sentient Being, which reads: 
On account of Thinking (being attributed to the first Cause by the 
scriptures, the Pradhana) is not (the first Cause referred to by them); 
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it (Pradhana) is not based on the scriptures (Swami Vireswarananda 
1996: 31) 
It is conclusively established that the sentient nature of Brahman is 
authenticated by its function of "seeing" and "resolvin~" and it is Brahman as a 
Sentient Being and not "matter" (pradhana) that is the cause of the World 
(Srinivasa Chari 1998: 11). The significance of this point adds to the fact that 
from a religio-philosophic perspective, there is a clear cognition of a Sentient 
Reality being the First Cause of the Cosmos and therefore there is divine 
purpose and meaning within it. However, this assumption stands in contestation 
to scientific paradigms that propose that "matter" (pradhana) is the First Cause 
and the only cause of the World. If the world is produced out of matter, then 
there can be no real justification for a moral or ethical purpose in it. By the 
scriptures affirming a Conscioas Reality behind the world order, there would be 
ample grounds to justify an ethical purpose for thi:.. world o,·dcr. It is the 
objective of this thesis to demonstrate that the world order cannot be without a 
moral status and that the connection with the notion of Brahman attributes to it 
a moral status. Therefore, the global ethical discourse needs to establish that the 
global guiding principle accords moral status to the world order on account of it 
being of a moral status. 
Srinivasa Chari also interprets the notion of "sarvatman" to imply that 
Brahman is the entire universe in the sense that it is the Atman or the Self of 
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everything in the universe (Srinivasa Chari 1998: 20). On the basis of this 
understanding, it would be logical to say that all elements or c.onstituents of the 
universe are ontologically of equal moral value. The natural law that governs 
all that is in the universe is the principle of essential equality. It is noted that the 
term "antaryami" refers to one who controls from within or is the Inner 
Controller (ibid. 1998: 33). The Vedanta Sulra (1.2.18) notes: 
The Ruler within of the gods and so on (is Brahman) on account of 
the qualities of that (Brahman) being mentioned (Swami 
Vireswarananda 1996: 71) 
Srinivasa Chari also establishes that it is the Brahman and not the individual 
soul that is the "inner controller" of all created entities (Srinivasa Chari 1998: 
34). The notion of "inner controller" (antaryamin) is very crucial to the global 
ethical discourse because it presents the idea that there is no absolute freedom 
in the individual existence. This means, that every individual is bound to a 
transcendent ethical reality, which is Brahman or the global guiding principle. 
This also means that an individual cannot see his/her self outside of a Cosmic 
Intelligent reality or global guiding principle. 
This investigation will further explore the Bhagavad Gila, which is believed to 
be the culmination of the Vedic literature, to ascertain the nature of the 
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relat ionship between the Brahman and the world . In this regard selected verses 
will be highlighted and analyzed. 
In the Bhagavad Gita, Lord Krishna declares: 
I am the source and the dissolution of the Universe. There is naught 
else higher than I, 0 Dhananjaya: in Me all this is woven as clusters 
of gems on a string (Sastry 1977: 210). 
My womb is the great Brahman; in that I place the germ; thence, 0 
Bharata, is the birth of all beings. Whatever forms are produced, 0 
son of Kunti, in any wombs whatsoever, the Great Brahman is their 
womb, I am the seed giving Father (ibid. 1977: 380-381). 
Sridhara Swami in his commentary notes that there is no independent cause 
outside of God for the destruction and origin of the universe (Swami 
Vireswarananda 1972: 216-217). Although Sri Inanadeva notes that it is matter 
that spreads out the entire universe of created things bl t this matter is grounded 
in the Divine essence (Bhagwat 1954: 167). The Gila expands the vision of the 
Upanishads and declares that the Ultimate reality is not only the source of the 
gross material world but is also the source of moral and ethical values. In the 
Gila (it says: 
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Intelligence, wisdom, non-illusion, patience, truth, self-restraint, 
calmness, pleasure, pain, birth, death, fear and security, innocence, 
equanimity, contentment, austerity, beneficence, fame, shame, these 
different kinds of dispositions of beings arise from Me alone 
(Sastry 1977: 260). 
Swami Chinmayananda notes that the notion of creation is often conceptualized 
as the world of physical forms. However, it also includes both mental and 
intellectual category (Swami Chinmayananda: 615). It is these categories that 
give rise to ethical constructs. So ethical constructs are ultimately linked with 
the Ultimate Reality through the intellectual and mental realms. This provides a 
further justification of the role of rationality in the ethical process. It is in the 
Bhagavad Gila that we can finally see the moral subst'lnce of the world reality 
and the ultimate reality being the source of moral values. Just as the gross 
physical universe emanates from the Brahman, moral and ethical values also 
have their source in Him. This is significant for the global ethical discourse, 
because it suggests that the global guiding principle should be the source of 
moral and ethical values. Therefore, the global ethical discourse needs to 
evolve a negotiated metaphysical system that will be able to contribute towards 
deriving ethical values from the global guiding principle. 
The above section examined the traditional texts, which clearly revealed the 
close affinity between Brahman and the world, and t! Ie moral ')tatus that is 
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accorded to the world on account of this connection. This study will now 
examine Shankara's proposal of the relation of Brahman and the world. 
Attention will focus on the "snake-rope theory"; the world as illusion; the 
concepts of Maya and avidya and the two standpoints of interpretation. It is 
important to note that the central method used by Shankara to advocate his 
case for a Cosmic reality is based on the Brahman analogy of the "snake-rope 
theory". One of Shankara 's key assumptions is that the world is an illusion and 
Brahman alone is real. He justified the illusory appearance of the world and the 
indisputable reality of Brahman on the analog~' of the "snake-rope" 
(Radhakrishnan 1923 : 561). Shankara 's argument of the illusory nature of the 
world was based on his primary position that both Brahman and the world 
cannot be equally real at the same time (ibid. 1923 : 561). He bases the unreality 
of the world on the following assumptions that the world of experience is not 
present at all times (ii) the world is sublated by true knowledge (iii) the 
recognition of the higher condemns the lower level of unreality (iv) the world is 
changing (ibid . 1923 : 562-563). 
It must be noted that Shankc!ra 's intention was to construct a metaphysical 
reality that was in direct contrast to that of the Buddhi. '11. He did flot pay much 
attention to an ethical discourse. If we accept the assumptions of Shankara then 
it would mean that there is no room for a moral foundation . Whatever moral 
foundation we attempt to construct, will stand as an illusion and with no real 
purpose in relationship to the reality of his Brahman. What may have been true 
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for Shankara then may not necessarily be relevant for today. Therefore, 
Shankara's method of understanding the Brahman needs to be re-examined. 
Furthermore, Shankara proposes that since the world cannot be real it is Maya 
(illusory) , which is not the essential truth of t.he eternal Brahman 
(Radhakrishnan 1923 : 565). Shankara proposes that the world has its origin in 
Brahman but Brahman is not identical to the world because Brahman and the 
world exist as reality and appearance (ibid. 1923 : 566). Shankara proposes that 
there is no real relationship between the world and Brahman and whatever 
perceived relationship there is, is cognitively indefinable (ibid. 1923 : 566). He 
conceptualizes the world as finite and conditioned and raises the question of the 
possibility of it having a source from the infinite which he sees as impossible, 
and declares it as the mystery to human understanding (ibid. 1923 : 567). The 
relationship between Brahman and the world is seen as indefinable because the 
infinite is not the cause of the finite (ibid. 1923 : 56.):. The nction of Maya 
registers our finiteness and points to our gap in knowledge (ibid. 1923 : 569). 
Shankara attempts to show that the world, although it hangs on Brahman, does 
not affect Brahman (ibid. 1923 : 569). This kind of causality shows that the 
cause can produce an effect without undergoing any kind of changes (ibid. 
1923 : 569). This does pose a challenge to the ethical discourse, however, the 
idea that the Brahman can assume the function of a universal guiding principle 
can still be pursued. 
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One of the challenges faced by philosophers is the unrierstanding of the notion 
of Maya. In the context of Shankara 's philosophy, Maya is described as "not-
being" because only Brahman is conceptualized as "being" and at the same 
time it cannot be "non-being" because it is the source of the world appearance 
(Damodaran 1967: 254). Shankara's notion of Maya was described as 
"negligible" from the ultimate standpoint, as "real" from the empirical 
standpoint and as " indefinable" from the standpoint of logic (ibid. 1967: 257) 
Maya was not an independent entity, it was an integral part of Brahman 
although Brahman was independent of it (ibid. 1967: 256). Arapura also deals 
with the notion of Maya in the Gontext of the Brahman discourse. He notes that 
the Maya concept is one of the most controversial ph I" sop hi cal concepts that 
have captured the attention of Indian metaphysicians for a very long period 
(Arapura 1986: 23). He also notes that the notion of Maya and avidya (false 
knowledge) are seen as one theory and acknowledges the progressive 
development of these notions within the Advaitic tradition (ibid. 1986: 23). It is 
clearly evident that Shankara actually interpreted the notions of Maya and 
avidya along the lines that served the purpose of furthering his non-dualistic 
vision. (ibid. 1986: 24). Arapura notes a very significant point and that is that 
the philosophers task is not to prove that the world exists, on the contrary, to 
explain the way the world exists - this knowledge is vital in the search for 
phenomenal meaning (ibid. 1986: 26-27). Arapura conrirms that IYla:;a does not 
mean world-denial (ibid ., 1986: 37) and he sees Maya as the ground for the 
provisional distinction between the world and Brahman (ibid. 1986: 37). 
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It becomes evident that Shankara explored a method that evolved the 
construction of new meanings in order to sustain his metaphysical position. 
This method needs to be adopted within the framework of the Global ethical 
discourse. Although the notion of Maya may have little relevance for such a 
discourse, it nonetheless has to be given a fresh interpretation in light of the 
deeply pragmatic nature of the global reality. 
Furthermore, one of the primary positions of Shankara on the issue of matter is 
that it does not exist (Damodaran 1967: 249). His denial of the objective 
reality of the material world rests on a mystical experience (ibid. 1967: 250) 
and not an empirical experience. The phenomenal world, at the empirical level 
of experience was unreal and merely illusory (ibid. 1967: 250). Shankara 
focussed his vision of the world on a kind of illusory existence in which he 
declared that it is neither real nor unreal. This position of Shankara will put 
him into direct conflict with the reality of the global society, which is 
profoundly empirical. However, Shankara does not deny the nature of the 
empirical reality but simply interprets it as an illusion. 
Shankara also created a dependent relationship between the illusory nature of 
the world and the unchanging nature of the Brahman, and this dependent 
relationship revealed that the world cannot exist without Brahman and that 
Brahman was not dependent on world for its reality because it alone had an 
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independent existence (Damodaran 1967: 255). Shankara rested his conception 
of the phenomenal world on principally two standpoints viz. the empirical and 
the Absolute. The world appearance from the empiric,J standpoint i!l based on 
the assumption that it is real but from the absolute standpoint as unreal 
(Damodaran 1967: 257). It must be noted that in most instances it is based on 
this method of interpretation that Shankara is often misunderstood. This 
confirms that Shankara does not deny the empirical existence in total. 
However, it must be admitted that he gives very little attention to the ethical 
discourse, 
At the very outset, any ethicist studying Hindu metaphysics will choose to 
leave out Shankara completely because his abstract notions of Brahman may 
serve no real purpose for an ethical discourse. ThIS may be a premature 
decision because the theory of "abstractness" is developing significance in 
contemporary discourse on globalization, a matter that will be taken up later 
and the notion of Shankara's Brahman may have relevance. Shankara 's 
absolutist paradigm serves as a model for an ultimate Guiding principle and can 
also serve as a common starting point for a Global Other Reality, Shankara's 
principle of the two levels of interpreting world reality viz. the empirical and 
the absolute level with both having some connection to each other is a useful 
tool for global philosophical hermeneutics. 
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Now, this study will venture to examine Sri Ramanuja's proposal on the 
Brahman - world relationship. This reflection will focus on Nature of Brahman 
in relationship with the world, Brahman as the cause of the world, the nature of 
the link between Brahman and the world, Brahman as a basis of Moral good 
and the nature of reality of the world. 
ri Ramanuja drew a complete distinction between Brahman and the world and 
human beings and concluded that this Brahman is not tainted with the evils of 
the world (Damodaran 1967: 262). In so doing Sri Rumanuja estarlishes that 
the Brahman is the highest vision of a transcendent moral good. In constructing 
the notion of the Brahman, Sri Ramanuja establishes a link between the 
Brahman and the world by affirming that Brahman created the world out of 
Himself (Damodaran 1967: 262). He further structures the existence of man 
and nature on the existence of Brahman and therefore establishes an 
inseparable connection between man, nature and Brahman (Damodaran 1967: 
264). Ramanuja, furthermore, describes God as One that transforms Himself 
into the manifold world (Sinha 1986: 167). It is also noted that the manifold 
diversity cannot be denied and it is impregnated by the One reality, Brahman 
(ibid. 1986: 167). Ramanuja also notes that God is the material, efficient and 
assisting cause of the world and in the midst of all modifications that goes on in 
the world, Brahman (God) remains unaffected and immutable under all 
transformations (ibid. 1986: 172). Sri Ramanuja's thesis seems to contribute 
more positively to the proposition that the world order is a moral order and with 
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ethical meaning and purpose and which can positively contribute to the global 
ethical discourse. 
Sri Ramanuja rejected the assumptions of philosophic materialism, which 
considered the material world as the only reality (Dc. t'lodaran ~ 967: 263). In 
fact, he advocated the thesis that the world with all its diversity is as real as the 
Absolute Brahman (ibid. 1967: 263), which was contrary to that of Shankara. 
He perceived the world as imperfect and limited but not illusory (ibid. 1967: 
263). In Sri Ramanuja's organization of his thesis of the world reality, he 
recognized the notions of subject and object and understood them as real and 
eternal with a permanent relationship existing between them (ibid . 1967: 264). 
Although this conceptual paradigm lays the basis for the development of 
empiricism, Sri Ramanuja connected the empirical relationship between object 
and subject to Brahman by suggesting that Brahman is manifested through this 
relationship (Damodaran 1967: 264). The theory of subject-object relationships 
together with the emphasis of an empirical paradigm have tremendous 
relevance for the global ethical discourse. 
It must be noted that the primary position of the Visisadvaitists is that there is 
only one God or Brahman who is the creator of the universe and is qualified 
with an infinite number of auspicious attributes and is free from all 
imperfections (Srinivasa Chari, 1988: 223-224). Sri Ramanuja proposes that 
Brahman is not only the efficient cause but also the material cause of the 
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universe and as such Brahman has for its body the ent:re world of sentient and 
insentient beings (Swami Vireswarananda. 1996: xlii). He also maintains that 
Brahman and the world are of different natures and they are related as cause 
and effect (Swami Vireshwarananda 1996: xlii). 
Sri Ramanuja projects a profoundly theistic conception of the Brahman-world 
relationship. There are several ethical principles that can be justified on the 
basis of his metaphysics viz. to seek defense for moral action and to account for 
one' s moral action. The theory of God with attributes can contribute to 
establi shing a framework of universal moral values. A personal God can be 
interpreted to represent perfect moral actions. This COd:truCt is a proposal that 
will be made relevant in devising a Global Ethic. 
Furthermore, this study will examine the classical thesis of Madhva whose 
contribution to Indian dualistic thinking has been profound . This investigation 
will centre on God as the Cause of the World, God as a Moral World Order, 
Theory of subject and object, the Reality of the world, and the Theory of 
Evolutionary Change in Nature. 
Madhva suggests that God is only the instrumental and efficient cause of the 
world and not the material cause while Prakriti is the material cause of the 
world order (Urquhart 1986: 204). This means that Brahman is not the 
transformation of itself into the world. Prakriti has been accepted as dependent 
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on Brahman (Sharma 1962: 235). It is also accepted as the direct material cause 
of the universe and the three gunas (satva, rajas and lamas) (ibid. 1962: 235). 
Madhva also submits that God, is a morally perfect being, is the cause of the 
moral-order in the world (Urquhart 1986: 205). He advocated the reality of the 
subject- object relationship and he saw this relationship as the basis of true 
knowledge (Damodaran 1967: 267). Madhva affirms his position on the status 
of the world by stating that the world is not illusory, .t had a re~l existence in 
space and time (ibid . 1967: 268). He advocated the theory that the objects of 
the world originated from evolutionary changes in nature (ibid . 1967: 270). If it 
is assumed that nature, which is part of the Brahman, has moral substance and 
value then it may be submitted that the objects of the world also embody such 
moral value. Madhva 's metaphysical positions may have relevance for the 
global ethical discourse and it demonstrates through the theory of the object-
subject relation the foundation of a relationship between moral value and the 
objects of the world. 
Now, this study will explore the way in which contemporary scholars have 
interpreted the relationship between Brahman and the worle! . This reflection 
will concentrate on the notions of Hiranyagarba as the "world soul" and the 
"inner controller"; the nature of relationship between Brahman and world and 
the "passive" and "active" principles of Brahman. 
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Radhakrishnan, moreover, takes up the issue of Brahman and the world by 
referring to the concept of Hiranya-garbha which he sees as the "world soul" 
that is expressed through the environment and who is organically bound with 
the created world (Radhakrishnan 1994: 61-62). He also makes a very clear 
distinction between the "world soul" and the Supreme transcendent reality. In 
this regard, he observes that while the world and "world soul" is organically 
related and is interdependent, there is no such relationship between the 
Supreme and the world (ibid. 1994: 63). This clearly reveals that while God is 
transcendent of the creative process and unaffected by it, it is also integral to it 
through the "world soul". Furthermore, RadhaKrishnan projects the 
understanding that the nature of Brahman is not just "a feature.less Absolute but 
it is all this world" (ibid. 1994: 64). It can be presumed, therefore, that the 
"world soul" has a moral function in relationship with the world. 
Radhakrishnan does not deal with the world soul encapsulating such a moral 
function, but such an interpretation will not be in conflict with his intent. 
Dasgupta, on the other hand, sees Brahman as the essence in both man and the 
universe (A History of Indian Philosophy, 1941: 48). He sees Brahman as the 
creator of the universe through the transformation of the Divine Self and is 
situated as the "inner controller" of the created universe (Dasgupta 1941 : 48). 
Dasgupta is also in agreement with Radhakrishnan that the Brahman is the 
most passive and unmoved principle of the universe but unlike Radhakrishnan 
he is unable to differentiate the active principle in Brahman into the categories 
T,'I4 fl U· :' LJ-\ ) 'J U 
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of Hiranya-garbha, lihvara etc. (Dasgupta 1941: 48). Therefore, he sees 
Brahman as both the active and passive principle at the same time. 
The Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gila seem to uifirm very 
positively that there is a deep and profound connection between the created 
order and the Brahman itself. The notions of "Inner controller" (antaryamin) 
and "all pervading self' (sarvatman) suggest an integral unity between the 
world and Brahman. This confirms that the world is not here by chance but it 
incorporates divine meaning and purpose and therefore has a moral and ethical 
purpose as well. As much as Shankara attempts to project the illusoriness of the 
world, his contemporary thinkers affirmed the moral relevance of both God and 
the world. 
Furthermore, from a metaphysical position, it becom~s apparent that 
Radhakrishnan did not compromise the unchanging nature of Brahman by 
associating it with the world. However, the "world soul" is of the substance of 
Brahman and therefore assumes a more objective relationship with the world. It 
is not clear from the submission made by Radhakrishnan whether such a "world 
soul", which is an active agent in the creative process, has an ethical substance 
or character. It can be assumed, on the basis that Brahman is the ultimate 
guiding principle of the universe that the "world soul" is also the "moral or 
ethical soul" of the universe. This idea becomes clearer when Dasgupta takes 
the Brahman as the "inner controller of the universe". For such control to be 
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exercised, it has to be founded on some law or principle that can equate itself to 
a universal moral or ethical principle. Srinivasa Chari also supports this notion 
of the " inner controller". Srinivasa Chari also establishes the link between the 
Brahman and the world on the basis of the Vedanta sulra text. The interesting 
feature of this proposal is that it stands in contestation of the proposal of 
scientific paradigms. In fact it does not oppose the scientific suggestion that 
matter may be the first cause, but it extends itself to identify the "world soul" of 
Brahman which the scientific method is fairly limited in comprehending. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Brahman stands transcendent to the creative 
process, it is connected to the world order through the "world soul" and as the 
first cause of the world, it serves as an " inner controller" of the universe and 
therefore contributes to a Cosmic moral function . Furthermore, the Gita 
enunciates the relationship between matter and the world and finally concludes 
that even the great Brahman is the source of ethical values through the mental 
and intellectual categories. 
3.4.3 Nirguna and Saguna Brahman 
In the last section, this study explored the relationshi:, hetween' Brahman and 
the world by tracing its development from the Upanishads through the classical 
and contemporary interpreters. It is established that the metaphysical discourse 
has positively contributed to the conceptual paradigm of the global ethical 
discourse to the extent to which it would promote the development of a 
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framework for a Global ethic. Moreover, there is ample justification for an 
ethical interpretation of metaphysical concepts to render it possible to 
contribute to the global ethical discourse. In this section, this study will focus 
on the nature of Brahman as the "manifest" and "unmanifest" reality. In this 
analysis, an examination of the two concepts of Brahman, viz. Saguna and 
Nirguna will be undertaken through the Upanishadic texts, the Bhagavad Gila 
and the Vedanta SUfra in order to construct an overview of the nature of 
Brahman. Furthermore, an analysis of the interpretation of classical Vedantic 
thinkers as well as contemporary western and eastern scholars will be 
undertaken. The central objective of this examination is to evaluate the notion 
of Brahman as a manifest and unmanifest reality and to probe into the 
assumptions that construct this discourse with the intent of assessing the 
contribution it can make to the global ethical discourse. 
Firstly an analysis of specific Upanishadic texts will be made and an 
interpretation of these texts through the scholarship of Radhakrishnan and 
Beidler will be undertaken. This analysis will focus on selected verses that deal 
with the negative and positive predicates of the Brahman and the rationale for 
such predicates. 
In the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, it is stated: 
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Verily, there are two forms of Brahman, the formed and the 
formless, the mortal and the immortal, the unmoving and the 
moving, the actual (existent) and the true (being) (Radhakrishnan 
1994: 192-193). 
It is quite evident that the Upanishads conceptualized Brahman as both the 
manifest reality and the unmanifest reality. In this regard, Beidler observes that 
the notion of Brahman is not restricted to its nirguna and saguna features, the 
Upanishadic teachers have surpassed these two categories and have introduced 
a third category, which is the notion of "Parabrahma" (Beidler 1975: 93). He 
also notes that the manifest Brahman (saguna) is often expressed in positive 
predicates and the unmanifest Brahman (nirguna) i': expressed in negative 
predicates as is evident in Ea (5); Katha (2.21) and Mandukya (7) (ibid. 1975 : 
93). In the Ea Upanishad and Mandukya Upanishad it is stated: 
It moves and it moves not; it is far and it is near; it is within all this 
and it is also outside all this (Radhakrishnan 1994: 571). It is 
unseen, incapable of being spoken to, ungraspable, without any 
distinctive marks, unthinkable, un-nameable the essence of the 
knowledge of the one self, that into which the world is resolved the , 
peaceful, the benign, the non-dual, such they think, is the fourth 
quarter. He is the self He is to be known (ibid. 1 ~ S'4: 698). 
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Radhakrishnan notes that these apparently contradictory statements do not 
suggest that the writer is experiencing a mental imbalance, on the contrary, the 
writer is struggling to describe divine experience through the limitation of 
human thought and language (ibid. 1994: 571). He further notes that due to 
limitations, the Absolute can only be expressed through negations, however, it 
is not a void (ibid. 1994, p~71) . In commenting on the verse from the 
Mandukya Upanishad, Radhakrishnan notes that this ut:scription ;s :,eyond the 
description of the subject-object categories (Radhakrishnan 1994: 698). 
Radhakrishnan notes that man ' s highest good consists of entering into this, the 
self, making it the center of one' s life (Radhakrishnan 1994: 699). Beidler in 
concurrence with Radhakrishnan also observes that the Brahman cannot be 
limited to empirical predicates and cannot be denied of them because such 
denial will constitute a limitation of the Supreme (Beidler 1975 : 94-95). 
Moreover, he is of the view that the nature of Parabrahma is indicated through 
more of contradictory predicates because it reveals that it is beyond language 
distinctions (ibid. 1975: 95). As much as the Upanishads project a dualistic 
conception to the Brahman, the nirguna serves, in tile Upanishads, as the 
highest moral end of man while the saguna adds moral value to empirical 
existence. 
This study will continue to examine the notions of nirguna and saguna in the 
context of the Vedanta Sutra and the Bhagavad Gila. This analysis will focus 
105 
on Brahman as the Supreme Person, Bliss as the Highest Good, human 
imperfections and Brahman, and the concept ofl!;hvara. 
In this regard, Srinivasa Chari explores the Vedanta sutra (1.1.20), and notes 
that: 
(The one) within (the sun and the eye is Brahman) because Its 
characteristics are mentioned (therein) (Swami Vireswarananda 
1996: 44) 
and he concludes that Brahman is a Supreme Person who possess a spiritual 
divine form and is different from the exalted individual souls (Srinivasa Chari 
1998: 19). This means that no human imperfection or limitation can be 
attributed to the Brahman. In this instance, the Absolute reality is not given an 
abstract identity, which cannot be readily used as a divine reference for ethical 
guidance. The Brahman, therefore, stands for that which is possible in the 
human condition. In addition to this, Srinivasa Chari concludes, on the basis of 
analyzing Vedanta sutra (1 .1.12), which reads: 
(In the passage) "The Self consisting of Bliss" etc (Brahman, which 
is spoken of as the tail, is put forward as an independent entity and 
not as something subordinate to Anandamaya, the Self consisting of 
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Bliss) on account of the repetition (of Brahman) in many passages 
of that chapter (Swami Vireswarananda 1996: 31). 
that the nature of Brahman is Blissful. He uses the following arguments to 
substantiate his position (I) that the Upanishads speaks of Brahman as the one, 
which causes joy (ii) the same Brahman, is described in the mantra portion of 
the Vedas as anandamaya (Srinivasa Chari 1998: 15). It is clear that the 
Vedanta Sutra upholds the notion that the nature of the ultimate reality is 
blissful, a condition or state that is opposite to misery, pain and suffering. If the 
Brahman, in this context, is assumed to be the Highest Good, then the Highest 
Good must be presumed to be Bliss and which can form the basis of an 
Ultimate Moral Being. 
Furthermore, in the Bhagavad Gila the Supreme Brahman is described as a 
Supreme Person. Dasgupta notes that Brahman in the Gila is used in the sense 
of God or 'i;hvara, which is accepted as the Supreme principle (Dasgupta, 
Vol. 2, 1941 : 474). lUIn the Gila, although the notion of the nirguna Brahman is 
evident, the saguna Brahman is said to be the upholder of the nirguna principle 
(ibid. ]941: 474). The Bhagavad Gila projects the Divine as being the essence 
of moral substance. In chapter 4, verse 7, it is noted that whenever there is 
moral confusion, the Lord manifests to restore moral order. So it can be 
presumed that the Divine is of universal moral substance. 
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This study will continue to review the notion of nirguna and saguna in the 
context of Shankara's Advaita philosophy. This analysis will focus on the 
theories of the two Brahman; the nature of the nirguna; nirguna and the 
Supreme Person; nirguna and the concept of time; the notion of Personal God; 
Concept of'i;hvara and the inconsistency of the saguna principle. 
In Advaita the theory of two Brahmans is strongly advocated. This theory 
basically upholds the view that Brahman has two natures viz. the higher and the 
lower, (I) the higher nature is defined as the Absolute which is beyond all 
differentiation, transcendental, supra-relational and beyond all thought and 
speech (ii) the lower is Brahman that is conditioned by Maya, a personal God 
endowed with attributes (Srinivasa Chari 1988: 229). Shankara's Brahman has 
no genus, no qualities, does not act and is related to nothing, has no internal 
variety; it has nothing different from it, nothing similar to it and no internal 
differentiation and is opposed to all empirical distinctions. (Radhakrishnan, 
1923 : 535). Furthermore, Shankara 's Brahman transcends the relative and the 
absolute, the finite and the infinite because if it is infinite then it will be a mere 
negation of the finite and therefore this absolute is not a "person" (ibid. 1923 : 
536). The notion of nirguna is applied to Brahman because it is seen by 
Shankara as trans-empirical and not an object of human thought (ibid. 1923 : 
536) . Shankara 's Brahman is unrelated to time because the events of time have 
no meaning for it and all time relations are beyond it (ibid. 1923 : 537). 
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The nirguna feature of Brahman presents tremendous challenges to attribute to 
it the notion of an Ultimate Good. However, such abstractness allows for some 
level of global interpretation, which will make it relevant for the global ethical 
discourse. However, Shankara's Brahman, in the context of the theory of 
abstractness, has relevance to the contemporary ideological approaches to 
human existence. 
Moreover, Shankara considered a personal God as a determinate reality. 
Shankara is of the view that God ' s existence is not different from the existence 
of other objects and therefore God will be subject to th~ category of being finite 
just as all other objects are finite (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 542). According to 
Shankara, fivara is supposed to be the material and efficient cause of the world 
(ibid . 1923 : 544). Shankara compares God to rain which simply helps plants to 
grow and what they grow into depends not on the rain but the seed (ibid. 1923 : 
549). Each new life is dependent on one' s moral qualities (ibid. 1923 : 549). 
The concept of lihvara is only made possible to explain the changing 
phenomenal reality which cannot be really attributable to Brahman which is 
unchanging (Radhakrishnan 1923: 555). Brahman is beyond subject and object, 
but when it is perceived as a subject dealing with an object it becomes lihvara 
(Radhakrishnan 1923 : 556). Ishvara is the medi .. f ng principle between 
Brahman and the world and it shares the natures of both (ibid. 1923 : 557). 
Ehvara is an active agent in the world and it is subject to time (ibid. 1923 : 
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558). To Shankara the saguna Brahman, which is the fihvara, is riddled with 
inconsistencies and contradictions and therefore cannot be the highest Reality. 
Shankara attempted to construct a Reality that is metaphysically perfect but 
with very little consideration for its practical operations. It is also evident that 
Shankara had no philosophic plans for incorporating the moral and ethical into 
his metaphysical scheme. On the other hand, Shankara 's absolute may have 
relevance as a starting point to ground global ethics on an ultimate reality but 
this may require a revision of his interpretation. Furthermore, the notion of 
fihvara underpinned as an active agent in the world order may have relevance 
for the global ethical discourse. 
Notwithstanding this, this study will probe the contribution of Sri Ramanuja's 
interpretation of the saguna and nirguna Brahman. This analysis will centre on 
the nature of Brahman; the Brahman of attributes; the functional role of 
Brahman; the interpretation of the nirguna and s.1guna; th~ relationship 
between the nirguna and the saguna; Brahman as the Supreme person; the 
Notion of Avatar; Concept off;hvara and the concept of the two Brahmans. 
Firstly, Sri Ramanuja refuted the propositions of Metaphysical Idealism, which 
proclaimed that Absolute consciousness was the only Reality therefore denying 
any reality outside of itself (Damodaran 1967: 263). He constructed his thesis 
of the Brahman on the idea that it is eternal and Blissful (ibid. 1967, p262) and 
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it is distinct from the individllal soul and the world (ibid. 1967: 262). He 
proposed that the Brahman is possessed of attributes '5'.lch as w:sd.O'11, power, 
auspiciousness etc. (ibid. 1967: 262). Sri Ramanuja attributes a functional role 
to Brahman as the arbiter and controller and perceives this control to extend 
over both organic and inorganic objects (Damodaran 1967, p264). He also 
conceptualizes the Absolute as an organic whole with parts, a substance with 
attributes (Sircar 1987: 168). Sri Ramanuja deals with both the notions of 
nirguna Brahman and saguna Brahman. He does not see the nirguna Brahman 
as a barren abstraction. He attaches equal value and importance to both the 
saguna and nirguna Brahman (ibid . 1987: 168). 
Sri Ramanuja does not admit to the distinction of Braiman as transcendental 
and empirical but sees the Supreme Reality as simultaneo:.lsly nirguna and 
saguna (ibid. 1987: 169). He conceptualizes the nirguna in the sense that salva, 
rajas and lamas do not exist in essence because the saguna has all auspicious 
qualities that belong to the Supreme (ibid. 1987: 169-170). Sri Ramanuja 
conceives of the Brahman as the Highest person with infinite excellent qualities 
(ibid. 1987: 168). This Brahman has qualities such as brilliance, compassion, 
beauty etc which are attributes that are eternal, boundless co-ordinate and not 
contradictory (ibid. 1987: 169). Sri Ramanuja advocates the notion of avatar as 
the decent of God to participate in the moral upliftment of the world (Sircar 
1987: 175). He sees this Brahman reality as being beyond the grasp of man and 
it is only through the incarnation that man has access to this Divine reality 
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(ibid. 1987: 176). The incarnation serves the purpose for moral elevation and 
emotional exaltation (ibid. 1987: 176). 
He further suggests that the nature of Brahman cannot be subjected to two 
natures and at the same time cannot be limited by the two forms (Swami 
Vireswarananda, 1996: xlii). According to Visistadvaita, the ultimate reality or 
Brahman is the personal Gcd of religion (Srinivasa Chari 1988: 223). 
Ramanuja also notes that Brahman, in its true nature, 13 formless 3.ltr..ough it is 
perceived with forms and as a formless entity it is not subject to karma (Swami 
Vireswarananda 1996: xli) . Visistadvaita does not accept the theory of the two 
Brahmans and reaffirms its position of the Ultimate reality being Brahman with 
infinite attributes (Srinivasa Chari 1988: 230). The Visistadvaita standpoint is 
that the nirguna Brahman is not attesting to a Brahman that is attributeless but 
affirms a Brahman that is free of all inauspicious qualities (Srinivasa Chari 
1988: 231). The notion of 'i;hvara as the bodily Brahman is used and is 
produced out of Brahman's free will for the benefit of the devotees to · enable 
them to offer prayers and do meditation (Srinivasa Chari 1988: 232). 
Sri Ramanuja 's Brahman seems to focus on an i~entifiable reality in which 
both moral and ethical relevance can be sought. The integration of the Absolute 
and the Personal and the association of the Absolute with the world order create 
ample room to develop a theory for moral justification within a metaphysical 
ideal. The theory of transcendent attributes can also contribute to establishing 
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global values that are immanent in the human condition and can further provide 
a basis for social ethics. 
This study will further explore Madhva 's conception o~' :!1e nirgut?a a:ld saguna 
Brahman. This analysis will investigate the independence of Brahman; the 
attributes of Brahman; Brahman as the Highest Perfection; the unlimited nature 
of Brahman; Brahman as the Supreme Person; the concept of nirguna and 
saguna; Notion of avatar and concept of:5hvara. 
Sharma notes that the independence of Brahman from the individual soul and 
matter is the most vital part of Madhva's conception of God (Sharma 1962: 
324). Such independence does not suggest that there is no relationship between 
the individual soul and the world and Brahman. Instead it suggests that 
Brahman is unchangeable in relation to the soul ar;d the world. Madhva 
conceives of God as being above change and limitation. Madhva further notes 
that God has infinite attributes, which are absolute, and he bases this on the 
assumption that there can be nothing, which is absolutely attributeless (Arapura 
1986: 201-202). Notwithstanding this, he notes that even the nirguna Brahman 
possesses attributes of oneness, divinity, transcendence and immanence 
(Sharma 1962: 331-332). He conceptualizes God as the highest form of 
perfection conceivable by the human intelligence and needs to be understood in 
terms of the unlimited pervasion of time, space and fullness of attributes (ibid. 
1962: 329). 
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Madhva also proposes that the Brahman is a Supreme Person, who is 
indescribable only because He is incomprehensible; is equally transcendent and 
immanent; and is knowable only through scriptures and is ultimately obtainable 
(Arapura 1986: 203-204). He accepts that the nirguna is trans-empirical and is 
superior to the products of matter (Sharma 1962: 332). Madhva notes that the 
saguna is not the absolute becoming a personal god, or a reality endowed with 
empirical attributes (ibid. 1962: 333). He also notes that it would not be 
possible to establish the negation of attributes because the nirguna text even 
advocates the notion of attributes (ibid. 1962: 335). Madhva sees the Supreme 
Brahman as a person who embraces the whole of life of the world and not 
someone standing above the world order (ibid. 1962: 343-344). 
Madhva advocates the notion of "Ehvara as the guide, controller and is 
passively present in the soul and matter (Arapura 1986: 203). He sees the 
Supreme manifesting Himself periodically in different avatars and he sees all 
the manifestations as being equal in status. He basis this view on the 
assumption that the same Infinite expresses itself in all ranks equally (ibid. 
1986: 206-207). Madhva also notes that there are no degrees of fullness or 
partial ness or completeness to avatars (Sharma 1962: 354). He has no 
preference for any particular avatara of God and treats all of them as equal in 
rank attributes and powers (ibid. 1962: 354-355). 
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Madhva 's interpretation presents a number of possibilities of conceptualizing a 
Supreme Guiding Principle based on Universal values and for making such a 
Supreme Being immanent in a global moral world order. His theory of an 
absolute governed by attributes creates sufficient room to evolve a global 
ethical framework for universal values. The notion of the avatar may be taken 
up to represent an ideal or perfect human condition based on glcbal ethical 
values. 
This study will now probe contemporary interpretations of the notions of 
nirguna and saguna. In this regard, Radhakrishnan also identifies two vital 
concepts of the Upanishads that contribute to the understanding of the 
Brahman viz. the "nirguna" and "saguna" and suggests that both these notions 
are not different from each other (Radhakrishnan 1994: 64). Although both 
these are technically referring to two separate conditions of the Brahman, they 
are ultimately found integrated in the whole of Brahman. Radhakrishnan ' s 
central position is that the Personality of God cannot be subjected to human 
formulations and therefore should not be attributed with human qualities (ibid. 
1994: 65). Radhakrishnan holds the view that the Absolute can only be 
described in negative terms and that these negative characters should not 
suggest that the Brahman is non-entity (ibid. 1994: 67-68). Dasgupta also 
shares a similar view with Radhakrishnan and maintains that the Brahman 
cannot be described by any positive content, which is limited by cognitive 
thought (Dasgupta 1941 : 44-45). Aurobindo, while maintaining this standpoint 
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goes on to add that even the negation theory cannot be applied to Brahman for 
it will limit it and he believes that Brahman cannot be li :nited by saying that "it 
is not this or not that" (Aurobindo 1996: 322). Although Aurobindo attributes 
this absolutist vision to the Brahman, he also believes that this Absolute 
Brahman is "self evident to itself and to the spiritual being" (ibid. 1996: 323). 
In this regard he said: 
But although thus indeterminable to Mind, because of its 
absoluteness and infinity, we discover that this Supreme and 
Eternal Infinite determines itself to our consciousness in the 
universe by real and fundamental truths (Aurobindo 1996: 322-323) 
Beidler also notes that the unmanifest Brahman (nirguna) is one without a 
second and stands in contrast to the manifest Brahman (saguna) which in 
reality is one and the same (Beidler 1975 : 84). He issues a word of caution on 
the interpretation of Brahman by stating that the notions of the manifest and 
unmanifest Brahman must be viewed coherently to avoid the development of 
any form of dualism which might render the concept of Brahman to criticism 
(ibid. 1975: 84) 
Radhakrishnan, on the other hand, postulated the theory of the "integral nature 
of the Supreme Reality" by suggesting a logical succession to its nature viz. the 
Absolute (Brahman) ," the Creative Spirit (ihvara), the world soul (Hiranya-
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garbha) and the world (Radhakrishnan 1994: 65). Such a conceptualization 
makes it possible to hold the ultimate reality above any sectarian vision and at 
the same time creates the flexibility of the world ideas of god to be instituted in 
the Ehvara and to be ultimately linked to the Brahman thus creating a basis for 
a global notion of an ultimate reality. 
From the above submission, it is quite evident that the notions of a nirguna 
Brahman and saguna Brahman are indisputable in tht Vedanta Sulra, 
Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gita. It is very difficult to say which of these 
two conceptions were upheld above the other. In the classical hermenuetical 
tradition it becomes evident that trends developed to either emphasize the 
nirguna or the saguna and the integration of both the nirguna and the saguna. 
Furthermore, in the contemporary hermenuetical tradition, it becomes obvious 
that scholars attempt to emphasize either of these conceptions or try to bridge 
these conceptions into a sort of conceptual philosophic hierarchy. There is a 
serious omission of the part of the interpreters to integrate any moral and 
ethical relevance to these ideas or even establish them as Transcendent guiding 
principles for moral and ethical behavior. However, this study will venture to 
develop the relevance of both these conceptions together with their associated 
conceptions for developing the global ethical discourse. 
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3.4.4 Unity of Brahman and Alman 
In the last section this study endeavored to establish the understanding of the 
concepts of nirguna and saguna Brahman in the Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads 
and Bhagavad Gila and also through the interpretations of classical and modem 
thinkers. It is quite evident that the idea of Brahman is both deeply 
transcendent as well as profoundly immanent. However, in this analysis we will 
explore the relationship between the Brahman and Atman through the texts of 
the Upanishads, and the interpretation of classical and modem thinkers. In this 
part we will analyze specific texts from the Upanishads. The central objective 
of this examination is to establish a concept of personhood based on the 
traditional metaphysical discourse and to contribute aspects of this to the global 
ethical discourse. 
In the famous Sandilya vidya, which is found in the Chandogya Upanishad, the 
oneness of the individual soul and the Supreme Brahman is affirmed 
(Radhakrishnan 1994: 392). In this regard, the Chandogya Upanishad says: 
This is my self within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice, than a 
barley com, than a mustard seed, than a grain of millet or than the 
kernel of a grain of a millet. This is myself within the heart, greater 
than the earth, greater th1n the atmosphere, greater than the sky, 
greater than these world (ibid. 1994: 391-392). 
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One of the primary objectives of the Vedic seers was to demonstrate some kind 
of unity between the notion of Brahman and Alman. Deussen observes that this 
perception of unity between the Brahman and Atman was rooted in the hymns 
of the Rig-Veda viz. Rig-Veda 1.164 and 10.129 (Deussen 1906: 85). He also 
notes that the notion of Brahman and Alman are used as denoting the first 
principle and are also applied synonymously in the Upanishads (ibid. 1906: 
86). Radhakrishnan supports the view that the Brahman is the Alman, however, 
he looks at the Brahman as the cosmical principle and the Alman as the 
psychical principle (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 169). 
Beidler, furthermore analyses the nature of the self as Purusha in the context of 
the Upanishads. He notes that the concept of Purusha in the Upanishads is 
largely limited to the notion of personality, the person or individual, not 
withstanding the fact that it is sometimes used in the context of Alman (Beidler 
1975: 16). He also notes that the Upanishadic view of the self rests at the 
physiological and psychological levels and the analysis of man are largely 
sensory and egocentric in nature (Beidler 1975 : 17). He notes that the theory of 
the kosha derived from the Taittiriya Upanishad 'ldds to the ontological 
analysis of the Purusha (Beidler 1975: 24) which gives greater clarity of the 
nature of the individual. He documents the operation of the Purusha through 
three vital mental conditions viz. the waking, dream and the dreamless states 
(ibid. 1975: 25-26). 
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One of the critical issues is trying to justify the notion of the self with the 
conceptual paradigm of the subject-object relationship. The Upanishads seem 
to emphasize the idea that the self can never become the object, it is the pure 
subject (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 152). Notwithstanding this, the Upanishads 
reveal that the self is not an abstract formal principle, but an active universal 
consciousness and from this standpoint it is both the subject and the object and 
it is the universal self that is both immanent as well as transcendent. (ibid. 
1923 : 157). The Upanishads conceptualize the self as the sole reality, which 
contains the facts of nature as well as the histories of experience (ibid. 1923 : 
158). It also demonstrates the reality of the self in the states of waking, dream, 
deep sleep and luriya (ibid. 1923, 158). 
It is clear that the Upanishads have documented a purely metaphysical 
relationship between the Alman and the Brahman as v ·ell as the understanding 
of personhood. However the notion that the self is a psychological and 
physiological reality has some bearing for the global ethical discourse. The 
kosha theory also reveals that the nature of personhood is essentially spiritual. 
However, it has not articulated the nature of "personhood" as a moral or an 
ethical being with metaphysical essence. 
This study will probe the concept of Atman and its relationship with Brahman 
based on the interpretation of Shankara. This analysis will focus on the root 
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meaning of the concept of Atman; the three connotations of the Alman; the 
Alman as the essence of existence; the Alman beyond knowledge; its existence 
in relation to the body reference; the nature and character of the self; the 
conceptions of empirical and universal selves; the relation of jiva and 
Brahman; and finally the relation ofjiva and j;hvara. 
Firstly, it is interesting to note that the root sense of the concept of Atman is 
derived from the Vedas and it refers to "breath" or "vital force" (Beidler 1975: 
44). Deussen suggests that there are three connotations to the concept of Alman 
viz. the corporeal self, which is the physical self, the individual self, which is 
the self free from the body and as a knowing subject is distinct from the object, 
and finally the Supreme self, in which the subject and object are no longer 
distinguished (in Beidler 1975: 44). This notion of the self-reveals that a person 
is more than a body self, it is also a spirit self. The connection of the supreme 
self, which is the foundation of moral value, to the individual person adds 
moral value to "personhood". The Atman is the essence of one ' s existence on 
which the vital breath, the senses, the internal organ and the bodily identity are 
dependent (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 476). 
Shankara suggests that it is not possible to know the self (Atman) by means of 
thought and he maintains that though the self is beyond our knowledge but it is 
known to exist on account of itself (ibid. 1923 : 476-477). Shankara says that it 
is both known and unknown (ibid. 1923, p477) and proposes that the notion of 
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Alman is developed once we divest it from all that surrounds it, discriminate it 
from the bodily frame and strip it from all experience (ibid. 1923 : 480). 
The notion of Self, presented oy Shankara, as an absolutely abstract entity, 
equivalent to nothing, to which no moral or ethical standard could b~ derived. It 
is described as undifferentiated consciousness because it is unaffected even 
when the body is reduced to ashes or the mind perishes (ibid. 1923 : 480). For 
Shankara, the Alman is pure consciousness, which is not dependent on any 
object to be reflected on (ibid. 1923 : 482). Shankara also notes that no action 
is attributable to the Alman since action is a limiting agent therefore his 
conclusion is that the Alman has no agency and can have no limitation placed 
onto it (ibid. 1923 : 483). Shankara also holds the view that the Alman, which 
has no other existences, is not a person (ibid. 1923 : 484). 
Shankara distinguishes between the empirical self and the absolute self (ibid. 
1923 : 595). The empirical self is an agent of all activity (ibid. 1923 : 595). 
Shankara sees activity as essentially painful and there must be a need to free 
oneself from it (ibid. 1923 : 595). It is avidya that causes the sense of the 
empirical self (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 596). The individual soul is connected to 
buddhi or reason (ibid. 1923 : 596). It is the jiva that rules the body and the 
senses and it is connected with the fruits of action (ibid. 1923 : 598). 
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One of the challenges in Indian thought is to capture a complete understanding 
of the Universal self. In this regard Radhakrishnan notes the method of 
Shankara : 
[t]hat we get the notion of the Alman if we divest it of all that 
surrounds it, discriminate it from the bodily frame with which it is 
encompassed, strip it of all contents of experience. To the logical 
minds it may appear that we have reduced it to a bare potentiality of 
thought, if not mere nothing, but it is better to regard it this way 
than as a whole of parts or a thing with qualities or a substance with 
attributes. It is undifferentiated consciousness alone which is 
unaffected even when the body is reduced to ashes alld the mind 
perishes (Radhakrishnan Vol. 2, 1923 : 480). 
Shankara proposes the notion of error to explain the confusion between the 
Alman and the body-mind complex (ibid. 1967: 250). Shankara attempts a 
conceptual unity between the notions of Brahman and jiva by advocating that 
the differences betweenjiva and Brahman did not exist and any such difference 
expressed in individual existence is merely through illusion (ibid. 1967: 250). 
Shankara conceptualized the individual as the jiva and he saw this jiva as the 







Shankara's interpretation of the concept of self (Alman) was indeed 
transcendental or trans-empirical. He conceptualized the notion of Alman or 
Universal self as "primal, eternal, and immutable facthood" (Sinha 1986: 72), a 
homogenous consciousness (ibid . 1986: 74), all pervading (ibid. 1986: 76), 
beyond space and time (ibid. 1986: 77). His central objective was to project the 
oneness of reality and articulate this absolute unity in the oneness of the subject 
and the object and therefore identifies the soul as Brahman itself. (Sinha 1986: 
72) . Shankara establishes the concept of Alman as the universal self, which is 
not deduced from empirical knowledge but which is self-manifested and self 
revealed and therefore is not dependent on any form of knowledge (Sinha 1986: 
72-73). In this regard Radhakrishnan says : 
Yet we cannot think away the self, for there is no consciousness or 
experience possible apart from it. Though it escapes our 
knowledge, it does not entirely escape us. It is the object of the 
notion of self, and is known to exist on accoupt of its immediate 
presentation. It cannot be proved, since it is the basis of all proof 
and is established prior to all proof (Radhakrishnan Vol. 2, 1923 : 
477). 
Shankara 's universal self forms the ontological basis for the individual 
empirical self (Sinha, 1986: 73). He sees the universal self as the essence of 
consciousness and bliss and is devoid of enjoyment and activity (Sinha 1986: 
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74). His universal self is not associated with mind or the properties of mind 
such as pleasure and pain and it is transcendent of being an object of 
consciousness (ibid. 1986: 74 -75). The reality of the universal self is found 
embedded in the act of experience (ibid. 1986: 76). This notion of the universal 
self can contribute to the construction of the idea of a universal or global 
person. 
Shankara makes a clear distinction between the concepts of jiva and alma and 
depicts the former as phenomenal while the latter is transcendental (ibid. 1986: 
78) . Shankara interprets the empirical self (jiva) to be an imaginary 
construction without a real ontological basis (ibid. 1986: 78). Although 
Shankara sees the jiva and the Alman as ultimately nne, he demonstrates the 
former as being the object of self-consciousness and the latter only known 
through supra-intellectual intuition (Sinha 1986: 78-79). The relationship 
between the empirical self and the universal self is mysterious and not known 
through the common forms of knowing (ibid . 1986: 79). However, the 
relationship of the empirical and the universal self is significant to construct the 
notion of ethical dependence. 
Radhakrishnan notes that : 
Each function and faculty, the gross body and (1~ vital br~ath. the 
senses and the internal organ, the empirical "me" appear only on 
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the basis of and in relation to the Alman (Radhakrishnan, Vol. 2, 
1923 : 476). 
Shankara also deals with the notion of Evara in the context of the Brahman. 
Here also, Shankara views the jiva and Evara as being the same from the 
transcendent standpoint and different from a phenomenal standpoint. He 
constructs the concept of jiva as an agent, an enjoyer, one that feels pleasure 
and pain, as being ruled, with limiting adjuncts such as ignorance, desire, and 
actions. Shankara also deals with the notion of'ivara in the context of the 
Brahman. Here also, Shankara views the jiva and 'tvara as being the same 
from the transcendent standpoint and different from a phenomenal standpoint. 
He constructs the concept ofjiva as an agent, an enjoyer, one that feels pleasure 
and pain, as being ruled, with limiting adjuncts such as ignorance, desire, and 
actions (Sinha 1986: 83-85). It is clear that Shankara's notion of the jiva falls 
within the perspective for moral application. It is not beyond moral application. 
Shankara attempted to construct a universal reality that was undifferentiated 
and coherent. However, his explanation of the Univ ' ~rsal self r.an become a 
positive global concept for the global ethical discourse. There must be a more 
concrete relationship between the universal self and the empirical self. The 
absolute unity of reality may serve as a substratum but it cannot be the ultimate 
fact of life. This will destroy all forms of moral and ethical relevance and any 
form of social conscience. It will be necessary to review and reconstruct 
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Shankara's ideas in order for it to make a contribution towards the global 
ethical discourse. 
This part will attempt to probe into the thesis of Sri Ramanuja and Madhva on 
the relationship between Brahman and Atman. This analysis will focus on the 
meaning of the Atman; the relationship between the individual soul and the 
Brahman; Brahman as the controller of the soul; the nature and character of the 
soul ; the soul and karma and finally the goal or destiny of the soul. 
Ramanuja suggests that the term Atman is derived from the word "anu", which 
means, "atomic" (Sinha 1986: 80). Upanishadic texts viz. the Svetasvatara and 
Mundaka Upanishad support the view that it is small in comparison to the 
Supreme self (ibid. 1986: 180). The primary assumption of Sri Ramanuja is the 
Jivatma or individual soul has a distinct existence fp·,r.1 Brahmf;m although it 
was united with Brahman (Damodaran 1967: 262). It is clarified that the 
individual soul was different from Brahman but was not independent of Him 
and the Jivatma was sustained and controlled by Brahman (ibid. 1967: 262). Sri 
Ramanuja 's conception of the soul is based on the following general 
assumptions: that it is eternal, conscious and pure; it is a minute particle which 
could enter into lifeless unconscious matter; that consciousness and vitality are 
inseparable aspects of the soul ; karma connects the soul and the body 
(Damodaran 1967: 263). 
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Ramanuja suggests that the soul is an individual in relation to the absolute and 
it is not absolutely independent (Sinha 1986: 179). He also proposes that the 
self is both subject and object within the scheme of objective reality (ibid. 
1986: 180). According to Ramanuja, the soul is intrinsically blissful, pure and 
perfect, however the apparent limitations to the soul are caused by individual 
karma (Sinha 1986: 182). Ramanuja also notes that the eternity of the soul is 
an essential condition for morality (ibid. 1986: 182). He suggests a triune 
reality of God in which man and nature is found ultimately reconciled in a state 
of unity in variety (Sinha, 1986: 183). He also submits that the soul is subjected 
to control, support and protection from the Lord ancl further notes that such 
control is not detrimental to the freedom of individual souls (ibid. 1986: 181). 
Notwithstanding that the soul is distinct from Brahman, Sri Ramanuja 
establishes that the soul has for its ultimate aim communion with Brahman 
(Damodaran 1967: 265). 
Sri Ramanuja presented a notion of personhood that is connected to the 
transcendent reality, which is a moral reality. He also suggested that an 
individual is not subjected to absolute empirical freedom and therefore is 
controlled by a transcendent guiding principle. The fact that the Atman can 
enter into matter suggests that individual personhool has equal moral value 
with other objects of nature. Being blissful and perfect suggests that it is of 
inherent moral quality. Karma is the basis of moral action that can either 
enhance the ethical destiny of the soul or limit it from the goal of spiritual 
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commUnion. Sri Ramanuja proposes an ideal model of the unity of man and 
nature in the context of divine space for the global ethical discourse. 
Madhva, on the other hand, conceptualized the Brahman as distinct from the 
jiva and the world and he sawall three entities as eternal (Damodaran 1967: 
267). The one concrete proposal advocated by Madh- 'a is that Rrahman is an 
object of realization (ibid. 1967: 267). He conceptualized the Brahman as an 
independent reality while the )iva was seen as a dependent reality (Damodaran 
1967: 268) Madhva also advocates the doctrine of pancabheda which is based 
on the assumption that the notion of difference constitutes the essential part of 
things (Sinha 1986: 207). He distinguishes the notion of Atman from that of 
matter and God and holds that differences also exist between each soul both in 
its embodied state and released state (ibid. 1986: 208). Madhva suggests that 
the soul is both the knowing subject as well as the object of its own knowledge 
(ibid. 1986: 208). Madhva suggests that the soul can never be equal to God and 
he basis this on the assumption that God has an intri.lJic super;orit.y over the 
soul (ibid. 1986: 210). 
Madhva, in upholding the distinction of the Brahman from world and the soul 
demonstrated its moral incorruptibility and therefore its perfect condition, while 
soul and world face moral imperfections. If the Brahman is the object of 
realization, then it is the highest ethical end towards which an aspiring soul 
must attempt to achieve. Therefore ethical excellence is a prerequisite for God-
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realization. The individual cap-not be independent from a moral ideal. The 
differences between individuals are acknowledged "r.d therefure ~he moral 
value attributed to "person" is both individual as well as collective. The 
superiority of the Guiding principle allows for moral transformation of 
individual towards the highest moral end. 
Furthermore, it 1S clear that Sri Ramanuja attempted to construct a 
metaphysical reality, which is conducive to a moral ethical discourse. His 
notion of the individual soul in relation to the Brahman brings into operation 
the principle of moral accountability and moral grounding. These are two 
essential principles for the global ethical discourse. Madhva on the other hand 
proposed the recognition of the difference of individual souls wh;ch is also 
going to contribute significantly to the global ethical discourse. 
This part will probe into the conception of Alman In relation to Brahman 
through the interpretation of the contemporary scholars. This analysis will 
focus on a psycho-physiological analysis of being; the relationship between the 
micro and macrocosm; the Purusha as the agent; the relationship between 
Purusha and Alman; the Alman in relationship to action and embodiment; the 
Alman as a goal ; the connection of mental impressions to Atman; the ultimate 
nature of Atman and universal self; the equation of individual to the universe; 
the 5 koshas as a basis of individuality; the destiny of the soul based on ethical 
excellence; integrated nature of existence and Brahman as a basis of social 
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equality. These variables have been included to assist in determining the deeper 
nature of "person" and to develop an understanding that will contribute to the 
evolution of a global ethical framework. 
It became evident that the microcosmic dimension of reality (the finite) was 
never isolated from the macrocosmic dimension of reality (the infinite). In this 
regard Beidler notes: 
From this it seems necessary to conclude that on the level of 
Purusha there must have been general agreement in the Upanishads 
that the microcosm was not different in its basic structure from the 
macrocosm (Beidler 1975 : 30). 
Beidler also conceptualizes the Purusha as an embodied self with a 
phenomenal character and is described as the active side of the Alman (Beidler 
1975 : 44-45). It would appear that the Purusha is the agent of the Alman and 
there is a close connection between the essence of our being and the expressed 
behavior of our nature. 
Beidler also suggests that there is a relationship between the self as Alman and 
the "embodied self' (Purusha) , notwithstanding the distinctions that exist 
between them, and on the evidence of the Aitereya (1.1 ; 1.3 .12) and Taittiriya 
Upanishads (1. 6), the A !man is located in the inner recesses of the heart and it 
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serves as the inner guide to the "embodied self' (Purusha) (ibid. 1975: 45-46). 
He says that "the Alman is the essence, the ultimate and true nature of the 
Purusha expressed on the highest" (ibid. 1975: 46) This means that human 
action is connected far more deeply that just the psychological and 
physiological levels. As the inner guide, the Alman can be seen as a moral 
agent for right action. 
Beidler takes up the issues of action and embodiment related to the A lman and 
the response to this is rooted in the Hindu nature of work and desire, which is 
seen to be mainly egocentric (ibid. 1975 : 47). His conclusion is that the Alman 
is not active and any activity associated with the Alman is related to the 
egocentric "embodied self' (Purusha) (ibid.1975 : 48). So the Alman is seen as 
pure consciousness unaffected by the movements of, "orldly lifp., yet it is the 
inner guide to human existence .. In fact, there is very little to refute the notion 
that the Alman is transcendent to all action. Notwithstanding this position, 
Beidler notes that the Alman is adhislhana, although not active by itself but by 
serving as a goal it stands as an ultimate reference to which all actions are 
directed (Beidler 1975 : 50). Beidler addresses the issue of the embodiment of 
the Alman with the suggestion that being the essence of the "embodied self' 
(Purusha), it allows for the egocentric Purusha to evolve to the essential nature 
of the Alman (Beidler. 1975: 51). This is an interesting view in that it is less 
monistic in nature and it suggc£ts that human life has a moral significance and 
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that evolution of being needs to take place at a moral level in order to arrive at 
the essence of life itself, which is the Atman. 
Beidler also takes up the point about the latent mental impressions and its 
association with the Alman and the designing of the future bodies (ibid. 1975 : 
52). Although this may be viewed to be very mystical in content, the 
ontological nature of the Alman leads one to make logical propositions that 
suggest, in the form of a univerc;al justice system, that the unchanging reality of 
the Alman is an opportunity for the Purusha to eV01 ve towarcis its highest 
ethical end. Human action is not ends in themselves but they are means to a 
moral end. The motions in human activity through time and space are justified 
on the grounds of the unchanging nature of the Atman. 
Beidler furthermore takes up the issue of the ultimate nature of Alman and 
makes a clear distinction of it from any grossly created entity. (Beidler 1975 : 
55). He therefore suggests that the Alman, which is a consciously functioning 
unit, be without multiplicity and is viewed as a cosmic person or a universal 
self (ibid . 1975 : 56). In facing the contradiction between the Alman as the 
transpersonal reality and at the same time found immanent in the hea:t of being, 
he suggests a dipolar theory to resolve this contradiction. He suggests that the 
Atman is dipolar with having an individual pole, which is the foundation for the 
individual personality, and the universal pole, which advocates its impersonal 
nature (ibid. 1975, p56). Although these concepts may appear to be 
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contradictory, they express with limited objectivity the mysterious nature of the 
Atman. Although the dipolar theory explains the two contexts that the Atman is 
found expressed, there is a clear indication and confirmation of the connection 
between the personal dimension and the impersonal dimension. 
Urquhart observes that in discovering the deepest nature of ourselves we also 
discover the fundamental nature of the universe (Urquhart 1986: 30). In the 
consideration of the individual personality, it is inevitable that the formula tat 
tvam asi (that thou art ) is going to be raised. He notes that this formula 
expresses the equation of the individual self with the universe and the universe 
with the self in the highest sense (Urquhart 1986: 31). He also notes very 
posit ively that the true self of each individual when known thoroughly is 
discovered to be not at all individual but the essence of the individual self is 
realized in the inevitable identification of the Atman with Brahman (ibid. 1986: 
31). In the conception of the soul ' s identity, there is a fhrther ccnception such 
as the subtle body, which is seen to be the nucleus of the soul and which 
constitutes subtle gross elements and which continues to exist even after the 
death of the gross body (ibid. 1986: 160). In the vision of the individual 
identity, the conscious and unconscious levels of the soul in the form of organs 
of senses and actions and the vital air sheaths are described as maintaining the 
human condition (ibid. 1986: 161). The idea of a transcendent destiny of the 
soul is evident in Hindu texts and these destinies have been graded from a 
highest condition of communion with Brahman to the lowest condition of 
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returning into animal existence or going into an abode of punishment. These 
destinies seem to be worked out on the basis of ethical exceilence in one's life 
(ibid. 1986, P 163). The nature of the ultimate destiny is described as a perfect 
communion, a state where fulfillment of purified desires and ultimate state in 
which there can be no lower stage (ibid. 1986, P 168). 
This conception of the unity of the Brahman and Atman supports the idea of an 
integrated existence in which the transcendent reality is at the same time the 
immanent reality . This connection between the transcendent and the immanent 
has tremendous value for evolving an ethical system because it provides an 
ultimate ground within the "immanent space" for the principle of moral 
justification. 
Damodaran evaluated Shankara's thesis and concludes that if Brahman was the 
only Truth and if all phenomena, all objects including human beings were 
Brahman, would it be wrong to conclude that all men must be recognized as 
equals (Damodaran 1967: 259). He continued that the same Brahman is 
manifest in a Brahmin and Sudra and therefore there can be no justification for 
a caste system or for any social inequalities (Damodaran 1967: 259). 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
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It is quite evident that the notions of Brahman, Alman and world is deeply 
enveloped in the metaphysical discourse and very little attention was given to 
interpreting these ideas for the purpose of contributing to the ethical discourse. 
It must be noted that the metaphysical discourse aimed at transcending the 
nature of reality to a state of absolute metaphysical perfection, which 
undoubtedly is a moral-ethical end. However, it demonstrated the irrelevance of 
the empirical nature of moral reality. The main reasor for such an outcome is 
due to the relative nature of the empirical constitution and therefore the relative 
nature of the empirical moral reality that the connection between the absolute 
and empirical became a challenge. The Indian thinkers seem to have locked 
themselves into an ideological law that prescribes that the finite i.e. the 
empirical cannot fit into the infinite absolute. The category of finiteness must 
be given up for the sake of the absolute. If this ideological rule has to stay, 
then it will present a challenge to the empirical global ethical discourse. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the absolute needs to be interpreted in 
the context of being a common factor to a world of variety. It also became 
apparent that the notion of Atman, which reflected tl. e inner personality of a 
person, was essentially equal in all persons and of similar value in all created 
objects. Despite the various conceptualizations held by the traditional 
interpreters of Vedanta, the nature of personhood was primarily based on the 
principle of having ontological moral value. Through the tradition of classical 
and modern interpretations, evidence of making the Indian metaphysics more 
practical and relevant to the global way of life is noted. The primary basis of 
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this thesis is to render global ethical relevance to the notions of Brahman, 
A tman and the world so that it can contribute to formulating a framework for a 
Global ethic. This is possible because of the flexible nature and the universal 
character of the notions of Brahman and Alman. 
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CHAPTER 4 HINDU ETHICS THE 
TRADITIONAL DISCOURSE 
In the last chapter, the study focussed on Hindu metaphysics and concentrated 
on the theoretical notions of Brahman, Atman and the world in the context of 
the Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gila as well as from the 
interpretation of classical thinkers such as Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva 
and other contemporary thinkers. It has been noted that the metaphysical 
discourse is not completely isolated from the empirical ethical discourse 
although it embodies absolute categories that surpass all forms of ethical 
relativism. Notwithstanding this, the study explored the metaphysical 
interpretation of the Indian idealistic and theistic thinkers and has observed that 
both systems of thinking can make a positive contribution to the global ethical 
discourse. There are traditional ethical concepts such as dharma and karma that 
seem to link itself to the historic metaphysical discourse for the purpose of 
explaining the ultimate purpose of human action and destiny. Therefore this 
study will examine how the notions of dharma and karma will contribute to the 
development of the conceptual paradigm of the global ethical discourse. In this 
regard the traditional ethical discourse is rooted in the Prasthana Traya of 
Vedanta, viz. the Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gila. This study 
will venture to explore the origins and development of ethical ideas from the 
Vedas, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita. 
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4.1 The Ethical Vision of Vedanta 
The broad ethical vision of the Vedas is incorporated in the various texts viz. 
the Upanishads, Bhagavad Gila and more importantly the Vedanta Sutra. The 
development of Vedantic metaphysics, as we have noted earlier in the thesis, is 
primarily based on the Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gita. 
Therefore the broad ethical vision of Vedanta is drawn from these three 
primary sources. 
In the ensuing discussion in this chapter, my discussion on the broader ethical 
vision of Vedanta takes into account the ideas drawn from the Vedanta Sulra, 
Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita and by its classical interpreters such as 
Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva. Since the interpretation of the Vedanta 
Sutra by classical interpreters viz. Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva has been 
largely supported from the Upanishadic text and the Bhagavad Gita, some 
understanding of the ethical vision of the Upanishad and Bhagavad Gila will 
help clarify the Vedantic ideas of ethics better. 
4.2 The Ethical Vision of the Upanishads 
In this section, an examination of the ethical vision of the Upanishads will be 
ventured into. The main purpose of this investigation is to establish the way in 
which the ethical character of the Hindus developed in the Upanishads. In this 
analysis, we shall examine the criticism of an absence of ethics in the 
139 
Upanishads, the aim of moral action, the law of ethical action, the virtues of the 
Upanishad, Brahman as dharma, the absolute and empirical imperatives of 
moral action, the psychological basis for moral action, justifying ethics on 
metaphysical constructs, the notion of harmony of existence, the notions of 
ashrama and varna dharma, moral action and ritual action, renunciation of the 
world, the role of reason, understanding and knowledge in ethical action and 
the method to realize ethical ideal in the Upanishads. These issues constitute 
the basis of the ethical vision of the Upanishads. 
Although there are several criticisms that the Upanishads have neglected to 
construct a sound ethical vision, Radhakrishnan observ ~~, on the , .ontrary, that 
the Upanishads have insisted on the importance of an ethical life and the 
practice of moral virtues (Radhakrishnan 1994: 104). Michael, in his book, 
Radhakrishnan on Hindu Moral Life and Action, observes that moral action in 
the context of the Upanishads was grounded in the basic aim to become one 
with the Absolute (Michael 1979: 35). This meant that the ethical vision of the 
Upanishads was solely for human beings because only they had the capacity to 
realise this Absolute (Michael 1979: 35). However, there is also the 
metaphysical insight that all things evolve from the Supreme and will finally 
return to it. Therefore, there is a basic ethical essence in all things that direct 
this ultimate union. 
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It must be noted that the ethics of the Upanishads, is therefore, subsidiary to 
this ultimate goal. In the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (4.4.5), the law of ethical 
action is established in the following way: 
According as one acts, according as one beha.ves, so do(;s he 
become. The doer of good becomes good; the doer of evil becomes 
evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action and bad by bad 
action (Radhakrishnan 1994: 272). 
This forms the basis of the Upanishadic ethical paradigm and it reveals that the 
law of action is basically universal ; it applies to all persons. However, the only 
problem within this law is deciding what is considered virtuous and what is 
bad. This issue is a contextual one and may vary from one set of circumstance 
to another. Notwithstanding this challenge, the Upanishadic paradigm shared a 
clear vision of what is considered good and what can be the basis of an ethical 
life viz. sacrifice, asceticism, liberality, integrity, non-injury to life and 
truthfulness (Radhakrishnan 1994, p 108). Further to this, Radhakrishnan 
establishes the following virtues that constitute the ethical principles of the 
Upanishads viz. self-control (dama), self-discipline (tapas) , brahmacharya 
(celibacy), silence (mauna), charity (dana), compassion (daya) (ibid. 1994: 
109-111) and on the basis of this he concludes that the Upanishads adopt a 
profoundly spiritual view of life (ibid. 1994: 111). Added to this are the virtues 
. of selflessness, detachment, self-realization, self-renunciation, liberality, right 
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dealing, non-InJury, truthfulness, kindness and compassIOll for all, 
(Radhakrishnan 1923 : 212-220). It is quite clear that the ethical values of the 
Upanishads are both individualistic and social in nature and they aim at 
evolving the human condition towards its highest end. Furthermore, these 
ethical values demonstrate a universal character, which suggests that it can 
contribute to a global ethical paradigm on individual and social ethics. 
Although these ethical principles constituted the essence of social and 
individual value during the Upanishadic period, their relevance for the modern 
global ethical discourse must be considered. 
Moreover, one of the important features observed by Michael is that Brahman 
as the highest ethical principle is Dharma and is the self in every human being 
(Michael 1979: 39). In this regard, it must be noted that the Upanishadic ethical 
paradigm makes provision for a Transcendent ethical reality, an absolute 
ethical being which is immanent within the empirical nature of existence as 
dharma. Therefore, this paradigm creates variables of "absoluteness", in the 
notion of Brahman and an "empirical relative", in the notion of dharma, in its 
ethics. The connection between these two is that the empirical relative variable 
serves as the means and the absolute ethical variable serves as the end. In this 
context, even the notion of evil is established agai.nst the backdrop of a 
metaphysically absolute reality and is therefore defined in terms of one' s 
alienation from what is real. Likewise, Radhakrishnan establishes that it is the 
Self that is the overseer of all actions, who executes justice, who restrains evil 
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and allots goodness (Radhakrishnan 1994: 105-106). In the context of the 
Upanishadic ethical paradigm, ethical action is governed by a metaphysical 
reality and therefore there is no absolute freedom to ethical action. 
The Upanishadic ethical paradigm constructs a psychological basis for the 
performance of good and evil and it links such intents with Divine purpose 
(ibid. 1994: 107). Therefore, Radhakrishnan notes that the fundamental ethical 
inclination emerges from the inward nature of a person and he connects this 
inward world with this psychological basis (Radhakrishnan 1994: 107). It must 
be noted that an individual is driven towards ethical action largely because of 
the constitution of the inner world. Radhakrishnan also sets the ethical 
framework of the Upanishads against the backdrop of two metaphysical ideals 
viz. the ideal of becoming one with God and the ideal of the world originating 
from God and seeking its final resting place in God (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 207). 
He places morality as subsidiary to the perfect ideal of the Eternal Reality (ibid. 
1923 : 208), however, this does not reduce the significance of this morality. He 
adopts the method of justifying the practice of ethics on metaphysical 
constructs viz. the love of one' s neighbour is justified on the metaphysical 
notion of the oneness of reality (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 209). He raises the 
contestation of the finite and the infinite within man as a moral struggle 
between what is good and evil (ibid. 1923 : 210), thus implying that the infinite 
is ultimately good. 
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It is essential to identify that the inward nature of a person cannot be isolated 
from the ethical discourse. Although the Indian ethical ideal was largely 
theistic it demonstrated that ethics served as a means towards an ideal. There is , 
clear evidence that fundamental ethical action can be justified on metaphysical 
thinking. The unique feature of the Upanishadic ethical system is that it accords 
ethical value on abstract categories as the finite and infinite. These conceptual 
ideas from the Upanishads will be able to positively contribute to the 
conceptual paradigm of the global ethical discourse. 
Furthermore, Radhakrishnan notes that during the transition from the Vedic 
period to the Upanishadic period, the ethical emphasis was placed on living in 
harmony with the world by discharging one' s duties and responsibilities to the 
gods, men and animals (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 131). It is clear that the notion of 
world in Hindu thought does not just refer to the human world. It is 
consequently evident that the notions of duty and responsibility formed an 
integral part of the Upanishadic ethical paradigm. Moreover, these duties were 
clearly defined and they were orientated towards a metaphysical end and not an 
empirical end. In fact, empirical contradictions and shortfalls did not matter as 
long as the empirical ethical norms defined rationally its relation to a 
metaphysical context. Besides, the Upanishadic ethical paradigm operated not 
only in the context of a human world but also in the context of a "nature world" 
and "spirit world". This is indeed a unique feature of this paradigm. 
144 
The Upanishadic ethical paradigm also incorporated ethical institutions, such 
as the varna system and the ashrama system. Both these institutions will be 
examined in detail a little later. However, for this purpose, Radhakrishnan notes 
that ashrama dharma was introduced during this period and it emphasized the 
duties for the different stages of life (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 132). In fact the 
ashrama system and varna system throw sufficient light on how duty and 
responsibility form the basis of a moral social order that served a metaphysical 
end. While these ethical institutions served a given purpose within the 
Upanishadic paradigm, they declined in time into unethical practices. 
Notwithstanding this,. Radhakrishnan pointed out that caste duties depended on 
character and not birth (ibid. 1923 : 222) thus demonstrating the rightful place 
for caste duties within the ethical paradigm. He also noted how the flexible 
classless society declined into a rigid caste based society that suppressed 
freedom and progress and promoted class exclusiveness (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 
133) although he does not account for the precise factors that led to this. It must 
not be assumed that traditional ethical systems have embedded in them 
weaknesses that may result in their deterioration. It is possible that outside 
forces may have been responsible for such decline. 
Although the idea of caste is totally contrary to the human rights culture, the 
notion of ethical value attached to specific duty for the purpose of social order 
is an important idea that can contribute to the global ethical discourse. The 
functional differences in duty and responsibilities call with them ethical value 
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and it is this principle that must be dialogued with In the global ethical 
discourse. 
It has generally been held that the Vedic era was deeply ritualistic, therefore, 
ethical action was grounded on ritual action. In fact, kadhakrishnan notes that 
Godliness rested on good works and truth speaking and not cn the mechanical 
performance of rituals (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 131). The notion of good works 
and truth speaking are not limited in interpretation generally and within the 
context of the Upanishads. Within the context of the Upanishadic ethical 
paradigm, there are several interpretations that may hold for these two ideas. In 
fact, these notions may even be included into the global ethical discourse with 
very little difficulty. 
In many ethical theories man is seen as a moral agent. However, in the context 
of the Upanishadic ethical paradigm man is seen as a mediator between nature 
and God (Radhakrishnan 1994: 105). Although Radhakrishnan does not get 
into the specifics of this role it leaves sufficient room for interpretation. In the 
context of the Upanishadic ethical paradigm it is observed that man alone can 
act as a moral being and agent, therefore, mediation may suggest the specific 
responsibility that man has towards the nature world. If God is the symbol of 
absolute goodness then man can play the role of communicating this goodness 
to nature. The harmony of God, man and nature is fundamental to the 
Upanishadic ethical paradigm. 
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Due to the deep mys~ical nature of the Upanishadic speculations, interpreters 
have often created a perception that the Upanishadic ethical ideal advocates 
complete renunciation of the world. Radhakrishnan notes that while the ethical 
system of the Upanishads emphasized the notions of detachment and 
equanimity, he clarifies that the spirit of renunciation did not call for the 
neglect of social duties (Radhakrishnan 1994: 106). In fact, ethical action was 
deeply rooted within social action in the form of social duty and responsibility. 
Furthermore, the Upanishads did not call for the forsaking of the world but 
rather for the realization of the presence of God in the world of nature and 
society (Radhakrishnan. 1923 : 219). 
Radhakrishnan emphasizes the role of reason and understanding in the ethical 
frame (ibid. 1923 : 211). Although these may not be the ultimate instruments, 
they are vital as a starting point. On the issue of knowledge, he saw morality 
preliminary to it and believed that all works must be performed with knowledge 
and that knowledge must not be viewed in a narrow sense but must realise itself 
in ethical works. (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 223-225). The means towards realizing 
the ethical ideals of the Upanishads rested with meditation, concentration, 
contemplation, cleansing one' s mind, prayers and fasting (ibid. 1923 : 220-221). 
These provided the basis on which ethical realization could take place with the 
purpose of actualizing the ethical goal. 
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His concluding remarks were: 
Moral activity is not an end in itself. It is to be taken over into the 
perfect life. Only this has transcendental worth ... .In this state the 
individual being is absorbed in the Supreme. This alone have 
transcendental worth, but the moral struggle, as preparing the way 
for it is not useless (Radhakrishnan 1923 : 230) 
It is interesting that Radhakrishnan reached such a conclusion because he 
follows the hermenuetical scheme of Shankara and Shankara found that there 
was a need for one to transcend ethics in order to actualize the final goal. In 
general, the Upanishadic vision seems to be summed up in the above point that 
moral action is subsidiary to a metaphysical ideal. It is evident that the 
Upanishads did place emphasis on ethics because it projected ethical action as 
a pre-requisite for metaphysical communion. It is this idea of union with the 
ultimate reality that constituted the framework of the Upanishadic ethics. 
Relative morality and its contradictions were not the mlin focus of the 
Upanishads. The law of ethical action revealed the principle of its universal 
intent. It is largely the connection of ethical action to the metaphysical ideal 
that renders ethical laws universal. An examination of the virtues of the 
Upanishads reveals that they also have a universal character and can easily 
contribute to the global ethical discourse. The need to use metaphysics in the 
traditional ethical discourse is demonstrated in the way the notion of dharma is 
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lifted from its empirical categories of application and linked with the ultimate 
reality, the Brahman itself. This suggests that empirical ethical categories 
cannot be isolated from its metaphysical ideals. Both empirical ar,d absolute 
imperatives are reqlJired to give full expression to moral action and for 
justifying moral action. Within the Upanishads the principle of justifying 
ethical action rests on how such action can be justified in the context of its 
metaphysical relevance. Metaphysical relevance forms the basis of ethical 
justification. The advantage of the metaphysical-empirical ethical paradigm is 
revealed in the fact that it results in harmony amidst the variety and diversity. 
Radhakrishnan discloses a fresh interpretation to the ethical paradigm of the 
Upanishad by raising moral action from its ritual inclination and by redefining 
the issue of renunciation. He raises the traditional ethical discourse to the level 
of a more universal ethical discourse by suggesting the role of reason, 
understanding and knowledge. It is on the foundation of such a hermenuetical 
framework that this study will venture to construct a proposal of a global ethic 
for the global ethical discourse. 
4.3 The Ethical Vision of the Bhagavad Gita 
In this investigation, the study will explore the basis of the ethical vision of the 
Bhagavad Gila. The main objective of this investigation is to establish the 
background of ethical ideas and approaches that can be used to contribute to the 
global ethical discourse. In the last section an explic?tion of the vision of the 
Upanishadic ethics was pursued and it became increasingly clear that the 
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traditional ethical discourse is rooted to metaphysical ideals which makes it 
possible to establish universal laws for human action. Furthermore, it is noted 
that Upanishadic ethics serve as a prerequisite for a metaphysical ideal. 
However, in this analysis, this study will probe into the list of virtues in the 
Bhagavad Gila, the distinction between virtue and vice, the notion of equality, 
the idea of a universal ethical standard, the unity of inner spirituality and 
outward action, the ethical nature of "means", the nature of social duty in 
Bhagavad Gila and the relationship between social duty and spiritual ideal. 
This study will also explore the Bhagavad Gila's ethical activism, the notion of 
svadharma, the impact of attachment and desire on human conduct, universal 
altruism, the morality theory based on the principle of sameness and finally the 
oneness of the absolute value and the diversity of the "means" as basis to 
explicate the ethical vision of the Bhagavad Gila. 
K. Damodaran notes that the Bhagavad Gila being a popular poetic exposition 
underpinned by a profound philosophic discourse between Krishna and Arjuna 
and forming part of the great epic the Mahabharata, emphasized the notion of 
human action (Damodaran. 1967: 186). He therefore implies that the Bhagavad 
Gila is a textbook of human ethics. Michael, on the other hand, observes that 
the Bhagavad Gila deals with ethical issues in great detail (Michael 1979: 55). 
In chapter 16 verse 1-3, a list of virtues is outlined viz. fearlessness, purity of 
mind, knowledge and concentration, charity, self control, sacrifice, study of the 
scriptures, austerity, uprightness, non-violence, truth, freedom from anger, 
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renunciation, tranquillity, aversIOn to fault finding, compassIOn to living 
beings, freedom from covetousness, gentleness, modesty and steadiness, vigor, 
forgiveness, purity, freedom from malice and pride (Michael 1979: 56). These 
virtues provide insight into the acceptable character of an individual in the 
context of his day to day life and the context of the ethics dealt with in the Gila. 
It must be noted that the distinction between virtue and vice is clearly defined 
in the Bhagavad Gila (ibid. 1979: 58). However, in the second chapter of the 
Bhagavad Gila Lord Krishna describes the character of a moral person as one 
who sets aside selfish desires, who feels self-contentment, who is absent of ego, 
not affected by the duality of the world, one who does not think about the fruits 
of what one does, and one who commits to duty for the sake of duty (Joshi 
1991 : 91-92). As much as these moral values were applicable to individuals in 
the context of their caste duties, they share a universal basis. 
Furthermore, K. Damodaran observes that the ethics of the Gita have arisen 
from a liberal philosophic outlook (Damodaran 1967: 192). This meant that the 
ethics of the Gita did not emerge from an orthodox system of closed values just 
passed down from one generation to another but it emerged out of the 
freethinking and contextual situation in which Arjuna and Krishna found 
themselves. The notion of equality that he advocates is based on two 
fundamental proposals viz. the linking of individual souls with one another 
which is encapsulated in the idea of injury to another is an injury to oneself 
(ibid. 1967: 192), and secondly, that the notion that the Lord is immanent in all 
151 
may mean that all human beings from brahmin to chandala are eyual before 
God (ibid. 1967: 193). Both these principles consist of ethical essences that 
point to the notion of justifying the human rights principle of human equality 
and dignity. Therefore the ethics of the Gita can contribute to theoretical 
propositions towards the global ethical discourse that add meaning to the 
notions of human equality and dignity. 
In the ethical discourse, it is often submitted that its methodology is in quest of 
a universal ethical standard. In this regard Mess notes that: 
Hinduism recognizes no universal ethical standard. The standard 
varies according to the degree of development of the individual or 
the group. It varies even according to the stages of life of the 
individual or the group (Mess 1986: 18) 
This does not mean that the various people cannot establish a universal ideal 
among themselves. To find one central idea of good may present challenges to 
the ethical discourse. 
Sri Aurobindo notes that the central interest of the Gita's philosophy and Yoga 
is to effect a kind of unity between the inner spiritual truth in its most absolute 
and integral realization and the outer actualities of man's life and action 
(http ://www.searchforlight.orgiGita). He notes that the Gila sets out with an 
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ethical problem in which we have on the one side the dharma of the man of 
action and on the other side the ethical sense which condemns the means and 
the action as a sin (ibid. http://www.searchforlight). The issues of truth, right 
and justice; and wrong and injustice are at the forefront of the mental conflict 
facing Arjuna. The issues of individual suffering, social strife, social 
disturbance as a result of the violence and battle and the right moral attitude is 
placed before Arjuna before the commencement of the battle (ibid. 
http ://www.searchforlight) . Aurobindo notes that a spiritualized ethics insists 
on Ahimsa or non-injury and non-killing as the highest law of spiritual conduct 
(ibid . http://www.searchforlight), yet social duty demands the very opposite. 
This is ethical conflict and therefore such conflicts are resolved by making 
reference to ultimate ends. 
Furthermore, Sri Aurobindo notes the struggle between social duty and an 
absolutist ethical idea and suggests that an inner spiritual direction may point 
away from life and may aim at a celestial supracosmic state, which is beyond 
the state of birth and death (ibid. http ://www.searchforlight). Having said this, 
he maintains that the Gila insists on the performance of social duty and accepts 
Ahimsa as part of the highest spiritual ethical ideal (ibid . 
http://www.searchforl ight). Therefore, he asserts the compatibility of human 
action and spiritual life lived in union with the Infinite (ibid. 
http://www.searchforlight) as a resolution to ethical dilemmas. 
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Hiriyanna notes that the Bhagavad Gila, not only concerns itself with the 
problems of conduct (ethics), it touches upon metaphysical questions as well, 
which form the background to the ethical teaching (Huiyanna 1993 : 117). He 
concludes that the central part of the Gila' s teaching is activism (ibid . 1993 : 
118). This activism, in the Gila's sense, refers to duties or social obligations in 
accordance with custom and tradition (Hiriyanna 1993 : 118-119). The ethical 
paradigm of the Gila emphasized the notion of focussing on the act and 
neglecting the result, in other words, making the action the end in itself (ibid. 
1993, P 119). In this regard, Hiriyanna stated: 
An important consequence of following this principle of action is 
that one can act with complete equanimity. Desire or self interest 
when allowed to have its sway over us may blind us to what is 
right, and even when we succeed in choosing to do the right deed, 
undue eagerness to secure its fruit may induce us to swerve from 
the path of rectitude (Hiriyanna 1993 : 119-120). 
Hiriyanna believes that the Gila's ethic is to engage in action within a social 
order and abandon the idea of deriving personal benefit from such action (ibid. 
1993 : 120). He highlights the Gila 's emphasis of svadharma (one' s own 
dharma or social obligation). The purpose of performing these selfless duties is 
to purify the heart and for subserving the purpose of God (ibid. 1993 : 125). 
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Both of these lead to self real ization and God realization in which the realm of 
good and evil is transcended (ibid. 1993 : 126). 
Dasgupta notes that the ethics of the Gita focuses on uprooting attachments to 
pleasures and controlling desire because attachment and desire are the seeds of 
frustration, and anger (Dasgupta Vol. 2, 1941 : 496-498). He also notes that the 
Gila does not make a case for universal altruism that one should live only for 
others (ibid. 1941: 501). He observes that when action is performed without 
attachment and for action sake, then the evil effects of the action wilf not affect 
or impact on the performer (Dasgupta 1941 : 503). He notes that the ethical 
theory of the Bhagavad Gila proclaims that the goodness and badness of an 
action does not depend upon the external effects of the action but upon the 
inner motive of the action (Dasgupta 1941 : 507). Therefore, the morality theory 
of the Gila proposes a deeply subjective basis (ibid. 1941 : 507). Dasgupta notes 
that the ethics of the Gila emphasizes duty and responsibility as a social 
obligation (ibid. 1941 : 509). He also notes that the virtue of samatva 
(sameness; balanced) is the great ideal of the Gila which is exercised in three 
contexts viz (I) subjective sameness which is the equanimity of the mind in 
joys and sorrows, praise and blame, and in all situations in life (ii) objective 
sameness which refers to regarding all people good, bad or indifferent a friend 
or enemy, with equal eyes and seeing them the same (iii) level of transcendence 
refers to a state of self realization (ibid. 1941: 511-512) in which all are seen as 
manifestations of God. 
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Radhakrishnan notes that the end that we seek is becoming Brahman, which is 
the absolute value (Radhakrishnan Vol. 1, 1923 : 553). He notes that the end is 
the same no matter whichever standpoint we take (ibid. 1923 : 553). The Gila 
demonstrates that different pathways are not ultimately different but lead to the 
same goal (ibid. 1923 : 554). This can become the basis of debating the 
common ultimate end. 
The virtues highlighted by the Gila correlate with that of the Upanishads and 
emphasize individual and social ethical conduct. The distinction between virtue 
and vice is clarified in the Gila and such a distinction is calculated on the basis 
of its relationship to the ultimate end and not the contextual nature of action. 
The presupposition of the immanence of God in the heart of all is an ideal 
notion to support the idea of the human equality and dignity. However, this 
idea of unity is not confined to the human world but also extends to the nature 
world and the spirit world. It is conclusive that it is difficult to establish a 
universal moral action in the empirical plane. This difficulty is resolved by 
connecting outward action to the inward spiritual sphere. The ethical discourse 
generally links moral action to the psychological sphere, however, the Gila 
proposes a link to the inward spiritual sphere. It is this link that will establish 
the ethical nature of the means. The Gila' s ethical activism advocates the ideal 
of fulfilling social obligations through individual. duty (svadharma) . 
Psychological activity can impact on ethical conduct and therefore 
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psychological purity through duty is prescribed. The Gila does not propose a 
philosophy of universal altruism but a morality based on equal vision. 
4.4 The Place of Ethics in Vedanta 
In this investigation, the study will probe the place of ethics in Vedanta. 
Scholars have often articulated that Vedanta is a post ethical metaphysical 
system, therefore leaving very little room for ethical interpretation. This study 
will evaluate whether such a position is true and if not, then to what extent can 
the Vedanta contribute to the global ethical discourse. In this analysis, this 
study will investigate the nature of ethics and the ultimate state; the conception 
of perfection and good; ethics and duality; the transcendence of ethics in 
Advaita; the nature of activity in Advaita; the validity of ethics in Advaita; the 
doctrine of inherent divinity; the aims of ethics; ethics and a character-less 
reality; and the depreciation of personality as a system to establish the place 
that Vedanta gives to ethics. The fundamental question that needs to be raised 
is whether Vedanta contributes to ethical endeavor? Whether ethical principles 
have their place in the ultimate state? Can ethical life be maintained in its 
fullness on the basis of the doctrine of abstract and unmodified identity 
between characterless Absolute and us? These questirlf)S are the starting point 
in the exploration of the place that Vedanta gives to ethics. 
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Urquhart notes that the ethical achievement of a pious man is not the final and 
that his ethical gains are not carried forward to the ultimate state (Urquhart 
1986: 172). This, in reality, will mean that there is no real relevance for ethics. 
This is a position that differs fundamentally from that of Radhakrishnan, which 
was articulated earlier. It is also observed from a Vedantic standpoint, that the 
notion of perfection is considered as a higher ethical concept than the concept 
of good and the latter is confined to finite experiences and not to the ultimate 
reality as a whole (ibid. 1986: 172). So the higher ethical standard will be 
absolute perfection instead of what is relatively good . One of the central 
proposals of the traditional ethical theory is that ethics belongs essentially to 
the sphere of duality and is not within any sphere in which activity is denied or 
transcended (Urquhart 1986: 172). This is because ethics is embodied in moral 
action and not simply in ethical thinking and theorizing. 
Shankara understood that ethical endeavor was impossible without 
individuality and personality. (Urquhart 1986: 173). It is not possible to deny 
one' s individual existence or sublimate it in the context of ethics. Ethical 
notions are connected to individuality and personality. He also maintains that 
ego cannot be got rid of in moral progress and as long as ego is present it is 
impossible to attain the highest (ibid. 1986: 173). Therefore, his conclusion is 
that ethics must be transcended or left behind (ibid. 1986: 173). Shankara could 
not see a direct place for his metaphysical ideas in the context of the traditional 
ethical ideas. However, Shankara's ideas need to be re-evaluated in relation to 
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the global ethical discourse. Furthermore, Urquhart, issues the warning that just 
because Shankara assigns a subordinate place to works, does not mean that 
they have no importance at all and he concludes that there is a close connection 
between Vedanta teaching and the practice of higher virtues (ibid. 1986: 174). 
Urquhart also observes that "Depreciation of the individual seems to result 
inevitably in a depreciation of ethics". (ibid. 1986: 174). Therefore, the idea of 
depreciating the individual is of little significance to the global ethical 
discourse. Instead Shankara's understanding of the empirical individual 
identity needs to be collaborated with the global ethical discourse. If this point 
is to be taken into consideration then the notion of the individual and social life 
must aim to reach and abide in perfection. If this is so, then one must give 
absolute validity to ethics (ibid. 1986: 175). In Vedanta, it must be noted that 
while highest condition of the soul may not necessarily be the highest ethical 
state (ibid. 1986: 175), the evolution of the individual towards the highest 
condition has ethical relevance. So the notion of the individual cannot be 
depreciated or reduced in value. 
Now on the issue of inherent divinity, one of the problems with the doctrine of 
the inherent divinity, which affirms that God is found within man, is that it 
equalizes man with God . If man can claim that he is godlike, he therefore does 
not stand in need of any ethical improvement (Urquhart 1986: 176) In response 
to this, Radhakrishnan notes that "God is not in man in such an obvious fashion 
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that he can possess Him absentmindedly and without a struggle. God is present 
as a potential or a possibility" (in Urquhart 1986: 177). This means that every 
individual has the potential of realizing the Divine that is situated within. The 
process of realizing this Divinity is an ethical one. Therefore, it would be 
incorrect to assume that on declaring one' s inherent divinity, one has perfected 
the human condition. Furthermore, the doctrine of inherent divinity consumes 
all superficial and artificial distinctions in social relationships, where one's own 
self is conceived as the other (Urquhart 1986: 178). This doctrine forms a 
powerful theoretical base for the principle of equality in the human rights 
discourse and the global ethical discourse. However, the common criticism of 
this doctrine is that it allows for social injustice when one promotes one's own 
interest thinking that in so doing the interest of the other will be promoted 
because all are one through the self. This criticism does not carry because in the 
context of the doctrine of inherent divinity, there is the doctrine of "duty" 
which is prescribed for each individual. Notwithstanding the fact that every 
individual is ontologically linked, there is also the need for the individual to 
perform his prescribed duty for the benefit of society. 
Urquhart observes that there is a fundamental deficiency in Shankara's concept 
of identity because it 'is not differentiating enough to provide a basis for social 
ethics (Urquhart 1986: 178-179). Urquhart says: 
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, 
[a]n identification with others which is associated with a denial of 
their reality as individuals is absolutely fatal to ethical endeavor of 
a social character (ibid. 1986: 179) 
It is observed that the notion of identity in the context of a characterless 
Brahman means nothing that has importance for ethics (ibid. 1986: 181). In 
this regards Urquhart says: 
Ethics refuses to be satisfied with a characterless Absolute. It 
demands a Reality having a character, which may constitute our 
goal (Urquhart 1986: 182) 
It must be noted that the conception of an eternal self which is conceptualized 
as ultimately unchangeable stands in no need to add good qualities or remove 
bad ones (Urquhart 1986: 182). Ethics depends on a sphere of reality in which 
it may work and be characterized by common experience, which takes into 
account the evil, and sorrow of the world and does not relegate these to the 
sphere of unreality (ibid. 1986: 183). Individual personality is not an accident 
or anomaly but is normal to the universe and therefore ethics cannot be secured 
if it is associated with the depreciation of the personality (Urquhart 1986: 187). 
Urquhart ' s conclusion is summed up as follows that God must be brought from 
the negative to the positive organic relationship with t'le world through contact 
with history and must be made present in endeavors in men (ibid. p 190). 
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However, for the purpose of this study the notion of Shankara's "individual 
personality" must not be allowed to be depreciated but be given a new 
interpretation. Furthermore, while Urquhart may find little significance of a 
negative notion of the ultimate, an interpretation of it for the purposes of 
satisfying the global quest may be relevant for the global ethical discourse. 
It is inevitable to conclude that there is very little room or relevance for 
personal or social ethics in an ultimate state. However, the ultimate reality must 
serve as a absolute substratum to be reinterpreted and be given social relevance 
by the global community. Furthermore, if the ultimate reality stands for an 
absolute point of reference, which is with character and is the final goal of 
existence, then it is easy to find a place in it for ethics. Whilst global ethics can 
be derived from the Advaitic tradition its relevance for a dualistic system 
cannot be ignored as well. In fact the ultimate ends of Advaita need to give 
validity to a global ethical system if such ultimate ends are to be of common 
human relevance. If Advaita aims to depreciate the nature of individuality, then 
it will destroy ethics. Therefore ethics must rely on and direct the interpretation 
of the empirical individual in the context of its relation to the ultimate goal. 
Even the doctrine of inherent divinity, which may present hermeneutical 
challenges, gives added meaning to ethical behavior. So the idealists and theists 
of Vedanta both have a contribution to make in developing the global ethical 
discourse. 
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4.5 The Concept Dharma 
In the previous section we explored the ethical VISIon of the Vedas, 
Upanishads, and Bhagavad Gila and established vClrious ethical ideas that 
constitute the general traditional ethical discourse in Indian thought. However, 
in this reflection we will focus on the analysis of the notion of dharma, which 
is considered to be the cornerstone of traditional Hindu ethics. 
4.6 Definition of Dharma 
In this part a detailed analysis of the concept of dharma will be pursued. This 
analysis will focus on the root meaning of the term dharma, the definition 
given by the lawgiver Manu, the relationship between the concept dharma and 
rta, dharma as an action concept, the basis of dharrr.c.: for mOf ai, mcial, and 
religious meaning, the relation of dharma to subsidiary concepts, and the 
notion of dharma in Scriptures. This analysis will give sufficient light on the 
meaning of the term dharma and the manner in which it has been used in the 
traditional ethical discourse. It is proposed that the theoretical features of the 
notion dharma will be able to contribute to the presuppositions of the global 
ethic. 
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Mess notes that the term dharma is derived from the root "dhri" which means 
support, sustain, maintain, hold or keep (Mess 1986: 6). Bhagavan Das defines 
the idea of dharma as follows : 
That which holds a thing together, makes it what it is, prevents it 
from breaking up and changing it into something else, its 
characteristic function, its peculiar property, its fundamental 
attribute, its essential nature, is its dharma, the law of its being, 
primarily (in Mess 1986: 11). 
Furthermore, it is noted that Manu defines Dharma in terms of the following 
virtues: "contentment, forgiveness, self control, abstention from unrighteously 
appropriating anything, purification, coercion of the organs, wisdom, 
knowledge, truthfulness and abstention from anger" (Mess 1986: 11-12). Manu 
also notes that dharma is taken in the sense of good works or merit performed 
by an individual which will be carried by the individual beyond Death (ibid . 
1986: 12). It is noted from the contribution of Manu that the notion of dharma 
is strongly associated with the idea of Divine Justice in which both cause and 
effect tend towards some form of equilibrium (ibid. 1986: 13). It is clear that 
Manu' s interpretation reveals that ethical constn'cts have metaphysical 
relevance and is also linked to eschatological ideals. 
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There is also a keen relationship between the notion of dharma and rfa. Mess 
notes that the notion of rfa is used in the sense of law and order in the Vedas 
and it assumes the function of being a sustaining principle of the higher and 
lower worlds (ibid. 1986: 9). It is furthermore noted that the notion of rfa has 
an ethical character and it also stands for social and moral order, with the social 
order being an instrument of the moral order (Mess 1986: 9). Following the 
line of Max Muller' s interpretation of the word, it is possible to establish that 
the word rIa refers to Law or Nature or Moral Law (ibid. 1986: 9). 
Furthermore, following the interpretation of Rudolf Otto, it is possible to 
establish that the notion of rIa means, order, to regulate and is expressed in 
social life as a binding order of morals, customs, laws and manners (ibid. 1986: 
10). It is clear that the notion of dharma and rIa have functional similarities. 
Lipner also notes that the notion of dharma means that which "bears up" 
(Lipner 1994: 86). He further notes that among the traditional Hindus, the term 
dharma refers to the essential characteristic or basic !1roperty of a thing (ibid. 
1994: 86). He also records that dharma can have a physical, moral, social and 
religious connotation depending on the context it is used (Lipner 1994: 86). 
Lipner refers to dharma as one of the most important "action concepts" in the 
history of Hinduism (Lipner 1994: 83). He clarifies this notion of dharma as a 
normative concept, which serves as a reference point for everyday 
implementation (ibid. 1994: 83). 
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Swami Vivekananda, on the other hand, notes that the term dharma signifies 
the law of inner growth by which a person is supported in his present state of 
evolution and is shown the way to future development (.htmthanks.htm.l 
.lvices.htmvices.htm, . p5). Prasad also notes that the notion of dharma is 
generally explicated in terms of the following subsidiary concepts viz. 
sadharana dharma, varnashrama dharma and svadharma (Prasad 1989: 286). 
According to the Purva Mimamsa, dharma is that good is determinable by the 
Vedic commands (Joshi 1991 : 187). So that which is enjoined by the Vedas is 
virtue and that which is prohibited by the Vedas is sin (ibid. 1991 : 187). 
In the Bhagavad Gila the notion of dharma is translated as duties and 
ceremonies (Govender A 2002: 31). Dharma is see'1 as moral or religious 
values operating at the basic social unit viz. the family (ibid. 2002: 31). Swami 
Prabhupada translates the word dharma in the Gila to mean religion (ibid. 
2002: 31). In the context of the Gila the highest moral value was to fulfil one ' s 
function or duty (ibid. 2002: 32). The concept of dharma is also used in the 
sense of righteousness, knowledge, discipline and advancement (ibid. 2002: 
32). It is also noted that the idea of dharma can be said to be synonymous with 
the idea of selfless action (ibid . 2002: 33). In the Gila the concept of dharma is 
very closely related to the notion of karma and the gunas (ibid. 2002: 33-34). It 
is noted that in the religious texts as the Mahabharata, Bhagavata Purana the 
notion of Dharma is depicted as a mythological persor. n~vealing moral lessons 
(Mess 1986: 6-7). 
166 
In the Dharma shastras, it is possible to establish that the notion of dharma can 
be translated as a legal compromise between the ideal and the actual (Mess 
1986: 14). This perhaps allows for a relativistic interpretation of dharma. In 
fact, much of what is found in the Dharma Shastras is accepted as Law, this 
means that dharma can also be translated as common law (Mess 1986: 14). On 
the issue of the difference or conflict arising between Shastra and rational law, 
the authority of reason is generally upheld (Mess 1986: 15). 
It is quite evident that despite the root meaning of the concept dharma, it has 
assumed a variety of secondary meanings. It is very difficult to pin the notion 
of dharma to an exact area of meaning. Right from the time of Manu to the 
Bhagavad Gila, the concept dharma evolved a moral, social and religious 
meaning. It is anticipated that this concept may even contribute to the Global 
ethical discourse with renewed meaning. It is also observed that the notion of 
Sanatana Dharma is associated with the idea of universal dharma, which 
became the foundation for the idea of international law (Mess 1986: 16) and it 
has raised the understanding of the notion of dhar'na into a universalistic 
theme. 
4.7 Sources of Dharma and Textual Conflicts 
In the previous section we explored the meaning of the concept dharma in 
various contexts. In this part, we will explore the different sources of dharma 
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and the procedure in resolving textual conflicts and conflicts in dharma. The 
main rationale behind this analysis is to establish the method that is used in 
resolving conflict. The development of the global ethical discourse is bound to 
bring many cultures and worldviews into conflict, and it is necessary to 
establish a method as to how such conflicts can be resolved. This analysis will 
focus on the conflict between sruti, smriti, sadachara; the non-scriptural 
sources of dharma; the hierarchy of scriptural authority; the principle of 
majority opinion; the sanction to override scriptural authority; the principles of 
Lokavidvista (popular view), mahajana (view of great people), and ka/ivarja 
(historical changes in society) and the issue of textual absolutism. 
Joshi notes that in Hindu ethics sruti, smriti and sadachara are valid sources of 
the knowledge of dharma (Joshi 1991 : 185). He also notes that dharma cannot 
be known by perception or inference therefore sabda is the only means of 
knowing it (Joshi 1991 : 187). He maintains that customs; common usage and 
practices of saints constitute legitimate sources of Dharma (Joshi 1991: 187). 
All Dharmashastras and Dharmasutra are also essential sources of dharma 
(ibid. 1991 : 188). 
If there is a conflict between the sruti text, smriti text and sadachara, the 
general rule accepted is that the preceding source will hold greater authority 
than the succeeding one (ibid. 1991 : 188). If the smriti is in conflict with the 
sruti then the authority of the sruti is upheld etc. If there are two Vedic texts 
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that are in conflict, then the conflict is resolved by holding that one 0f the texts 
states a general rule and the other states a special rule (ibid. 1991 , P 188). 
According to the Gobhila Smriti the opinion of the majority should prevail in 
the case of conflict between the smriti (ibid. 1991 : 188). 
Joshi further notes that when public opinion disapproves of that which the 
smriti has sanctioned, then according to certain smriti texts themselves that 
which is consequently lokavidvista should be dropped (ibid. 1991: 189). He 
notes that this is an important concession to society for overriding scriptural 
authority in certain cases (ibid. 1991: 189). Such concepts were availed for 
sanctioning social changes. This does not mean that public opinion is always 
progressive but it justifies the point that moral and ethical knowledge cannot 
always be based on textual sources (Joshi 1991 : 190). Furthermore, this 
suggests that values and norms that are sanctioned by the scriptures are not 
immuned from the impact of social changes. 
Joshi notes that sometimes the conflict among all sources of dharma is so 
intense that all attempts at legitimizing it through scriptures are given up then 
the path followed by the great mass of virtuous people should be adhered to 
(Joshi 1991: 190-191). Joshi also notes that people can change the norms and 
rules or choose among the conflicting ones as individuals or as groups (ibid. 
1991: 191). This provision can be used to evolve new directions for social 
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morality as well as individual morality and this principle is known as mahajana 
(Joshi 1991: 191). 
The principle of kalavarja illustrates the necessity of taking into account the 
historical changes in the consciousness of the people through time (ibid. 1991: 
191). Through this principle it becomes intelligible as to how changes in social 
consciousness may lead to changes in the nature of moral sanctions (Joshi . 199: 
191). The tension between scriptural texts and social changes i.s a contemporary 
one and therefore requires a modern day solution. Joshi notes that extreme 
textual morality has never worked because social change, experience and 
observation, moral sensibility and public opinion have always threatened 
textual absolutism (ibid. 1991: 193). 
It is evident that there are both scriptural and non-scriptural sources of dharma 
in Indian thought. There is a very systematic method of dealing with conflicts 
in dharma between the scriptural texts. It is also important to note that in 
certain instances majority opinion may be taken into account to establish a 
dharmic principle. There is also a rule to override a scriptural injunction if such 
an injunction is against the spirit of progress. The principles of Lokavidvista, 
mahajana, kalivarja allow for greater mobility in establishing principles of 
dharma for the global ethical discourse and it prevents scriptural absolutism. 
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4.8 The Character of Dharma 
In the last section we focussed on the various sources of dharma and the 
principles that inform the formulating and evaluating of dharmic action. In this 
part of the analysis we will focus on dharma in relation to the different stages 
of one' s life; the relation and integration of dharma to different perspectives of 
life; its relation to action; dharma as a means to ethical ends; dharma 
transcends culture of rights; dharma 's relation to order and choice; dharma and 
functionality ; the relation of virtue and function; and finally moksha as the 
basis of justifying dharma. This analysis fundamentally outlines the character 
of dharma for the purpose of understanding the kind of contribution it can 
make to the global ethical discourse. 
Mess notes that dharma is conceptualized according to the different stages of 
an individual ' s development and it is related to the different fields in which 
individual ' s work (Mess 1986, p22). He also notes that the notion of dharma 
has significance for the religious person, the ethical person, a legal person, a 
psychologist as well as a philosopher (Mess 1986: 22). Therefore, the notions 
of religious Jaw, standards for good and evil, protection of right, tradition, 
common law and consciousness of unity can all be traced to the notion of 
dharma (ibid. 1986: 22). 
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Furthermore, the nature of dharma involves action and not flight from action 
(ibid . 1986: 23). Mess notes that there are many kinds of work which ranges 
from physical labor, emotional, mental and spiritual work that falls within the 
sphere of dharma (ibid. 1986: 23). In the fourfold purpose of life, material 
well-being (A rtha) , sensuous and sensual experience (Kama) and moral 
perfection (Dharma) are subsidiary to spiritual liberation which is the final end 
of man (ibid. 1986: 25-26). Mess also notes that the performing of dharma led 
to the ethical ends of health, wealth, pleasure, happiness and bliss (ibid. 1986: 
28) which was part of the lifestyle of the Hindu. He also notes that dharma 
brings happiness if all discharge their own duties to the community and social 
groups or to the world as a whole, regardless of rights (ibid. 1986: 30). 
Lipner notes that the notion of dharma consisted largely of rules and 
regulations which expressed socio-religious ideals (Lipner 1994: 83). From a 
socio religious perspective, dharma upholds private and public life and 
therefore establishes social, moral and religious order (ibid. 1994: 86). He notes 
that at the heart of this concept there are two tensions viz. order and chaos and 
between choice and necessity (ibid. 1994: 86). These tensions do impact on the 
ethical discourse either positively or negatively. 
It must be noted that dharma has a relative nature and therefore does not 
proclaim an exclusive absolute state of Good or Evil (.htmthanks.htm.l 
.lvices.htmvices.htm, p5). To impose a single concept of Good is a social 
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injustice and therefore any attempt at defining Good is done in the context of 
realizing God which is the basis of the unity of existence ( ibid. htmthanks.htm. 
I.Ivices.htmvices.htm, p5). 
Prasad also notes that the concept of dharma is not only soci?J but also 
functional in the sense that every one has to follow some dharma because the 
dharma of an individual is located in a social function (Prasad 1989: 284). The 
virtue of a man is in performing his function (ibid. 1989: 284). Prasad also 
notes that the notion of dharma is deeply integrated with svadharma, 
varnashrama dharma and sadharana dharma and it does not allow for 
degeneration or exploitation of one order by another (ibid. 1989: 290-291). It is 
also noted that for some Indian thinkers the dharmic life is nothing but a 
condition for the attainment of moksha and moksha is the ultimate justifier of 
dharma (ibid . 1989: 299) The problem that may be associated with this is that a 
liberated person may have no purpose for any morality. This can only happen if 
the person is situated outside the human society (ibid. 1989: 301). Therefore, 
Prasad notes that moksha may be an amoral ideal (ibid. 1989: 301). 
It is quite clear that the concept of dharma is multifaceted in character, it has a 
unifying function or a global function and it is deeply rooted in life. The 
concept of dharma appears to be very relative in nature in that it clearly defines 
the different stages of one' s life. The different stages of life will require 
different functions, duties and responsibilities and this is adequately catered for 
173 
in the concept of dharma which is very flexible in d :aracter. at.:Ir.an life is 
fairly complex and it involves various perspectives such as the religious, the 
social, the economic, political, ethical etc. In this context the notion of dharma 
is adjusted to each of these perspectives, defining their essential character and 
responsibilities. In fact, it is like the inner guiding principle of every action. Not 
only is dharma the ethical standard for moral action, it is at the same time the 
means to an ethical end. This suggests that the "end" of moral action must 
justify the "means" of moral action and the "means" must justify the "end". 
The unique feature of the notion of dharma is that while it compliments the 
culture of human rights, it also transcends it. This transcendence is based on the 
fact that it has an ultimate goal to fulfil. 
4.8. 1 Svadharma 
In the last section this study ventured to establish the character of dharma in a 
multifaceted context. It became evident that the concept of dharma is more 
than just an ethical concept, it is a social, economic and political concept as 
well . In this part, this study will analyze the subsidiary notion of dharma viz. 
the concept of svadharma. This reflection will focus on svadharma as an 
individual professional duty; the links with rebirth; t}1e relation of svadharma 
and sanatana dharma; and svadharma as caste duties. The notion of svadharma 
is situated in traditional professional ethics and it is the objective of this thesis 
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to establish the theoretical features of this notion an evaluate the extent to 
which it can contribute to the global ethical discourse. 
Mess notes that the notion of svadharma is taken as the dharma of an 
individual, which is limited to the effects of one' s previous life and which 
hampers one ' s present unfoldment (Mess 1986: 17). This would mean that 
svadharma is a determined phenomena rather than one t~ken by freewill. It also 
refers to the inmost law that points to the evolution of the individual member of 
a social group (ibid. 1986: 19). This notion of svadharma may be extended to 
include not only the individual but also the social group and the state. It is a 
concept that applies individually as well as collectively to a group of people 
engaged in the same duty. Lipner notes that svadharma meant applying this 
universalistic ethic of sanatana dharma in the circumstances of one' s own life 
(Lipner 1994: 228). This means that there must be no contradiction between the 
universal ethic and the individual ethic. This is an important theoretical 
contribution to the global ethical discourse. 
Prasad, on the other hand notes that svadharma really means varnashrama 
dharma but the word gives the impression that what it denotes is related to 
man' s nature in some inviolable manner (Prasad 1989: 286). In this context it 
would mean that individual duty as an individual ethic is performed within the 
scheme of collective ethics. Prasad also notes that the concept of svadharma 
literally means "one' s own dharma" (ibid. 1989: 287). In making reference to 
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the Bhagavad Gita, he notes that the concept of svadharma is used in the sense 
of caste obligations (ibid. 1989: 288). One may also interpret svadharma to 
mean a set of professional obligations, with such obJigat:ons being tased on the 
skill and competency of the individual (Prasad 1989: 288). Prasad notes that 
Krishna describes svadharma as doing such actions which one is fitted to do in 
virtue of his nature or his psycho-physical make up (Prasad 1989: 288). This 
may not be possible if caste duty was considered on the basis of birth. Prasad 
further notes that the concept of svadharma is similar to the notion of 
varnashrama dharma but may have an emotive advantage based on the fact 
that it calls an action one's own dharma thus creating an impression that 
dharma has an intimate category to it (ibid. 1989: 288). He finally notes that 
the notion of dharma has built into it an element of obligatoriness, in which one 
is obligated to do what his svadharma, enjoins him to do (ibid. 1989: 289). 
The notion of svadharma is precisely referring to an individual form of action 
carried out by an individual, society or state in order to fulfil a particular end. 
In some interpretations it can stand for professional duties and ethics. In the 
classical understanding the notion of svadharma was linked to rebirth and it 
seems to justify itself in the context of the rebirth theory. It also referred to 
social duty that an individual took on in continued fulfillment of some form of 
Divine justice, and in which the individual believed that he was trapped by 
previous karma. However, the individual had choices to change the condition 
or state of his being. Furthermore, the concept of svadharma is testimony of the 
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possibility of universal dharma, at the level of the absolute, to function at the 
level of the particular. In other words, global truths and ethics must have 
individual and specific relevance; it must be translated for a specific situation 
or context. The notion of svadharma represents this trend. 
4.8.2 Sadharana Dharma (Personalistic Virtues) 
In the last section we examined the notion of svadharma as an individualistic 
professional ethic and the possibility of it representing the idea of particularistic 
ethics against the backdrop of universalistic ethics. In this part, this study will 
explore the notion of sadharana dharma. This analysis will focus on the 
interpretation of sadharana dharma by Manu, Lipner and Prasad; the 
contextual variation of its meaning; the element of choice and freewill 
associated with it; its democratic and liberal nature; its universal nature; its 
association with social obligation and behavior. 
Manu submits the following as part of sadharana dharma viz. non-injury, truth, 
not stealing or coveting, purity, control of the senses (.Ijpner 1994: 223). Manu 
also considers ahimsa as an important moral practice and suggests that it is a 
central part of dharma (ibid. 1994: 223) Manu notes that Kshatriyas were 
exempt from the injunction not to injure because it was in their line of duty to 
commit to the act of violence (ibid. 1994: 224). Manu suggests that there are 
certain types of injury that were meant for the fulfillment of the Veda that was 
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exempted from being called himsa (violent) (ibid. 1994: 224). There were also 
examples of permissible violence in animal sacrificial rites (ibid. 1994: 224). It 
is noted that the practice of suaee/sati, which is a suicidal form of self-injury, 
was recommended in traditional society and although it was recommended, it 
was not enforced upon woman (ibid. 1994: 225). Ther ~ ;s also e"'id~:;1ce of the 
tension between sadharana dharma and svadharma observed in Hindu ethical 
practice. During the 19th century the notion of sanatana dharma, during the 
times of Ram Mohon Roy, assumed an egalitarian ethic embracing women and 
untouchables (Lipner 1994: 228). By the time of Gandhi the notion of ahimsa 
also assumed a universal ethical status (ibid. 1994: 228). 
Prasad refers to sadharana dharma as universal dharma, which contain 
obligations that are binding upon everyone (Prasad 1989: 286). He notes that 
everyone has the obligation to cultivate virtues such as truthfulness, 
mercifulness, forgiveness, selflessness, non-violence, hospitality to guest ' s etc. 
(ibid. 1989: 286). Prasad also notes that the virtues that constitute sadharana 
dharma can be required only of a man living in a society, it makes no sense for 
such obligations to be fulfilled by a person who belongs to no society (ibid. 
1989: 287). 
It is quite evident that classical and modern day interpreters have given a very 
flexible interpretation to the notion of sadharana dharma. This form of dharma 
is universal and is applicable to any person irrespective of caste, race, gender 
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etc. It has the element of free will and choice in it, e\erefore, it is suited to a 
more democratic and liberal context. Although it is an individualistic ethical 
system, it is also applied in a social context for social harmony and purity. It 
will make an impressionable contribution to the global ethical discourse. 
4.8.3 Ashrama Dharma 
In the previous section we focussed on the notion of sadharana dharma as a 
universal ethic suited to a democratic and liberal social context. In this section, 
this study will explore the concept of ashrama dharma and its relevance for a 
global society. 
Michael notes that ashrama dharma was formulated during the Vedic times 
and therefore it was more suited to the social context of those times (Michael 
1979: Ill). Individual life within the Indian social system was divided into 
four stages viz. brahmacharya (life of study and preparation for earthly life), 
grihastha (married life and active participation in social and political 
activities), vanaprasthana (a stage of retirement) and sannyasa (a life of 
worldly renunciation) (Damodaran 1967: 60) The brahmacharya is initiated 
into the study of the Vedas and is subject to a detail code of behavior that 
governs his/her relationship with men and women in all waiks of life (Lipner 
1994: 93). At this stage, the student was governed by rules that decided his 
code of conduct in the presence of the teacher, the teacher' s wife, and the 
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cultivation of virtues such as celibacy, truthfulness, obedience, humility, self 
control (ibid. 1994: 93). The next stage of life was the garhasthya 
(householder) which was crucial for social stability. The special duties of the 
householder were referred to as the "five great sacrifices" or pancha 
"mahayajna" (ibid. 1994: 95). These duties range from celebrating the de vas, 
the ancestors, life in the world, human existence and Brahman (ibid. 1994: 95). 
Thirdly, the vanaprasthya (forest dweller) was a stag,- in which an individual 
progressively detached oneself from active life and focussed on serenity. The 
forest dweller was to remain a celibate, be sparsely clothed, practiced austerity, 
depended on nature and begged for food (ibid. 1994: 96). The final stage is that 
of the sannyasa or a complete renunciate. A sannyasa was to recite a few 
verses of the Veda, beg for his food, dwell where no kitchen smoke is seen. 
Although these four stages of life have their origins in the remote periods of the 
Vedic era, their general character has relevance for a global society. 
4.8.4 Caturvarna Dharma System 
The caturvarna system has been subject to intense criticism from scholars 
because aspects of its contemporary translation are in violation of the human 
rights culture. However, this analysis will focus on the technical difference 
between the concepts of varna and jati; the justification of caste duties; caste 
mobility through fulfillment of duty; origins of caste system in Vedas; concept 
of a classless society; natural components of the varna system; role of social, 
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economic and productive factors influencing varna; :}Ie notion of hereditary 
rights; the aim of the varna social system; varna and racism; the fourfold 
division of society; the nature of social duty; the theory of race superiority; 
social evolution through ethical fulfillment; modern interpretation of caste 
duties; social duty and after life; level of caste position and moral restraints; 
social inequalities and injustices; concept of mutual social service and the issue 
of the relations of professional ethics and ethics. This analysis will produce 
theoretical positions, which can be evaluated for its relevance to the global 
ethical discourse. 
The caturvarna system is often referred to as the "caste system" . There are 
however, technical differences between the caste system or jati system and the 
Varna system. It must be noted that the basis of the caste system is rooted in a 
person' s self-evident inborn inequality at the physical, intellectual, and spiritual 
level and people are being born into the lower and higher castes as a result of 
actions in their previous birth may be assumed as the foundations of the Hindu 
argument for the caturvarna system (. htmthanks.htm.l.lvices.htmvices.htm, 
p3). It is also assumed that by discharging the duties determined by one ' s caste, 
a person becomes qualified for birth in a higher caste in a future life (ibid. htm 
thanks.htm. I. Ivices.htmvices.htm, p3). This will mean that caste duties were 
decided by birth instead of the psycho-physical inclination of the individual. It 
must be noted that there are traces of social mobility between the castes, the 
Brahmin was demoted to Shudra and the Shudra promoted to Brahmin on the 
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basis of fulfillment of virtue (.ibid. htmthanks.htm'/'/vices.htmvices.htm, p4). 
Although through social changes the caste system deteriorated to levels of 
unacceptability, in its revised form, it has upheld the caste of the Brahmin 
which it advocates as an ethical goal which human society should strive for 
(ibid .. htmthanks.htm././vices.htmvices.htm, p4). 
K. Damorlaran observes that the earliest reference oftll~ ca{urvar,vJa system can 
be traced to the Purusha Sukta of the Rig-Veda (Damodaran 1967: 58). He 
notes that in the earliest days of the Aryan civilization there existed a classless 
society (ibid. 1967: 57) and it was through the growth of productive forces and 
material conditions that necessitated the emergence of functional roles of the 
caturvarna system (ibid. 1967: 57). He supported the idea that the four 
divisions were natural components of society with degrees of specialization and 
these divisions were shaped largely by social development, productive forces 
and economic factors (Damodaran 1967: 58). However, the persons that fitted 
into these duties were also supposed to be decided naturally, instead, the issue 
of birth decided the duty. It was through the passage oftme that these positions 
became a matter of hereditary right (Damodaran 1967: 58). K. Damodaran 
observes that the varna system was structured on specific duties and 
responsibilities and the stability of the social order rested on the nature of 
relationship between the various classes based on collective rights and duties 
(ibid. 1967: 59) 
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Lipner notes that the notion of Varna, derived from its Vedic origins, was a 
term that may have racist connotations (Lipner 1994: 89). However, the 
caturvarna refers to the four caste orders of tradition. \\ Hindu society viz. the 
Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras (ibid . 1994: 89). He confirms that 
membership to each varna was generally determined by birth (ibid. 1994: 89). 
Lipner also noted that the Brahmin (I) belonged to an exalted status (ii) 
presided over the sacrificial ritual which was the seat of spiritual and social 
power (iii) were referred to as gods among men (iv) was considered superior to 
all other varnas (v) and had the special duty of reciting, practicing and teaching 
the Vedas (ibid . 1994: 89). He notes that the Kshatriya were (I) kings and rulers 
(ii) responsible for the preservation of justice (iii) tasked to protect society 
(ibid . 1994, p90). He further no:ed that the duty of the Vaisya (I) was to engage 
basically in trade and commerce and the Sudra (I) belollged to the lowest varna 
(ii) not initiated into the rights and responsibilities of the Veda (iii) had to serve 
the three higher classes (iv) could win virtue and acquire ethical approval 
(Lipner 1994: 91). 
Mess notes that the term varna has been mistranslated into jati ( caste) and has 
created much confusion in Western thought (Mess 1986: 50-51). He also notes 
the challenge of translating the word varna and sometimes refers to it as 
"class" and at other times as "natural class" and in some instances to "social 
order" (ibid. 1986: 52). According to the Cambridge History of India, the 
conception of varna literally meant "color" and it referred to the difference of 
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race, the superiority of the white skinned over the dark skinned (ibid. 1986: 53). 
This appears to be more or less like the Colonial paradigm of racial superiority 
and whether this paradigm can be used to justify the interpretation of the notion 
of varna needs to be taken up. Mess notes that in the Brahmanas the notion of 
varna assumed a cultural implication and it celebrated altruistic behavior above 
egoistic conduct with the leading idea being the sociality of the individual (ibid. 
1986: 54). It is also noted that in the Vayu Purana, Ramayana and Bhagavata 
Purana there is reference to the fact that during the Age of Krita, there was no 
varna, there was a classless society (ibid. 1986: 55). \1ess notes that there is 
some form of social evolution from one social order to the next with the ideal 
being that of Brahmana (ibid. 1986: 57). This means that an individual could 
evolve along the social ladder on the basis of ethical fulfillment to the state of 
Brahmana until there is complete liberation. Mess suggests that the theory of 
Varna does not refer to Hindu society, but to the human society in general 
(ibid. 1986: 79). 
It is further suggested that (I) persons concerned with guidance, education and 
psychological unfoldment (sucr. as teachers, medical men, psycho-analyst, the 
priest) (ii) persons involved with regulative dharma (persons of !egislative 
executive powers, business magnate, the military man, the policeman (iii) 
persons with a distributive task (in business, traffic, intercourse) and persons 
with a productive task (in agriculture, industry, industrial arts) - all these 
people are specialists in their own right (Mess 1986: 80). These four classes 
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have been interpreted in the modern language as the spiritual and 
psychological, the ruling and regulating, the distributive and finally the 
productive duties of life. (Mess 1986: 81). The key issue is whether there exists 
a distinction between professional duties and morality? It becomes apparent 
that professional duties and ethical values seem to p-oduce the same desired 
result which final communion with God. It will be interesting to see how this 
model develops in a pluralistic post-modern society. 
It also becomes apparent that within the theory of varna, the issue of social 
duty is placed above individual rights (ibid. 1986: 127). The idea of social duty 
was underpinned with the thinking that observance of duty will lead to svarga 
and infinite bliss and if violated will lead to the demise of the world order (ibid. 
1986: 128). Another feature that is observed is the higher one' s caste, the 
greater the moral and ethical restraints and rules placed on that individual (ibid. 
1986: 129). Mess notes that although the varna sys em advocated a natural 
hierarchy, it did not mean that each order was socially unequal to another (ibid. 
1986: 153). Mess advocated the notion of Brahman as the basis of explaining 
the equality of nature (ibid. 1986: 154). It is undoubted that the social duties 
were marked with certain degrees of privileges if we compare the Brahmans 
and sudras, however, this was not overemphasized and had deep psycho-
spiritual reasons for them. The order of Sudra was justified on the grounds of 
providing social service to the higher classes (Mess 1986: 156). Mess interprets 
this social service as mutual and as performing one' s dharma (ibid. 1986: 155). 
185 
From a spiritual point of view the work of all four varnas, of whatever kind it 
is, leads towards perfection which was observed to be a very much later 
development in the Vedic period (ibid. 1986: 156). There are also several 
examples in the literature to demonstrate that sudra born persons were spiritual 
instructors of Brahman born persons (ibid. 1986: 156). This evidence of social 
mobility stands against the issue of the compulsion of duty as a result of birth. 
Finally, Prasad notes that caste groups are professional groups and caste ethics 
is professional ethics and to claim that these ethics are unalterable because they 
are created by God is to claim that professions and ethics are unalterable 
(Prasad 1989: 253). Prasad notes that to allot to profes<;ional ethics the place of 
ethics is a conceptual mistake because not doing one' s professional duty is a 
professional lapse and not a moral lapse (Prasad 1989: 254). However, in the 
Bhagavad Gila, Krishna allows for professional ethics to usurp the place of 
ethics (ibid. 1989: 254). Arjuna was placed in a moral dilemma because he 
wanted to know whether it was morally right to fight in view of the 
consequences of fighting (ibid. 1989: 254). In this context, Krishna 
demonstrated that not doing one' s duty would result in social disapproval as 
well as loosing the final goal. 
It is quite evident that the notion of varna present. ~ C: many ch?.llenges for 
interpretations. In its traditional sense, it referred to the fourfold natural duties 
of society and in its deteriorated form it assumed the title of jati and 
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represented one' s hereditary right to professional duties. Within the context of a 
traditional society and its worldview, the varna system could be very easily 
justified, but it is very difficult to maintain the system in its traditional form 
and to find any modem day relevance for it. Although caste mobility was 
previously possible through fulfillment of duty, today social mobility depends 
on levels of functional specialization and has nothing to do with ethical 
conformities. The Vedic idea of a classless society is a modem day communist 
ideal. However, right from the Vedic times it became apparent that society 
cannot be without division and class differences. There is sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that productive economic and social forces, which are the 
dominant forces of the post-modem society are demanding specialized 
functions. The theory of Varna being associated with racism or race superiority 
may be difficult to prove given the clear evidence of it representing a functional 
purpose in society. It is also possible to show that the traditional functional 
roles of varna can very easily be translated into modern day social functions. 
The one important lesson that reveals the deep connection of the social and the 
spiritual in traditional Hindu society is the fact that social duties were linked 
with the ethical goals of after-life. This meant that social functions were deeply 
interwoven in ethical norms. This becomes clear when one observes that the 
different social functions carried various levels of ethical and moral restraints 
with it. Although social inequalities and injustices were evident in the 
traditional Varna system, such inequalities and injustices were mere 
interpretations and were never viewed as such. All members of society were 
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given responsibility and duties. Injustice would come about only when duty 
was violated. It must be noted that the varna system has many positive 
elements that could contribute to the modern day global ethical discourse. 
4.8.5 Purushartha - Theory of Human Values 
In the previous section a detailed analysis of the notion of caturvarna in the 
context of the traditional worldview was pursued. A detailed examination of the 
functional structure of society and the ethical roles those individuals were 
obliged to perform. In this analysis we shall examine the concept of 
Purushartha. This reflection will focus on the four goals of human life; the 
relation of the goals to sacrificial tradition; the concepts of pap and punya; the 
meanings of artha and kama in relation to moksha; the concept of moksha; the 
nature of Hindu ethical striving; moksha as a trans-moral concept; the social 
nature of trivarga; the principle of regulation. The main purpose of this 
analysis is to establish theoretical positions that can be evaluated for its 
relevance to the global ethical discourse. 
It is noted that in Hinduism there were largely four important goals viz. artha 
(prosperity); Kama (gratification), dharma (religious merit) .and moksha 
(liberation from samsara) (Lipner 1994: 159-160). Lipner also notes that these 
three goals initially centered around the Vedic sacrificial tradition with artha 
referring to the means required to fund the Vedic sa ~rifice, kama meant the 
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satisfaction gained from the fruits of the sacrifice, and dharma meant the 
religious merit acquired by regular and proper performance of the sacrifice 
(ibid. 1994: 160). He also notes that the pursuit of artha and Kama was set in 
an ethical context and was not opposed to dharma (Lipner 1994: 160). The 
terms pap and punya are generally used to indicate merit and demerit in the 
traditional ethical discourse (ibid. 1994: 214). 
Artha is generally translated as prosperity and therefore is underpinned by the 
idea of wealth. It must be affirmed that Hindus recognize wealth as a legitimate 
and indispensable ethical property and must be used for individual and social 
welfare upliftment (.htmthanks.htm.l.lvices.htmvices.htm, p6). Kama refers to 
sense pleasure and it is encouraged as long as it promotes spiritual freedom and 
is not in violation of dharma (ibid .. htmthanks.htm././vices.htmvices.htm, p6). 
The hedonists alone regard sense pleasure as an end in itself. Prasad notes that 
kama means desire but in the theory of Purushartha it denotes the satisfaction 
of desire which results from the fulfillment of desire (opcit. 1989, p278). He 
notes that the word kama does not include in the commonly accepted version of 
the theory a desire for moksha (ibid. 1989, p278). 
Moksha is the highest ethical goal that emerges as a result of ethical striving. 
Moksha is related to the idea of absolute freedom from the finiteness and 
limitations of worldly experience (opcit. .htmthanks. htm.l.lvices.htmvices.htm, 
p6). So the Hindu ethical striving is transcendental and post-empirical in 
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nature. Prasad notes that moksha is denoted as the highest to which dharma is 
treated as the means (Prasad 1989: 279). Moksha denotes freedom from the 
chain of birth and death, freedom from karma and is taken as a purely intrinsic 
value of the highest order (ibid. 1989: 279). Moksha cannot be said to be a 
moral goal because it is odd to say that a man who is not interested in seeking 
moksha is not interested in leading a moral life or one who is nO( a mukta 
(liberated) is not a moral person (Prasad 1989: 305). 
Prasad notes that the theory of Purushartha is central to classical Indian ethics 
(ibid. 1989: 275). Etymologically, Purushartha means that which is aimed at or 
desired (ibid. 1989: 277). It denotes both positive and negative desires (ibid. 
1989: 277). Prasad notes that this theory appears to depict the complete life-
plan of a viable citizen (ibid. 1989: 280). He also notes that artha and dharma 
are social goals, which can be sought only in the social world by the social man 
(ibid. 1989: 281). Prasad observes that dharma is a regulator in the context of 
artha and Kama and an individual who pursues them must not transgress 
dharma (ibid. 1989: 282). 
The four traditional human goals have evolved from the Vedic vision of life and 
they constitute elements that are evident in a modem society. Although these 
four values have been rooted within the context of the sacrificial tradition it is , 
easy to give to them fresh interpretations. Such interpretations are evident in 
the works of most modem day scholars. Although the concepts of merit and 
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demerit have their beginnings in the traditional ethical discourse, these 
concepts have immense value for the contemporary etllical discour:)~ . Defining 
what is ethical and unethical is what results in the actualization of demerit and 
demerit. As much as the concept of moksha is trans-moral in character, it 
represents an ideal or an end in which ethical fulfillment culminates. The 
notion of dharma serving as a social regulator is vital in the ethical discourse. 
Every moral action is determined by some form of regulator that prevents the 
content of that action from deteriorating to immorality. 
4.9 Karma 
In the foregoing section, we concentrated on the concept of Purushartha as a 
set of socio-spiritual values and demonstrated their place in the ethical scheme 
of life of the Vedic people. We also identified the key ethical values of the 
traditional society and how they are derived and with what purpose. In this 
section, the analysis will focus on the notion of karma. This analysis will 
examine the nature of karma; karma and rebirth; karma and the consequence 
theory; types of cyclic karmic actions; the issue of freedom and determinism; 
karma and intentional action; karma and the law of causation· karma and god· , , 
the theory of reward and punishment; karma and bondage; karma and non-
attachment; karma and duty and accounting for human diversity. 
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Mess believes that the notion of karma is related to the notion of dharma (Mess 
1986: 20), however, he does not show precisely how this relationship is brought 
about. About the nature of karma, Lipner notes that there is a link between 
certain kinds of karma and the fruits that they produce, whether it is good or 
bad (Lipner 1994: 230). Traditional methodology always leads us to tracing 
ethical notions in the scriptures. In this regard, Lipner notes that the notion of 
karma and rebirth are not clearly evident in the Samhita portion of the 
scriptures (ibid. 1994: 230). Notwithstanding this, he observed that it is only in 
the Upanishads that there is a clear reference to these ethical principles (Lipner 
1994: 230). One of the central assumptions to karma is that good karmic action 
leads one to acquire a good birth by being born in the home of a Brahmin, 
Kshatriya or Vaisya and those who perform poor karma will take birth among 
dog, pigs or chandala (Lipner 1994: 231)' This traditional understanding urged 
individuals to perform good action in order to avoid the lower birthforms. It is 
also clear that ethical action is consequential in the Vedic tradition. Therefore, 
there is some connection between moral striving and the attainment of 
salvation, which is represented by the notion of karma (ibid. 1994: 232). 
One of the primary methods noted by Lipner on the traditional ethical discourse 
is not to reject totally any previous teaching but to assimilate it into a new 
synthesis (ibid. 1994: 232). Therefore, the karma paradigm needs to be 
understood in the context of the contemporary ethical discourse so that it may 
contribute towards a global ethic. The notion of the four types of karma 
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documented by Hindus viz. (1) prarabdha which refers to karma that is 
maturing in one' s life, which one has no control over (ii) kriyamana karma -
refers to present karma or karma in the making (iii) samcita karma - this is 
accumulated karma which is not being activated (ibid. 1994: 237) and (iv) 
agami karma which are the foundations of explaining the cycle of karma. 
There is a subtle difference between kriyamana and agami karma in that the 
former is limited to the present life whereas the latter is extended to the future 
and determines the future. These three principles work towards accounting for 
the system of moral justice that is found in the world . However, there is no 
absolute form of determinism enveloped in this theory. Lipner notes that while 
it is not possible to gain control over the genetic make up and other 
determinants of life there is a certain amount of freedom that an individual 
exercises in what one chooses in life (Lipner 1994: 237). So he concludes that 
there is a balance between deterministic forces and that of free will (ibid. 1994: 
237). 
Prasad, on the other hand, notes that belief in the law of karma is widely 
accepted by all schools of classical Indian thought (Prasad 1989: 210). The 
reason for examining the notion of karma is that almost all-modern interpreters 
have claimed it to be a central part to Indian ethics. In analyzing the notion of 
karma as an ethical concept, Prasad uses the term karma in the sense of normal 
or intentional action (ibid. 1989: 213). Moral action is not only understood in 
terms of its physical expression but also in terms of its psychological intent. 
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One of the characteristic features of the law of karma is that it applies to both 
human and non-human beings (Prasad 1989: 213). This indeed declares the 
universal operation of this moral law and it must therefore be interpreted in this 
context. It is noted that the law of karma is the counterpart in the moral world 
of the physical law of uniformity and is also referred to as the law of 
conservation of moral energy (ibid. 1989: 214). The law of karma is similar to 
the law of causation, which stipulates that every cause has an effect and an 
effect is the antecedent cause of another effect (ibid. 1989: 214). The law 
operates in such a manner that an individual gets what he deserves. The law 
stipulates that good action leads to happiness and bad actions lead to 
unhappiness. Prasad · notes that it is this postulate of what the individual 
deserves as a result of his actions that makes the law of karma a postulate of 
morality (ibid. 1989: 215). This is perhaps a very challenging part to the ethical 
theory because there are several problematic questions that can be raised 
around this issue. However, this study will concentrate on the elements of 
karma that can contribute to the global ethical discourse. 
Prasad notes that the consequences of samchita actions can be avoided by the 
attainment of right knowledge (ie. knowledge of the ultimate reality) but those 
of prarabdha cannot (Prasad 1989: 217). He notes that all actions are morally 
relevant or important (ibid. 1989: 221). The theory of karma is closely 
associated with the notion of rebirth, which stipulates that every birth is a 
rebirth preceded by death and every death is a death succeeded by a rebirth 
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(ibid . 1989: 223). The theory of rebirth basically allows for the principle of 
"what one deserves" to be fulfilled (ibid. 1989: 223). This is a unique feature of 
an ethical theory and that is to see it operate across births with the intent of 
meeting out absolute justice. The theory of karma normally accepts a threefold 
causation of joys and sorrows viz. (1) those that are attributable to one's own 
action (ii) some to the actions of others (iii) and some to events (ibid. 1989: 
224). However, in most instances the effects caused by the actions of others 
and of events is interpreted as effects of one' s own actions through those agents 
(ibid. 1989: 225). Therefore ethical action is deeply individualistic from the 
point that the effects are considered to be directed to the individual and they 
account for the fruits of one' s action, irrespective of the source of the initiating 
action. 
Prasad also notes that there is a theistic version to the law of karma in which 
God is viewed as the moral administrator of the world (Prasad 1989: 225). It is 
noted that it is God that evaluates the moral worth of our action and decides 
what we deserve on account of them (Prasad 1989: 225). This theory may 
present several problems until we clarify this god as a "world god" that is 
acceptable to all. Also built into the theory of karma is the conception of 
reward and punishment. Prasad notes that whether the reward or punishment is 
given out by human or God it must be fair and just (ibid. 1989: 227). The 
interpretation of what is fair and just is also problematic because it is relative 
because of the relative nature of the reward and punishment. It must be noted 
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that the consequence of right action must be empirical so that it is realizable in 
some visible good, notwithstanding the fact that this visible good changes from 
time to time. Prasad submits that a moral law is a reason providing law, a law 
providing not merely a reason but some sort of an overriding reason, or the 
criterion of such a reason (ibid . 1989: 232). This is vital, however, it must not 
be made an end in itself but should serve as a basis on which moral law can be 
derived. Prasad also notes that the law of karma is a retributive law and 
therefore is opposed to consequentialism and utilitarianism (ibid. 1989: 233). 
Prasad also notes that from karmic theory it is not possible to discern in a direct 
way which action leads to happiness and which to suffering and therefore he 
concludes that it is difficult to obtain from karmic theory a motivational push to 
act correctly (ibid. 1989: 235). It is the ethical ends that are the source of 
motivation for one to act ethically. Actions that result in some consequence are 
actions that arise from desire or motive, and are classified as intentional action 
or action done in order to secure something in return (ibid. 1989: 238). 
Actions cause bondage and one is inevitably caught up in the cycle of birth and 
death (ibid. 1989: 239). Not all effects of one' s actions are accounted for in 
just one birth, there are several births in which an individual meets out his 
consequences (Prasad 1989: 239). All actions whether morally right or wrong 
results in bondage (Prasad 1989: 239). The remed: ' to this problem is to 
perform non-attached action and to acquire right knowledge (Prasad 1989:. 
239). Associated with this issue is the debate of double-punishment through the 
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legal and ethical consequence theory. An individual who commits an unethical 
act may also commit an illegal act and may be punished by (I) the natural 
consequence of the cause-effect theory and (ii) by serving imprisonment for 
such a crime. It is interesting to see how this issue develops in the context of 
the global ethical discourse. 
By non-attachment it is generally meant that the doer has no attachment, this 
means that there is no care or interest in the results of the action (ibid. 1989: 
239). Indian classical thinkers did not create a condition of absolute desireless 
in action, instead they developed the idea of having desire for moksha (ibid. 
1989: 240). It must be noted that attachment or non-attachment to an action 
does not make the action either morally right or wrong (ibid. 1989: 243). It is 
also noted that desireful action may result in both happiness and unhappiness 
while desireless action results in freedom from rebirth (ibid. 1989: 247). Prasad 
also notes that classical thinkers propounded the view that non-attachment 
destroys the causal power of action (ibid . 1989: 248) This means that if an 
action is performed without any desire, whether it is moral or immoral, it 
removes the binding nature of the action (eg. of the profession of the whore 
often referred to) . (ibid. 1989: 248). It must be noted that the moral rightness of 
the action cannot remove rebirth but it is the non-attachment to the action that 
removes rebirth (ibid. 1989: 248). 
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Prasad further notes that the theory of duty is a very important constituent in 
Indian philosophy and it is generally assumed to be a moral principle (Prasad 
1989: 249). In order to get rid of bondage the sole motive for an action should 
be for the sake of duty (ibid. 1989: 251). Prasad notes that the concordance of 
duty and desire does take place and from a moral point of view it cannot be 
called undesirable (ibid. 1989: 251). Indian moral teachers urge individuals not 
to tone down their desires but to have none (Prasad 1989: 257). 
Radhakrishnan is of the view that people are born unequal, unequal in caste, 
talents, conditions and circumstances of life, physical, and intellectual and in 
moral endowments and it is the belief in karma, which explains the diversity of 
the human conditions (in Michael 1979: 10). Radhakrishnan also notes that 
karma signifies any action or deed and therefore ev~ry action by its nature 
produces an effect, whether mental, verbal or physical (Michael 1979: 11). 
Michael notes that in the Upanishads action springs from desire therefore 
whenever a deed is done the mind and subtle body follow the deed (ibid. 1979: 
11). And it is this that connects the deed to the sphere of afterlife. 
Radhakrishnan sees karma as not a mechanical principle but an ethical one 
(ibid. 1979: 12). Radhakrishnan notes that the theory of karma recognizes the 
rule of law both in its empirical status as well as in the psychological and 
ethical levels as well (ibid. 1979: 12). Yet the doctrine of karma does point out 
the past as determined but it equally emphasizes the fact that the future is 
conditioned (ibid. 1979: 15). It is noted that Radhakri.'f.'1an is of the view that 
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the Divine element in man will exert its pressure and will direct man to choose 
what is best for him as a spiritual being (Michael 1979: 15). Freedom is limited 
by past karma and choice means that we limit ourselves to one among the many 
possibilities (ibid. 1979: 16). Michael holds that Karma is not a principle that 
absolutely determines man' s future, it is not a principle of retribution and has 
nothing to do with hedonistic or juridical reward and punishment (ibid. 1979: 
20). 
The theory of karma as an ethical discourse presents many challenges to an 
objective ethicist. There are several elements in this theory that will be 
developed and dialogued with in the global ethical discourse. 
4.10 Conclusion 
It is quite evident that the traditional ethical discourse is rooted in age-old 
concepts, methods and specific forms of interpretation. However, the ethical 
vision within the context of the Vedanta, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gila seem 
to point towards a universal ethical ethos. It is also clearly evident that concepts 
have revised themselves to meet the challenges of new time:; and in each 
instance the core principle of the concept was given a fresh interpretation. It 
was also apparent that certain concepts are very complex and carry a host of 
general meanings that reveal a sort of global context to it. There is evidence to 
support the point that traditional ethical concepts were applied universally. 
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However, the urge of the human spirit to reach a perfect stage of universalism 
seems to produce the idea of a dualistic reality, the one being characterless and 




CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN GLOBAL 
In the last chapter, the study explored the traditional and contemporary ethical 
discourse in Hindu thought. In the context of the traditional discourse, the study 
attempted to construct an ethical vision of the scriptural tradition of the 
Vedanta, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita, which are considered most 
important and authoritative in Hinduism. A further exploration of the notions 
of Dharma and Karma were pursued with the intent of establishing elements 
that would contribute to the global ethical discourse and the formulation of a 
global ethic. In this chapter the central focus of the study is to outline the 
various ethical trends that constitute the postmodern era and to examine 
proposals for developing a framework for a global ethic. This ar.alysis will 
probe the moral tradition and its interpretation, transgressions in moral ethical 
traditions, change in moral traditions, methods in moral tradition, different 
ethical systems, cultural ethical conflict, minimal universal moral standards, 
and the need for macro ethics. Furthermore, this study will examine the nature 
of ethics and moral philosophy within the western discourse; the nature of 
morality; the raising of fundamental ethical questions; the basis of moral 
reasoning; the principles of ethical relativism, individual morality, and social 
morality; the Kantian model of ethics; the essence, structure and function of 
morality; the main trends in twentieth century ethics and the phenomenon of 
Globalism. This analysis will provide greater insight into the western ethical 
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trends, which IS profoundly relevant for the post-modern global ethical 
discourse. 
5.1 Moral tradition and Interpretation 
It must be noted that the world has many moral systems and each have their 
origins within their specific religious, theological and philosophic backgrounds. 
Joel J Kupperman (In Culture and Modernity: East West Philosophic 
Perspectives) notes that a moral tradition does not just centre on rules of 
conduct, it also includes training in moral significance which calls for moral 
reflection or moral judgement and it must provide an interpretative scheme so 
that situations and actions will be perceived within the categories of a given 
tradition and not outside of it (Deutsche 1994: 314). In fact, it is necessary to 
establish a hermenuetical scheme, whether it is in the context of an individual 
moral tradition or a global one that will engineer new meaning in the context of 
this evolving contemporary ethical discourse. However, the principle that must 
underpin a global interpretative scheme is determined by the philosophic 
categories of a universal tradition. These categories must be clearly defined 
and must serve as a framework in which any hermenuetical scheme can 
function. 
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5.2 Transgressions in Moral-Ethical traditions 
The issue of ethical transgressions is essential in any ethical discourse and the 
key question is: are all transgressions within the different traditions weighted 
equally? If not, then how are they going to be reconciled for there to be a 
Global ethic? Joel J. Kupperman observes that all traditions may not assign 
equal weight to all transgressions (Deutsche 1994: 315). In the Vedic tradition, 
transgressions were dealt with in terms of a natural system in which an 
individual degenerates into the bodies of lower species on account of moral 
transgression. Within the Hindu worldview, this was acceptable because of the 
three-world theory that they uphold viz. the spirit world, the nature world and 
the human world. However, such an interpretation may experience challenges 
in the global ethical context. The key point is that this issue of transgressions 
must be incorporated into the global ethical discourse. 
5.3 Change in Moral Traditions 
Joel] Kupperman observes that moral traditions change over a period of time 
and that such changes are not only the result of philosophical argumentation or 
intellectual movement but it may constitute responses to the changes in the 
structure of society (Deutsche 1994: 316). This is a significant observation in 
that it reveals that hat those ethical traditions that are deeply rooted in philosophic 
and intellectual movements may not necessarily depend on an alteration of their 
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paradigms in order to effect change within their conceptual or methodological 
frameworks but may also be influenced by changes in th~ structure of society. 
Simal K Matilal notes that cultures together with their ethical systems face 
internal and external challenges therefore causing change, development and 
mutation (Deutsche 1994: 152). He further asserts that: 
A culture that does not react and change with time is as good as a 
dead one or it is dying, or at best it maintains a fossilized form of 
existence, fit to be turned into a museum piece (Deutsche 1994: 
152) 
He quotes the work of comparative ethnographers that have pointed out that 
certain core values which are unique to each culture show some resilience to 
change in the midst of interaction with other cultures (ibid. 1994: 152). He 
specifically highlights historically conditioned and environmentally generated 
values, which are shaped by myths, rituals etc. which offer the greatest 
resistance to change (ibid. 1994: 153). Notwithstanding this, he notes that they 
yield to slow change almost imperceptibly (ibid. 1994: 153). These 
observations are vital to the ethical discourse from the standpoint that ethical 
systems are dynamic systems, which must offer themselves for change. 
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Moral systems cannot remain stagnant there must be progress within their 
systems. Joel J Kupperman captures the notion of moral progress and sees its 
necessity, notwithstanding the general opprobrium it faced during the 
nineteenth century. He clarifies the basis on which he sees moral progress, 
firstly not on an improvement in actual behavior or the elevation of the peaks of 
human behavior, but he proposes to view it analogously (ibid. 1994: 317-318). 
I would like to submit that If the traditional ethical system of Hindu thought is 
to make a contribution to the development of a global ethic, which amounts to 
universal moral progress, then it must also be prepared to make changes to its 
inner structure. 
5.4 Methods in Moral traditions 
It is inevitable that the issue of methodology is going to arise in the context of 
developing a global ethical discourse. Most moral systems are situated within 
the context of their traditional P.1ethods in terms of how they derive themselves 
and respond to challenges. In this regard, Joel K Kup~ :.rman n0!e3 ~hat moral 
traditions are not static systems, they differ from one another in their 
methodology towards condemnation of transgressions. He further notes that 
there are differences between moral traditions in so far as how they see what 
they condemn, what they condemn, and how they condemn it (Deutsche 1994: 
316-317). It will become obvious that the specifications of individual 
methodologies will have to adjust itself in light of a universal methodology that 
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underpin the development of a Global ethic. However, such changes in 
methods must not create internal tensions to the point where moral systems 
resort to withdrawal. 
5.5 Different Ethical Systems 
Bimal K Matilal notes that there are various theoretical paradigms such as 
Singularism, Pluralism, Relativism, Conservatism that constitute a scheme in 
the context of ethical discourses (ibid. 1994, P 141). In this analysis the study 
will examine these different ethical systems and test them against the 
standpoint of this thesis, which is the contribution towards a Global ethic. 
5.5.1 Pluralism 
Bimal K. Matilal notes that Pluralism allows freedom of choice and a 
. multiplicity of the concept of common good (Deutsche 1994: 141). One of the 
principle assumptions of pluralism is its liberal character and its desire to 
accommodate diversity, which stipulates the need for the basic agreement about 
the indispensability of mutual toleration (ibid. 1994: 141). However, one of the 
challenges faced by the pluralistic paradigm is its ability to devise a judicious 
blending of social and political institutions that will accommodate such 
diversity (Deutsche 1994: 141). He also expressed the view that pluralism is 
not relativism (ibid. 1994: 142). He observes that the diversity of human groups 
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and the plurality of human goals are very ancient (ibid. 1994: 142). He also 
notes that the plurality that we experience is only apparent and falsely created 
and with our rational wisdom we can see through this veil of appearance and 
experience directly the deeper unity of mankind (ibid. 1994: 144). It must be 
noted that in the global ethical discourse the pluralistic paradigm is very 
popular. However, the challenge to this system comes from the exclusivist 
groups. Are there a common goal and a unified good for all human beings? 
This is a vital question. As we march into the global age, human beings are 
realizing that there is a need to set common goals, whid t impact O~ the survival 
of human existence as a whole. 
5.5.2 Singularism 
The main assumption of this paradigm defies the thought that there is a variety 
of conceptions of good (Deutsche 1994: 141). Bimal K Matilal noted that the 
socio-political thinkers of the nineteen and twentieth centuries aimed for a 
singularist goal in which there was a single unified conception of good which is 
desirable for all human beings (ibid. 1994: 142). He notes that authoritarianism 
has been the breeding ground of Singularism and anti-plurclisrn. (ibid. 1994: 
142). He maintains that it is impossible for a singularist to be tolerant and 
sincere and respect another ' s way of life (ibid. 1994: 144-145). This paradigm 
may serve as a challenge to march forward in the development of a global 
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ethic. The Global ethic cannot be developed with a single-minded effort, on the 
contrary it must consider the contributions from all perspectives of life. 
5.5.3 Relativism 
The foundation of this paradigm holds that one such conception of good is as 
good as any other, with there being no overarching standard (Deutsche. 1994: 
141). Bimal K. Matilal points out that ethical norms are regarded as being 
immanent or embedded in cultural norms and when these cultural norms vary 
then ethical relativism becomes an inevitable conclusion (Deutsche 1994: 145). 
He further maintains that each culture has its own axiomatic construction of 
reality which is an integral part of one's world view and that each ethical 
system is embedded in such &P axiomatic construction of reality (ibid. 1994: 
145). He also notes that some sort of relativism I.!:{ists between cultures 
(Deutsche 1994: 153). There are shifts in moral positions from one moral 
tradition to another and such relativistic schemes are inevitable. However, such 
relativism must not be destroyed, on the contrary, it must be used to develop a 
common global ethic in which relative positions which are not in conflict with 
common positions can be tolerated. 
5.5.4 Conservatism 
This paradigm mainly articulates the view that one's own conception of good is 
the best one. (Deutsche 1994: 141). Bimal K Matilal arrives at the conclusion 
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that we cannot say that one particular way of life is best for the whole of 
humanity (ibid. 1994: 142). It is clear from this description that conservative 
thinking will not be adequately able to contribute to the global ethical 
discourse. In fact, it will become the source of conflict and tension for any 
effort made to develop a global ethic. 
5.5.5 Individualism 
Horace Greeley made the remark in 1853 that this is an age of individualism in 
which the individual has the right to do as he pleases ~Deutsche 1994: 303). In 
the opinion of Hilary Putnam, individualism can mean the doctrine of 
individual rights (ibid. 1994: 303). There cannot be an absolute individual right. 
However, individual right can be exercised in the context of what are 
commonly good and right and not what is individually good and right. 
5.6 Cultural - Ethical Conflict 
Bimal K Matilal is of the view that each ethical system is unique to its own 
culture and there cannot be any real confrontation between one culture and the 
other (Deutsche 1994: 145). He observes that cultures and societies of the 
present day are not .watertight compartments, they interact with each other 
either violently or peacefully and through this process there is value trade-offs 
and value rejections (ibid. 1994: 151). He makes a very clear conclusion that 
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world cultures and sub-cultures do flow into each other, interacting both visibly 
and invisibly, eventually effecting value rejections and value modifications at 
every stage (ibid. 1994: 151-152). He proposes that where there is a conflict 
between universal and the particular morality then the universal morality 
should override the particular (ibid. 1994: 156). Global ethical systems cannot 
be constructed from conflicts but through co-operatic n Global terrorism is a 
symptom that ethical systems are in conflict and they are leaving very little 
room for interacting for the purpose of moral progress. 
5.7 Ethical System/s and Values 
Bimal K Matilal notes that ethical systems are built on faith, myths, rituals, 
kinship systems and standards of interpersonal behavior (Deutsche 1994: 147). 
K. Damodaran notes that ethical values are not mere reflections of economic 
and social conditions and are not mere products of economic and political 
change, they depend on man ' s experiences and reactIons to the er.vironment 
and relation to the world (Damodaran 1967: 495). He sees a mutual relationship 
between moral values and social development. In this regard he said: 
Ethical values which are prescribed and upheld in isolation from the 
socio-economic conditions often loose their significance and have 
no authority today (ibid. 1967: 500) 
210 
Therefore, the global ethical discourse must set for itself a framework , which 
allows for dialogue between all these variables for th~ purpose of poducing a 
global ethic. 
5.8 Minimal Universal Moral Standard 
Hilary Putnam raises a fundamental question as to whether ethics should be 
universalistic or should rather be rooted in the forms of life of particular 
traditions and cultures (Deutsche 1994: 229). This is a very critical question for 
the global ethical discourse. Bimal K Matilal believes that there is a minimal 
universal moral standard, which is applicable to all human beings (ibid. 1994: 
150). He also believes that the notion of an ethical law demands some 
universality (ibid. 1994: 150) which takes into account the desires of the global 
community. He also advocates that the notion of "minimal morality" must be 
distinguished from the natural law doctrine and the singularist paradigm (ibid. 
1994: 150) because minimal morality must embody a universalistic application. 
His foremost observation is that the natural law doctrine lacks the flexibility as 
well as amenability to contextual interpretation as compared to the minimal 
universal morality doctrine (Deutsche 1994: 150) and should be revised or 
reformulated in light ofthe global ethical discourse. 
He believes that there is a basic moral fabric in all societies, which holds 
human beings together (Deutsche 1994: 153) and which must be identified for 
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the purpose of constructing a global ethic. He also maintains that there is a 
rational side and a contingent side to morality and he conceptualizes the 
rational side as common morality which is dictated by the common concerns of 
humans while the contingent side, which is historically and geographically 
conditioned, varies from culture to culture (ibid. 1994: 154). Therefore for the 
purpose of the global ethical discourse it is incumbent that the rational side be 
advocated and the contingent side be revised. He uses the methodology of the 
traditional Indian ethicists in justifying a distinction between general moral 
duties and particular moral codes (Deutsche 1994: 154). He proposes three 
cardinal moral virtues as common to world religions viz. respect for life, truth 
telling, and prohibition of adultery. 
Bimal K Matilal corresponds the notion of non-violence to the idea of respect 
for life and extends these notions to include the non-killing of both humans and 
animals (Deutsche 1994: 155). He commits to recognizing "self preservation" 
and ' Self defence" as the only justifiable reasons for killing and highlights the 
contextual variation of opinion on the issues of abortion and euthanasia (ibid. 
1994: 155). Bimal K Matilal identifies truth telling or prohibition against lying 
as a universal moral virtue and he illustrates the varying contexts in which this 
principle operated (Deutsche 1994: 156). He made reference to the Kantian 
absolute as well as the Indian contextualism of this notion. K. Damodaran is of 
the view that moral standards must be linked with man ' s effort to achieve on 
this earth the ideals of peace, freedom, equality, fraternity and justice through 
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suitable changes in social, economic and political environment (Damodaran 
1967: 494). Such efforts were evident in the life and teachings of Sri Aurobindo 
and Mahatma Gandhi . 
5.9 Contextual Interpretation 
Rimal K Matilal observes that in certain ethical issues there is a need for 
contextual interpretation. However, if there is a move towards the principle of 
universality then contextual interpretation may have to be excluded (Deutsche 
1994: 155) He observes that specific universal morals renders itself for 
contextual interpretation, depending upon individual societies. His firm 
position is that such contextual interpretation does not concede to relativism. In 
this regard he says : 
Contextual interpretation IS needed because the universality of 
some of these principles suffers (and shrinks) when we deal, as we 
must, with a particular formulation of them in reference to 
particular languages or social practice (ibid. 1994: 157) 
This is a vital indicator for the global ethical discourse. Contextual 
interpretation is necessary within the transitional phase of a global ethical 
paradigm. As much as individual ethical systems may identify with a universal 
system from the level of common ground, human experience is always 
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interpreting itself in the context of individual ethical systems. Therefore 
universal values must be contextualised within individual ethical experience 
without contradiction. 
5.10 The Need for MacroEthics 
Karl-Otto Apel (in Culture and Modernity: East West Philosophic Perspectives) 
notes that there is an urgent need for macroethics, which he views as an 
important task of philosophic ethics and sees as a ne~ ;~ature ir. the historical 
development of ethics (Deutsche 1994: 261). He identifies challenges to 
conventional ethics, which he sees as being restricted to human relations within 
small groups and merely fulfilling the duties of professional roles within social 
systems (ibid. 1994: 261). He justifies the call for a new ethical system on the 
basis of the impact the international economy and world markets is having on 
conventional morals and the evolving new relationship between humankind and 
nature (ibid. 1994: 264). He notes that technological skills and achievements 
have always been ahead of moral responsibilities and that there is a need to 
organize a sense of collective responsibility (ibid . 1994: 264). In this regard he 
makes the following comment : 
Thus it appears that in both dimensions of cultural evolution , 
namely, that of technological interventions in nature and that of 
social interaction, a global situation has been brought about in our 
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time that calls for a new ethics of shared responsibility, in other 
words, for a type of ethics that, in contradistinction to the 
traditional or conventional forms of ethics, may be designated a 
(planetary) macroethics (Deutsche 1994: 264) 
He notes the proposal of Konrad Lorenz who suggests the need for a biological 
evolution so that a new quasi-instinctive disposition of morality based on 
human reason may arise (ibid. 1994: 265). He also notes the view of Nobel 
prizewinner Friedrich August von Hayek who makes a call for ethics of human 
solidarity and social justice based on a global scale (ibid. 1994: 265). He finally 
concludes that the new ethics, macroethics cannot be based on either the quasi-
instinctive feelings or on conventional morals, because it requires a rational 
foundation, which must transcend all traditions (Deutsche 1994: 265). The 
justification for a new ethical system cannot be limited to just economic and 
human-nature relationships, it must encompass humar qovernance. power and 
control as well. 
It is inevitable that macroethics or global ethics would commence with a 
conceptual paradigm that is rooted in philosophic ethics, however, global ethics 
requires an integrated conceptual framework and therefore cannot be confined 
to philosophic ethics alone. A conceptual framework that must see the 
development of new ideas that can encompass integrated meaning. 
215 
Conventional ethics being firmly fixed in human relationships must be revised 
in light of an integrated approach. 
Karl Otto Apel notes that science has called for a new rational ethics and by its 
monopoly of the definition of rationality, it has blocked the way for a rational 
grounding of ethics (Deutsche 1994: 266). He further notes that the modem age 
is a planetary civilization where culture, science, technology and economy have 
been unified (ibid. 1994: 269). He clarifies the point that a universally valid 
ethics for humankind does not mean a prescribed uniform style of ethics for the 
different socio-cultural forms (ibid . 1994: 269-270). On the contrary, he 
proposes a form of pluralism of individual forms of life in which universally 
valid ethics based on equal rights and equal co-responsibility for solving 
problems of humankind is respected (ibid. 1994: 270). In his opinion, co-
responsibility is a principle of ethics and it goes even beyond any ethical sense 
of justice and conventional forms (ibid. 1994: 274-275) 
5.11 The Nature of Ethics or Moral Philosophy 
It is also necessary to understand the precise nature of ethics or moral 
philosophy from a western perspective in order for this study to make a vital 
contribution towards constructing a framework for the global ethical discourse. 
It is substantive to understand the types of thinking that underpin moral 
philosophy and to evaluate whether such thinking is relevant for the 
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development of a global ethic and in what ways can such thinking be applied in 
the global ethical discourse. 
It is noted that Ethics is a branch of philosophy, and as such it refers to moral 
philosophy or philosophical thinking about morality, moral problems, and 
moral judgements (Frankena 1973 . 4). It is assumed that moral philosophy 
arises when we think for ourselves in critical and general terms and achieve 
autonomy as moral agents (ibid. 1973 : 4). It is proposed that three kinds of 
thinking relate to morality (I) descriptive empirical thinking which attempts to 
describe the phenomena of morality or try to construct a theory of human 
nature that impacts on ethical issues (ii) normative thinking refers to raising the 
debate of what is right, good or obligatory and then forming a normative 
judgement as a conclusion and (iii) the third form of thinking is analytical, 
critical or meta-ethical thinking, which falls outside the framework of empirical 
or normative thinking and it raises questions about the meaning and use of 
moral expressions, about finding justifications for value judgements, finding 
explanations for the distinctions between moral and non-moral and searching 
for meaning to concepts such as "free" or "responsible" (ibid. 1973 : 5). It is 
observed that the trend in the modern world is to exclude empirical and 
normative thinking from ethics and to depend more on meta-ethical thinking 
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5.12 The Nature of Morality 
The examination of the terms ethics and morality is needed in order to 
understand the context in which these terms have been used and to 
conceptualize a possibility to define the term Gobal ethics along similar lines. 
Frankena notes that the term ethics is not always used as a branch of 
philosophy it is also used as another word for morality (Frankena 1973 : 5). It is 
also observed that the terms moral and ethical are used as equivalents to what is 
right and good as opposed to what is immoral and unethical (ibid. 1973 : 5). The 
problem with these concepts is their association with the notions of what is 
right and good. Although the idea of what is right and good may vary from one 
individual to another, the common term ethic or morality is used to refer to the 
varying notions of right and good. However, the concept of global ethic must 
refer to what is relative and standardized for each individual and at the same 
time commonly good to all . 
Frankena notes that morality is a social enterprise, for it exists for the 
individual and it goes on to exist even after him and it is also social in its 
origins, sanctions and functions (Frankena 1973 : 6). It is essential to consider 
the extent to which morality becomes the instrument ()f a society. Firstly, it 
must be confessed that humanity as a whole, is made up of many minor 
societies each governed by its own sense of morality. Each moral situation in 
its individuality will be of very little relevance for a global society. If morality 
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has its social origins, functions and sanctions, then it is also possible to 
conceptualize the arising of a global morality within the context of a global 
society. 
At some point or the other, the question of individual desires and interests are 
going to be raised in the context of morality and how are these going to be 
accommodated in a developing global ethic. Frankena notes that it is not 
characteristic of the moral point of view to submit to individual desires and 
interests of what is right and wrong and suggests in Freudian terms that 
morality is the function of the "superego" (Franken a 1973 : 7). This would 
mean that within the context of the ethical discourse there is no 
compartmentalization of morality, and it is possible to serve a very much larger 
interest than just individual interest. 
5.13 The Fundamental Ethical Questions 
This part will focus on some of the fundamental questions raised in order to 
establish a source for moral and ethical thinking. In this regard the analysis will 
focus on a rationale to justify right action; the compulsions for right action; the 
role of reason in moral judgements; an examination of the following theories: 
(I) the law theory, (ii) the moral fact theory, (iii) the moral sense theory, (iv) the 
theory of intuitionalism, (v) the theory of rationalism, (vi) the theory of 
calculative rationalism, (vii) the response theory and finally the emotive theory. 
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This analysis alms to establish the fundamental Issues that underpin the 
construction of an ethic. 
Baier raises a fundamental question in his book, The Moral Point oj View - A 
rational Basis ojEthics, Why should we do what is right? (Baier 1958: 6). This 
question intends establishing the intent and the rationale for doing what is right. 
In response there may be various answers, however, he continues to explore a 
justification for morality by examining what benefit or advantage an individual 
can gain from being moral whether in this life or in the afterlife (Baier 1958: 6). 
It must be noted that, within individual ethical systems, there is in-built some 
advantage that the individual can strive for. However, noting the variety of 
backgrounds that people come from, it becomes increasingly challenging to 
think of a common advantage to which human beings can strive for in 
justifying their moral behavior. He suggests that right action is advantageous 
because the world is designed in this way (Baier 1958: 7). One of the 
fundamental points he raises is a quest for a reason to justify moral action and 
he raises the debate whether God 's reason is sufficient to justify moral action as 
against man 's reason for right action. 
Baier also explores a second question and that is : why do we do what is right? 
He examines the first assumption that all men always seek their greatest 
pleasure, their greatest happiness and greatest advant, f~ and thJ.t they do the 
right thing only when they believe that these things coincide (Baier 1958: 14). 
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It must be noted that doing the right thing does not always result in pleasure 
and happiness. If an individual acts solely because it produces happiness and 
advantage then he may fail to act righteously if such advantage is not present. 
He also rejects the assumption that human beings can act only from a desire for 
the greatest possible advantage on the ground that there is no truth for such a 
theory (ibid. 1958: 14). 
Baier further examInes the assumption that reason can have nothing to 
contribute to the establishment of moral judgements. He basis this assumption 
on Hume's suggestion that morality is not a matter either of empirical fact or of 
relations between ideas and a matter of taste (Baier 1958: 15). However he uses 
Kant in the dialogue between reason and desire. Kant suggests that by reason 
we know what is right and wrong and reason determines our conduct (ibid. 
1958: 16). There is a further assumption that says that a conscience or sense of 
duty which drives us to do what is right and avoid what is wrong (ibid. 1958: 
16) It is also proposed that the environment plays an important role in 
modifying conscience, howev~r, there is no conclusive proof that we are born 
with propensities leading to right conduct (ibid. 1958: ':'). 
Baier takes up the third question: how do we know what is right? and he 
evaluates the following theories viz. the "law theory", the "moral fact theory" 
and the "emotive theory" in light of this question. The "Law theories" are based 
on the fundamental supposition that morality is a system of commands, rules or 
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laws issuing from some authority (Baier 1958: 18). Notwithstanding this basic 
proposal, the law theory is beset with the following problems (I) who is the 
authority that issues the commands (ii) how certain are we that the commands 
or laws are correct or incorrect (iii) if it is issued by a perfect being how sure 
are we that it came from a perfect being (ibid. 1958: 21). These questions place 
the law theory under some degree of pressure. 
The "moral fact theory", is based on the conjecture that morality is a system of 
facts, namely moral facts, which are stated more or less correctly and 
accurately in the moral convictions of a group (Baier 1958: 19). Baier clarifies 
that one knows moral facts by a special moral sense, by intuition or by reason, 
however, his conclusion is that none of these can provide a satisfactory answer 
to the question of how we know what is right (ibid. 1958: 22). The "moral 
sense theory", on the other hand, proposes that we ha"e a special moral sense, 
an inner eye which enables us to see the rightness or wrong-ness of certain 
sorts of action (Baier 1958: 22). Baier notes that the only problem to this theory 
is that there is no such inner organ to determine moral sense (ibid., 1958: 22). 
Furthermore, the theory of intuitionism suggests that it is our intuition, which 
works like a sixth sense, that tells us what is right and wrong (Baier 1958: 23). 
One of the serious challenges facing the theory of intuitionism is that of 
verification. The question is how do we verify intuition and what is gained 
from intuition as true or false? I)n the other hand, it is proposed that the theory 
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of rationalism, which is based on the presumption that we know by reason what 
is right and wrong (Baier 1958: 24). Calculative rationalism suggest that reason 
enables us to tell what is right by working out what is a means to our end (ibid. 
1958: 24). The limitation of this proposal is that it cannot tell us what is the 
proper goal and how we can come to know that (ibid . 1958: 24-25). However, 
categorical rationalism asserts that reason can tell us what are proper ends to 
aim at and what are the best means to that end (ibid . 1958: 25) 
The response theory is based on the assumption that morality is a system of 
responses to certain sorts of behavior (Baier 1958: ' 9) . In other words, this 
theory advocates the idea that moral utterances are not about conduct but are 
about responses to conduct (ibid. 1958: 20). This theory faces two problems (I) 
to find the method whereby to single out those feelings that are 
characteristically moral (ii) the difficulty to solve the question of whose 
feelings, responses or attitudes should count (Baier 1958: 26). Finally, the 
emotive theory rests on the assumption that moral utterance express moral 
feelings aroused in the speaker by people and their conduct (ibid. 1958: 20). 
It is quite evident that there is no clear-cut answer to justifying right action. 
Moreover, any form of justification may have limite~ relevanct: and they are 
constantly changing. In a global society, there is more that one stakeholder that 
is involved in contributing towards a global ethic; therefore, there will be 
different degrees of rationale applied to justify ethics. The new framework for a 
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global ethic must consider this challenge and be able to propose a common 
rationale that is accepted to all. 
5.14 Moral Reasoning 
In the last section, this study explored the fundam ~r.tal theories in ethical 
thinking that inform how we develop a rationale for justifying our moral 
actions. It has been noted that there is no single way of justifying moral action, 
moral justification is largely contextual. In this section, this study will examine 
the principles of moral reasoning. One of the principle features of modem 
ethical theories is the issue of moral reasoning. The question that needs to be 
raised is what type of reason will be considered morally adequate? It must be 
noted that different people, coming from different worldviews have their 
individual forms of reasoning. It is evident that human action is reasoned 
differently in different contexts. One of the critical issues that will influence the 
development of a global ethic is that of individual mora·:;ty. In thi3 regard, it is 
the issue of the right of the individual to decide what is good for him/her. This 
issue may seem to be a challenge or a good thing; the question is how is society 
going to respond to certain moral issues? However, this analysis focuses on the 
following issues viz. ethical relativism, the principle of individual morality and 
the principle of social morality. These three principles constitute an essential 
feature of the global ethical discourse. 
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5.15 Ethical Relativism 
The fundamental position of ethical relativism is that moral truth or ethical 
truths are not absolutely true but true relatively to a particular society or 
individual. This means that there is no absolute notion of Truth or a common 
factor that links humanity together morally. Furthermore, the cultural relativist 
position is that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on the norms of 
individual societies (Olen, et al. 1992: 5). This means that contradiction in 
moral values may occur, with each individual society exercising its own moral 
sense. The individual relativist may argue that the rightness or wrongness of an 
action depends on the individual ' s own commitments (ibid. 1992: 5) and not 
that of a social group. Although ethical relativism fo', ms an important part of 
the ethical discourse, it must be noted that there are several opponents to rigid 
forms of relativism. One of the challenges that face ethical relativism is 
establishing a global ethical standard. This problem can be resolved by 
searching for an ethic that is common to all and that may not necessarily be 
rooted in an individual ' s cultural or religious tradition. Negotiating a global 
ethic is bound to lead to moral disputes. It is apparent that there is no decisive 
way to settle moral disputes (Olen, et al. 1992: 5). It must be noted that 
morality is not just a matter of taste or desires, there are norms and 
commitments that we engage in for reasons and therefore these reasons must be 
carefully examined. (Olen, et al. 1992: 5) 
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5.16 Principles of Individual Morality 
Olen (et al.) have noted that moral rules are not arbitrary, they are there for 
good reasons (Olen, et al. 1992: 6). Morality is not just a matter of rules, if 
reason requires us to change them, we must do that, because there is no moral 
rule that is exceptionless (ibid. 1992: 6). This is an important point and should 
form part of the framework (jf the global ethical discourse. The principle of 
utility is based on the assumption that there must be J. balance of happiness 
over unhappiness (ibid. 1992: 7) This principle also makes possible the making 
of a choice between different moral rules in order to maximize happiness (ibid. 
1992: 7). Olen (et al.) concludes that the principle of utility cannot be the final 
option for all moral decisions because the problem with this principle is that it 
fails to take into account the happiness of all (ibid. 1992: 8). The idea of what 
may be good for one may not be good for another is central to this principle. 
The principle of fairness is based on the assumption that we do unto others as 
we would have them do unto us (Olen, et al. 1992: 9). Olen suggests that 
respect for other persons is one of the fundamental moral principlts and it is 
based on the Kantian notion of respect which stipulates that one should never 
use other people merely as a means to further one' s own ends (Olen 1992: 9). 
Olen suggests that to respect persons one must see them as autonomous with , 
their own reasons for acting with their own goals and aspirations and with the 
ability to decide how to reach the goals (ibid. 1992: 10). 
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Olen notes that moral principles focus on individual obligation to others and 
how we ought to act towards others (Olen, et al. 1992: 11). On the other hand, 
ethical thought focuses on the human good of huwan life and when taken 
together they constitute the good life for human beings (ibid. 1992: 11). The 
basis of determining human excellence in human activity is derived from the 
Aristotelian idea of examining the human artifact and determining whether it is 
good or bad. (ibid. 1992: 11). It is a known fact that some of the human 
excellence is distinct while others are commonly accepted and these human 
excellence are often called virtues (Olen, et al. 1992: 11). Olen takes up the 
idea of the natural purpose of man and establishes it on the proposal of 
Aristotle who believed that everything in nature has both a natural purpose as 
well as a social purpose (ibid. 1992: 11). Aristotle established that the natural 
purpose of a human being is happiness (ibid. 1992: 1 1 .. 12). He Jlso suggested 
that a good part of this happiness is to fulfill one's social roles by living well 
ordered lives which is not given to extremes and is based on deep reason (ibid. 
1992: 12). Olen takes up the issue of social roles and raises the question of 
compassion for the dying, respect for nature, mercy for convicted criminals, 
understanding pregnant woman, and concern for fetuses in the context of social 
role and human excellence (ibid. 1992: 12). 
It is inevitable that we submit that some people see religion as providing the 
final word on moral questions and that people often turn to religion for 
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guidance on moral issues (Olen, et al. 1992: 13). The role of God in moral 
matters is based on the assumption that God made the world and put the human 
being in it with some purpose and that God is both the source of moral and 
physical laws in the universe (ibid. 1992: 13). Thomas Aquinas, a Catholic 
thinker, postulated the view that moral laws of God are natural laws embedded 
in nature and human reason (Olen, et al. 1992: 13). God is not only the source 
of morality; He is also the best authority on morality (ibid. 1992: 13). While 
these proposals may hold firm in a strong debate, but the foHowing challenges 
needs to be given due consideration (I) how certain we are that we know what 
God really wants (ii) different religions give confl i -;t.!ng ansv/ers to moral 
questions (iii) religious individuals give their individual consciences as ultimate 
answers to moral questions (ibid. 1992: 13). 
It must be noted that the principle of utility, the principle of fairness and the 
Aristotelian idea of happiness form an integral part of the global ethical 
framework and they cannot be ignored when constructing a global ethic. Each 
of these ideas has significance and relevance for human existence and moral 
regeneration. 
5.17 Principles of Social Morality 
One of the sound principles of social morality is social justice, whether we 
agree with what such a justice requires or not (Olen, et al. 1992: 14). Social 
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justice primarily aims to eradicate all forms of inequality of opportunity and 
allow individuals equal access to all that brings them the greatest happiness. 
Olen proposes that Individual rights be submitted as part of social morality and 
individual rights are largely determined by the Bill of Rights that is embedded 
in the political Constitution of a country. These rights rest on the principle of 
equality, justice, human dignity and freedom. The main problem undt:rlying the 
Bill of Rights and the issue of social morality is the int~rpretation in the 
different contexts. It must be noted that part of the individual rights is "natural 
rights" of an individual. The main proposition of natural rights is that every 
individual has the legal right to do whatever we have the natural right to do 
without any interference and this proposition is supported and advocated by 
persons like John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, Robert Nozick (Olen, et al. 1992: 
15). However, the problem with this approach is that while individual rights 
may legitimatize action for individual benefit, it may be the source of 
unhappiness or may impact negatively on others. For example, while a person 
may claim to have the right to abortion, this right may impact on the right of 
the fetus to life. 
Furthermore, Olen proposes the principle of equal treatment as part of social 
morality and underpins it on the following basis (I) that there must be equal 
treatment before the law (ii) there should be equal opportunity for all without 
discrimination (iii) finally equal treatment requires equal results (Olen, et al. 
1992: 17-18). Olen also suggests that the general welfare or the common good 
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of public interest is part of the principle of social morality and he rests this 
responsibility largely on the shoulders of government (ibid. 1992: 18). On the 
issue of equal treatment, it must be noted that the plant and animal life also 
form part of the social ecosystem of man. Therefore, the principle of equal 
treatment must extend to include them as well . Olen notes that public decency 
in the form of creating a healthy moral environment where there is the 
promotion of sex between married people, prevention of excessive drunkenness 
in public, and disorderly conduct in public and restrictions on private behavior 
such as homosexual behavior and pornography and prostitution etc (Olen, et al. 
1992: 19). It is noted that in a pluralistic society the various independent 
centres of power viz. family, the press, religion, business and labor 
organizations, government, do not have unlimited power and each institution is 
given the freedom to pursue its own ends (ibid . 1992: 21). No individual centre 
of power can be given unbridled power, which may lead to exploitation. Olen 
notes the following challenges in moral reasoning (I) dilferent moral questions 
may present different moral answers sometimes contradicting each other and 
therefore, making choices very difficult (ii) such moral dilemmas lead to moral 
skepticism. 
The global ethical discourse needs to embrace the principle of social morality, 
despite the fundamental challenges it poses. If there is to be a global ethic then 
Hindu thought must be interwoven into both the principles of individual and 
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social morality and it must also be able to deal with the Issue of ethical 
relativism. 
5.18 The Kantian Model Of Ethics 
In the last section we explored the basis of moral reasoning in the western 
ethical discourse. It became apparent that the notions of ethical relativism, 
individual and social .morality is central to this discourse. However, in this part, 
focus will be given to the contribution of Immanuel Kant to the western ethical 
discourse. Kant adequately captures the ethical discourse of the nineteenth 
century~ therefore it will be useful to make reference to him. This analysis will 
examine the Universal Law and the Principle of Humanity; the categories of 
duty and the Metaphysics of Morals~ the Religion of Reason and Freedom and 
the Criticism of Utilitarianism. 
Immanuel Kant was born in Konigsberg, Prussia, around 1724 in a devout 
Pietist family. (Natalya 1989: 201). It has been noted that his ethical theories 
were far more influential than his epistemology and metaphysics and his ethical 
theories were found in two books viz. "the Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals" (1785) and "The Critique of Practical Reason" (1787) 
(http ://www.utm.edu/research). Kant's primary focus for his ethical vision was 
deontology which deals with the nature of duty which he expressed in his 
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famous statement: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law." (ibid. http://www.utm). 
To Kant, the notions of God, immortality and freedom were beyond the limits 
of theoretical understanding (Natalya 1989: 207). These issues were more of 
metaphysical significance. He proposed a fundamental notion to action and that 
is willing, willing something is determining yourself to be the cause of that 
thing and determining yourself the means to it (ibid. 1989: 208). To Kant, a 
moral rule does not say "do this if you want that" but simply "do this" and is 
expressed in a categorical imperative (ibid. 1989: 208). According to Kant, in 
the phenomenal world, due to its temporal nature and the principle of causality, 
every event has a cause and there can be no freedom (Natalya 1989: 209). But 
the noumenaJ world does not exist in time and a ~pontaneou!l c?,Usality is 
possible for it, it also leaves room for belief in the freedom of will (ibid. 1989: 
209). To Kant, the freedom of will provides the content of morality and its 
motive (ibid. 1989: 209). It is noted that moral law, which is a categorical 
imperative, governs freedom, which determines the moral nature of actions 
(ibid. 1989: 209). 
The will, Kant says, is the faculty of acting according to a conception of law. 
When we act, whether or not we achieve what we intend with our actions is 
often beyond our control, so the morality of our actions does not depend upon 
their outcome. What we can control, however, is the will behind he action. 
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That is, we can will to act according to one law rather than another 
(http ://www.utm). The morality of an action, therefore, must be assessed in 
terms of the motivation behind it (ibid. http://www.utm). The only thing that is 
good without qualification is the good will and all other candidates for an 
intrinsic good have problems viz. courage, health, and wealth can all be used 
for ill purposes, (ibid. http://www.utm) and therefore cannot be intrinsically 
good. Happiness is not intrinsically good because even being worthy of 
happiness requires that one p"ssess a good will (ibid. http://www.utm). The 
good will is the only unconditional good despite all en..;roachmerlts. Misfortune 
may render someone incapable of achieving her goals, but the goodness of her 
"will" may remain (ibid. http ://www.utm). 
Kant recognized the ultimate worth of persons by acknowledging that every 
rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means (Olen, et 
al. 1992: 32). Kant suggests that human beings who are rational beings are 
designated as "persons" and other beings that are dependent on nature and are 
not a rational being have relative worth and are designated as "things" (ibid. 
1992: 32). Such "persons" are an object of respect (ibid. 1992: 32). The very 
existence of a human being is an end in itself and its worth does net arise as a 
result of another action (ibid. 1992: 32). This approach of Kant therefore places 
humans above all other living objects such as trees and animals. This idea may 
result in the exploitation of the lower by the higher factors of life. Furthermore, 
Kant noted that human beings are moral agents as lawgivers and for him 
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morality consisted of relating every action to legislation in which no action was 
inconsistent with a universal law (ibid. 1992: 33). Kant proposed that in the 
realm of ends whatever has a price can be replaced with something equivalent, 
but whatever is above all price has a dignity and he proposed that morality and 
humanity alone has dignity (ibid. 1992: 33). An im~ (\rtant contrlbution that 
Kant has noted is the inherent dignity of human beings and their role in social 
development through the development of universal laws. ' However, the 
weakness of this thesis is that it fails to take into consideration the idea that 
plants and animals share some degree of dignity as humans and therefore need 
to be treated in a way that does not result in them becoming the mere means to 
an end. 
5.18.1 Universal Law and Humanity 
According to Kant, duty is just duty without any purpose and this is the law, 
which he projects as ·a universal law (Olen, et al. 1992: 211). Duty without a 
purpose can be understood as duty based on selfless action, an idea that is 
similar to the notion of svadharma in Hindu thought. Kant holds the view that 
only a rational being has capacity to act in accordance with law or principle 
(ibid . 1992: 211) which therefore excludes all animals. The maxim is the 
principle on which you act and it embodies the reason for the action (Olen, et 
al. 1992: 211). He also suggests that your action must be a means to your end 
and your end must be consistent with your happiness (ibid. 1992: 21 1). Kant 
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attempts to construct a universal law from every m.t:\im and he notes very 
brilliantly that where there are contradictions that arise there can be no such 
universal law (ibid. 1992: 212-213). Kant also basis his thesis on the proposal 
that one always acts with some end in view (ibid. 1992: 214). It would mean 
that if there were no end in view then man would not act. Kant notes that 
ends/goals provides us with positive reasons (I) purposes to be achieved and (ii) 
negatively - things that we must not act against (ibid. 1992: 214). Kant believes 
that absolute value cannot be found in things that we desire, because they get 
their value from the fact that we desire them (ibid. 1992: 214). Kant also 
suggested that every rational being exist as an end in himself (ibid. 1992: 214). 
Kant proposes that the only thing that has unconditional value is "good will". 
He basis his conclusion on the following premises (I) that ultimate value 
springs from a source which is unconditionally valuable (ii) a thing has 
unconditional value if it derives its value in itself and maintains this value 
under all conditions (iii) goodwill - because it's the object of our own choice 
which we take to be good and the source of value is not in the object but rests 
in us, not our desire and needs but our humanity, rational nature and capacity 
for rational choice (Olen, et aI. 1992: 214). Kant says that it is our rational 
nature in its perfect state that is "good will" (ibid. 1992: 214). Kant also 
suggested that we must act so that we treat humanity as an end and never as a 
means (ibid . 1992: 215). We must attribute the same kind of value that we 
attribute to our humanity to the humanity of others as well (ibid. 1992: 214). 
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Kant sees violations of perfect duty being brought about when the power of 
rational choice is made subordinate to certain conditions (Olen, et aI. 1992: 
215). One who uses deceptive methods to undermine t\" e freedom of choice and 
action brings about violation of perfect duty (ibid. 1992: 215). Deception is 
unjustifiable no matter what end it serves, for the good end is the object of 
every rational being (ibid. 1992: 215). The principle of humanity is based on 
the following understanding (1) we realise our humanity and develop our talents 
and powers and rational capacities (ii) acknowledge others as a source of value 
(iii) treat their chosen ends as good (iv) pursue their happiness as they see it (v) 
all human pursuits to be seen as good as long as everyone agree with them 
(Olen et al. 1992: 215). 
5.18.2 Categories of Duty: The Metaphysics of I\lul'als 
Kant's Metaphysical Principle of Justice deals with the issue of both natural 
right and acquired right (Olen, et al. 1992: 216). No person has the right to 
interfere with the freedom and property or another; however, the use of 
coercion is authorized (Olen, et al. 1992: 216). Kant believes that freedom is an 
innate right and also suggests that objects be considered as property and be 
given a moral status (ibid. 1992: 216). The person who transgresses the rights 
of others is bad, the person who simply conforms to the law, merely does what 
is owed but the person who conforms to the law because he or she has made the 
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rights of humanity his or her end is morally good (ibid. 1992: 218). Kant 
describes 4 (four) categories of duties of virtue [inner freedom] (I) perfect 
duties to oneself, to preserve and respect the humanity in one' s own person; (ii) 
imperfect duties to oneself, to develop ones humanity, intellectually and 
physically (iii) duties of love for others, to promote their happiness (iv) duties 
of respect for others, including the respect for their rights (ibid. 1992: 219). 
Kant believes that a world in which everyone ' s rights are respected is a world 
in which complete external freedom is achieved (ibid. ] 992: 219). Kant notes 
that a free will must have its own law or principle, which it gives to itself and 
which makes it an autonomous, will (ibid. 1992: 222). He maintuins that moral 
law arises from an autonomous will and that free will and moral law is identical 
(ibid. 1992: 222). 
Conceiving of a means to achieve some desired end is by far the most common 
employment of reason. But Kant has shown that the acceptable conception of 
the moral law cannot be merely hypothetical (http://www.utm). Our actions 
cannot be moral on the ground of some conditional purpose or goal. Morality 
requires an unconditional statement of one's duty (http://www.utm).The 
argument for the first formulation of the categorical imperative can be thought 
of this way. We have seen that in order to be good, we must remove inclination 
and the consideration of any particular goal from our motivation to act 
(http://www.utm). The act cannot be good if it arises from subjective impulse, 
nor can it be good because it seeks after some particular goal, which might not 
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attain the good we seek or could come about through "happenstance" 
(http ://www.utm). If we remove all subjectivity and particularity from 
motivation we are only left with will to universality. The question "what rule 
determines what I ought to do in this situation?" becomes "what rule ought to 
universally guide action?" What we must do in any situation of moral choice is 
act according to a maxim that we would will everyone to act according to (ibid . 
http://www.utm). 
5.18.3 The Religion of Reason and Freedom 
To Kant the object of moral law is Highest Good, virtue and happiness (Olen et 
al. 1992: 224). The highest Good is the systematic totality of good ends to 
which the moral law directs us (ibid. 1992: 225). He holds that happiness is not 
the utmost importance, the desire for your own happiness must not stop you 
from doing what is right (ibid. 1992: 225). He notes that happiness is 
conditionally valuable and when its condition is met, it is a genuine good (ibid. 
1992: 225). It must be noted that sometimes it is impossible to achieve the 
Highest Good (ibid. 1992: 225) It is also noted that in the phenomenal world 
the results of our actions are influenced by the forces of nature and actions of 
others and not only our intentions and therefore the attempts to realise the good 
is diverted by these forces (ibid. 1992: 226). Kant also notes the role of the 
Author of Nature who is conceptualized as one who designed the laws of 
nature, who is omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good and who has 
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attributes ascribed to God (Olen, et al. 1992: 226). He notes that the Highest 
Good is possible if we believe that end is possible (ibiu. : 992: 22S-::!27). 
Freedom plays a central role in Kantian ethics because the possibility of moral 
judgments presupposes it. Freedom is an idea of reason that serves an 
indispensable practical function because without the assumption of freedom, 
reason cannot act. So reason has an unavoidable interest in thinking of itself as 
free . That is, theoretical reason cannot demonstrate freedom, but practical 
reason must be assumed for the purpose of action. Having the ability to make 
judgments and apply reason puts us outside that system of causally necessitated 
events. In its intellectual domain, reason must think of itself as free . It is 
dissatisfying that he cannot demonstrate freedom, nevertheless, it comes as no 
surprise that we must think of ourselves as free . In a sense, Kant is agreeing 
with the common sense view that how I choose to act makes a difference in 
how I actually act. 
5.18.4 Kant's Criticism of Utilitarianism 
Kant's criticisms of utilitarianism have become famous enough to warrant some 
separate discussion. Utilitarian moral theories evaluate the moral worth of 
action on the basis of happiness that is produced by an action (http://www.utm). 
Whatever produces the most happiness in most of the people is the moral 
course of action that one should follow (ibid . http://www.utm). Kant has an 
239 
insightful objection to moral evaluations of this sort. The essence of the 
objection is that utilitarian theories actually devalue the individuals it is 
supposed to benefit (ibid. http://www.utm). If we allow utilitarian calculations 
to motivate our actions, we are allowing the valuation of one person's welfare 
and interests in terms of what good they can be used for (ibid . http://www.utm). 
It would be possible, for instance, to justify sacrificing one individual for the 
benefits of others if the utilitarian calculations promise more benefit and doing 
so would be the worst example of treating someone utluly as a means and not 
as an end in themselves (ibid . http ://www.utm). Another way to consider his 
objection is to note that utilitarian theories are driven by the merely contingent 
inclination in humans for pleasure and happiness, not by the universal moral 
law dictated by reason (ibid. http ://www.utm). To act in pursuit of happiness is 
arbitrary and subjective, and is no more moral than acting on the basis of greed, 
or selfishness (ibid. http://www.utm). All three emanate from subjective, non-
rational grounds. The danger of utilitarianism lies in its embracing of baser 
instincts, while rejecting the indispensable role of reason and freedom in our 
actions. 
The Kantian model to ethics holds several elements that are vital for the global 
ethical discourse. Firstly, the issue of the freedom of choice or will is central to 
the human rights culture and allows for human freedom. However, such 
freedom of will needs to be reconciled with the idea of determinism, which 
partly arises from the theory of rebirth in Hindu thought. It has also become 
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apparent that the Kantian model suggests that moral law is integral to legal law. 
However, it must be noted that there are several challenges to reconciling moral 
law with legal law. NotwithstMding this, the Kantian model proposes a view 
that is essential for the global ethical discourse in which global :-t1orality is 
matched with international law. The concept of human dignity is well captured 
in Kantian ethics; however, the ground principle on which such dignity is based 
is discriminative of other living entities. This may be a challenge for Kantian 
ethics in the global context. 
5.19 The Essence, Structure and Function of Morality 
In the last analysis, a detail inspection of the Kantian model of ethics within the 
context of the western ethical discourse was pursued. In this section, this study 
will examine the essence, structure and function of morality in general. This 
analysis would establish fundamental principles and guidelines that could 
contribute to the theoretical development of the global ethical discourse. 
One of the challenges in social life is the multitude of interpretations there are 
to morality and ethics (Natalya 1989: 97). The essence of morality constitutes 
(I) experience of worldly wisdom where an individual is taught to be virtuous 
and .to secure immortality of the human soul (ii) doing one ' s duty as a means of 
upholding social order (iii) promoting public good and removing squalor and 
injustice of life (iv) imposing responsibilities on man 1.nd help curb the animal 
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instincts in him (ibid. 1989: 97) . These essences may work well from a 
religious perspective; however, consideration must also be given to the non-
religious perspective as well. It must be noted that morality is not enclosed in 
any single sphere of human activity; it is all pervasive (Natalya 1989: 98). 
Morality is objectively multifunctional, it can safeguard a social system or 
undermine it (ii) it can unite people or divide them (iii) it gives value and 
meaning to human existence (iii) is marked by continuity and it can be seen as 
a qualitatively distinct social phenomena (ibid. 1989: 99). The specific 
character of morality is understood by knowing its role and function and it is on 
this basis that it is different from science, law or art (ibid. 1989: 99). The 
difference between science and morality is that scientific theoretical methods 
differ from religious assimilation of the world (ibid . 1989: 99). While the centre 
of science is the problem of truth, the centre of morality is the problem of 
behavioral standards (ibid. 1989: 99). Therefore, morality is seen as regulating 
man 's behavior between good and evil (ibid. 1989: 99). It is noted that science 
contains elements of value attitude towards the world and morality incorporates 
the truths of science, which necessitate moral choice (Ibid. 1989: 100). The 
conclusion reached is: 
Each of the methods of assimilating the world is not only original 
and independent but is inseparable from the other methods. 
Supplementing one another, they perform the same task, which 
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brings them together, promoting society' s progress (Natalya 1989: 
100) 
It is noted that moral imperatives are supported by special psychological 
mechanisms viz. conscience and a sense of duty whicr ~re peculiar to morality 
alone (ibid. 1989: 102). Conscience demands that a person does good and 
resist evil and duty commands a person to be honest, to adequately meet his 
responsibility and to maintain his honor and dignity (Natalya 1989: 102). 
The main concern of the philosopher of ethics is to try and single out the 
principal function of morality. It is suggested here that regulation is the 
principal function of morality, and it takes place through regulation of behavior 
through moral standards; notwithstanding the fact that it is not the sole 
regulator (ibid. 1989, P 1 03). From the other social regulators viz. legal, 
administrative, technical etc. moral regulation shoulJ be distinguished from 
legal regulation (Natalya 1989: 103). It must be noted that legal regulation is 
bolstered by social institutions e.g. the state and this may not be the case for 
moral regulations (ibid. 1989: 103), notwithstanding the fact that in history the 
traditional Indian states supported moral standards. However, conscience and 
duty are nominated as the personal regulators of human behavior (ibid. 1989: 
128). Furthermore, duty is a high moral obligation and has become an internal 
source of voluntary submission to attain and preserve one's moral values (ibid. 
1989: 132). Awareness of one ' s duty meant adopting a social and class stand 
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and consciously choosing a worldview or a system oL tandards and norms that 
suited it (ibid. 1989: 133). It must also be noted that in a morally advanced 
person duty harmonizes with conscience and inner conflicts may arise in 
individuals as a result of duty clashing with one' s conscience (ibid. 1989: 133-
134). 
In developing the global ethical discourse, the essence and function of morality 
cannot be overlooked. In fact the essence, structure and function of morality 
differ from one community to another. The objective of the global ethical 
discourse is to formulate a global essence, structure and function for an 
integrated system of morality and ethics. 
5.20 Moral Principles 
It is noted that moral principles generally define moral standards and are 
distinct from moral standards (Natalya 1989: 190). One of the challenges to the 
development of moral principles is the historical contestation of collectivism 
(selflessness, altruism) and egoism (individualism, self-seeking leanings) (ibid. 
1989: 191). Egoism is often viewed as greed of a single individual and it must 
be learnt that each individual is defined in terms of one' s social values which is 
perceived as his own and for which one is prepared to make sacrifices (ibid. 
1989: 191). In fact, one cannot live in a society and be independent of it, social 
interests form the core of the individual ' s personality (ibid. 1989: 191). It must 
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also be noted that egoism is not restricted at the level of the individual, it also 
manifest in the form of group, territorial, social egoism, family egOIsm 
corporate, community and patriotic egoism (ibid. 1989: 192). . 
The principle of humanism reveals continuity between collectivism and moral 
experiences (Natalya 1989: 19) . The organic part of humanism advocated (I) 
the need for compassion (ii) respect (iii) and love for tellow mankind (iv) each 
person's right to happiness (v) equal opportunities for human growth and 
development (ibid. 1989: 196). Part of humanism is communist humanism 
which is based on (I) universalism (ii) respect and love for all persons (iii) that 
each individual has the equal right to happiness (iv) that there must be equality 
through practical relations (Natalya 1989: 201). 
It must be concluded that the moral principles of egoism and collectivism form 
an important trend in the western ethical discourse. There are advantages and 
disadvantages to them, which must be examined and evaluated in the context of 
the global ethical discourse. 
5.21 The Main Trends in Twentieth Century Ethics 
In the last section of this study, an investigation of the essence, structure and 
function of morality and moral principles was attempted. In this section a 
general examination of the main streams of ethical thinking within the western 
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discourse will be pursued. This analysis will present a clearer picture of the 
ethical paradigms that need to be critically evaluated and integrated into the 
global ethical discourse in order to formulate a global ethic. 
5.21.1 Existentialist Ethics 
One of the founding proposals of existentialism is that man is left alone with 
himself therefore is absolutely free (Frankena 1973 : 298). It is also noted that 
existentialists are of the view that the individual ' s moral freedom is complete 
independence from the outside world and outside influence (ibid. 1973 : 299). It 
will be challenging to understand how the external factors such as the objects 
of the external reality cannot influence an individual ' s freedom. They further 
maintain that the freedom of man' s will is manifested through its capacity for 
self-determination independent from any influences from the natural and social 
environment (Frankena 1973 : 299). Existentialism considers man, who possess 
freedom of will and the environment which is subject to the principle of 
causality as being two alien, isolated and separate realities (ibid . 1973 : 300). 
The existentialists advocate that the individual has an absolute right to life, a 
right that cannot be taken away by any necessity or any kind of violence (ibid . 
1973 : 301). His life should be worthy and dignified and that his right to 
happiness is superior to all other rights (ibid. 1973 : 301). These submissions 
will be dialogued with Hindu thought for the purposes of developing the global 
ethical discourse. 
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5.21.2 Neopositivist Ethics 
The two powerful trends that are evident in this school are emotivism and the 
linguistic analysis of the language of morality (Frankena 1973 : 301). One of the 
trends of the neopositivists is philosophical subjectivism, which interprets the 
world as having no depth and complexity and having no ontological 
significance for man (ibid. 1973 : 303). In terms of this thought system the facts 
and values oflife are viewed as two separate categories (ibid. 1973 : 304). This 
would mean that moral precepts would lie beyond the sphere of science (ibid. 
1973 : 304). Neopositivism focuses on the correlation of moral values and facts 
and their common feature is that moral judgements cannot be reduced to facts 
(ibid. 1973 : 304). It is noted that this methodological principle, according to 
which knowledge has no philosophical significance while the world outlook 
and practical value problems cannot be an object of scientific analysis paves the 
way for skepticism, relativism, and nihilism in ethics (Franken a 1973 : 304). It 
must be noted that the logical positivist scientism which is founded on the idea 
of the universal applicability of the language of science and which led to the 
development of emotivism in philosophy concluded that moral judgements 
cannot be verified in the positivist sense and that they differ from scientific 
notions (ibid. 1973 : 304). It must also be noted that morality and science are 
different ways of assimilating the world and their languages differ, therefore 
there is no reason to despise morality because it is not science to refuse 
247 
recognition of science because it is not morality (Franken a 1973 : 305). This 
issue of the relationship between morality and science is essential for the global 
ethical discourse and it must be considered from the point of how these two 
variables can operate together without any contradiction. 
5.21.3 Phenomenological Ethics 
The basis of phenomenological ethics does not deny that there is a possibility 
of scientifically substantiating moral standards and therefore differs from the 
neopositivists standpoint (Franken a 1973 : 309). Phenomenological ethics ranks 
values into the following hierarchical categories pleasant and unpleasant, vital 
values (life, health) and spiritual values (ibid. 1973 : 310). To 
phenomenologists, morality is associated with an orientation at higher values 
(ibid. 1973 : 311). Phenomenological ethics are an imrortant trend in that they 
attempt to dialogue morality with scientific method and they formulate clear 
categories of values, which inform the human will. This trend does not isolate 
spiritual values but also incorporates it into their scheme of ethics. 
5.21.4 Neo -Thomist Ethics 
This system of ethics involves relating the origin, essence and goal of morality 
with the idea of God (Frankena 1973 : 312). While most philosophical ethicists 
identify the supreme good to be happiness, this school identifies it with God 
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and developed a notion that activity directed to God (the most perfect Being) is 
the criterion for perfection (ibid. 1973 : 314). Thomas advocated the idea that 
happiness on earth was impossible, incomplete and not in full bloom and it was 
only attainable after death (ibid. 1973 : 314). Neo-Thomist' s view is that the 
purpose of moral values is to guide a person to fathom God and attain 
happiness after death (ibid. 1973 : 314). It is evident that the meaning of human 
life is carried beyond this life and it includes the sphere of afterlife (ibid. 1973 : 
315). Another challenge that needs to be pursued is that religious morality 
imposes limits on human activity and freedom which is aimed at reaching 
humanistic goals and improving the life of society ag?inst the behavior to earn 
God ' s forgiveness (Frankena 1973 : 315). Modern Thomism advocates that man 
is placed between heaven and earth and being a mortal, he is a unity of body 
and soul and therefore, he is different from dumb animals that cannot reason 
(ibid. 1973 : 316). Although Neo-thomism acknowledges the freedom of will, it 
is subject to striving for the Supreme good (God) and is interpreted in a 
theological sense (ibid. 1973 : 317). The freedom of man ' s will is largely 
engendered by God and its purpose and the final goal is defined by God (ibid. 
1973 : 318). Neo-Thomist ethics generally articulate a deeply theological basis 
to the western ethical disco!..lfse. The elements of God, happiness, moral 
judgement and choice are vital to the global ethical dis\ ~(I!..lrse . 
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5.21.5 Naturalism in Ethics 
Naturalism bases its doctrine on the assumption that the individual behavior is 
naturally determined (Frankena 1973 : 320). Contemporary western 
philosophers believe that goorlness is inherent in human nature while the 
opposite may also hold true that man is essentially eVl1, selfish '-!le'. aggressive 
(ibid. 1973 : 322-323). It is noted that man lives in two conflicting dimensions 
the natural and the social (ibid. 1973 : 323). 
5.21..6 Deontoiogicai Theory of Ethics 
It is vital to recognize the two important deontological ethical theories viz. act 
deontologism and rule-deontologism (Frankena 1973 : 17). The basic 
postulation of act-deontologism is that general rules can be built up on the basis 
of particular cases and may be useful in determining what should be done in 
later cases (ibid . 1973 : 17). It offers no standard whatsoever for determining 
what is right and wrong in particular cases. Its method of determining right is 
by becoming clear about the facts and then forming judgement about them in 
the form of a decision (ibid. 1973 : 23). It offers us no criterion or guiding 
principle for moral judgement (ibid. 1973 : 23). Rule-deontologists hold the 
view that the standard of right and wrong consists of one or more rules either 
concrete ones or abstract ones (Frankena 1973 : 17). Rule deontologists 
distinguish between actual duty and prima facie duty (Frankena 1973 : 26). It is 
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noted that what is actually right is what ought to be done in a particular 
situation, however, every rule of actual duty has an eyception (ibid. 1973 : 26). 
Prima facie duty is always a rule/obligation that one must try to fulfil. 
Deontology is an important method in the ethical discourse and can serve as an 
essential tool for the formulation of moral judgements. 
5.21. 7 Ethical Egoism 
The fundamental tenets of an ethical egoists are (I) an individual promote for 
himself the greatest possible balance between good and evil (ii) when an 
individual is making moral judgements in the context of others he should go by 
his own advantage (ibid. 1973 : 18). An ethical egois(~ may hOld ClIly kind of 
theory of what is good and what is bad (ibid. 1973 : 18). Frankena notes that "It 
seems doubtful therefore that ethical egoism can serve as an acceptable basis 
for this important part of morality" (ibid. 1973 : 19). Psychological egoism, on 
the other hand, is a view that all men are selfish in everything that they do and 
the motive from which anyone acts is self-interest (Di Leo 2002: 29). 
Furthermore, ethical egoism is a view that advocates the way that men ought to 
act and the focus of action is what is in one' s own interest (ibid. 2002: 29). This 
means that a person is always justified in doing what is best for one' s own 
interest without consideration of the effect on others. 
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It is quite evident that the western ethical discourse is made up of several 
divergent ethical positions with each attempting to base ethics on its own 
philosophic grounding. It also became apparent that there are several ethical 
approaches to the ethical end of happiness but no single ethical system seem to 
adequately reconcile the ethical diversity. The methods adopted by the western 
ethical theorists are mainly humanistically inclined. 
5.22 The Phenomenon of Globalism 
In the last section the study probed into the various ethical trends that have 
influenced the western ethical discourse in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. It became evident that the various systems have a deeply human 
interest at their core and they attempt to demonstrate what is in the best interest 
of mankind. However, in this section, this study will examine the phenomenon 
of globalism. In this analysis will shall focus on the notion of globalization as a 
western phenomenon; the meaning of globalism; and the integration of 
activities. 
Sri . S. Gurumurthi, at a lecture given at the International Symposium on the 
Gila held in December 2000, suggested that Globalization is more a western 
experience and it has impacted through the exploitation of nature, it has altered 
the relationship between man and nature and it has enhanced the notions of 
individual liberty and freedom (http ://www.bharatvani.orgl) . He views the idea 
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of global exchange together with global trade, global understanding and global 
harmony as being part of the human program (ibid. 
http ://www.bharatvani .org/). He notes that globalization is more about the 
continued imperialization and colonialism by the west and it is not about global 
understanding and harmony (ibid. http ://www.bharatvani.org/). 
Oliner (et aI.) notes that the idea of "Global' refers to something much larger 
than just the physical features of the earth (1995 : 178). According to the 
Webster' s Dictionary the term global is linked to ideas such as 
"comprehensive", "all inclusive", "involving the whole world". Oliner (et aI.) 
further notes the following view on the meaning of globalism: 
Globalism implies a whole world, not merely the earth but 
something beyond, in which humans are no Ie l1',?-er the exclusive 
frame of reference but part of an intricately interdependent 
ecosystem. Making the global connection means personally relating 
to and feeling responsible for this totality, even if understanding 
escapes us (Oliner, et al. 1995: 178) 
It is noted that the following elements to a large extent contribute to the 
phenomenon of globalism viz. deep respect for natural systems and diverse life 
forms, an intuitive sense of human equality, an appreciation of human attributes 
that can create a more humc:.ne future (Oliner, et aI. 1995 : 178). Two 
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fundamental principles viz. "stewardship" and "restoration" are identified as 
guiding principles within globalism. "Stewardship" calls upon people to leave 
the world ' s human and non-human resources to no less depleted state than it is 
found now and "restoration" calls upon people to repair and replenish the 
world' s human and non-human resources (Oliner, et at. 1995 : 179). 
Oliner (et at.) suggests that global thinking is one way that can positively 
contribute to globalism. One characteristic of global thought is that it is abstract 
and therefore it is advantageous because it helps keep people focussed on the 
larger picture as they act locally because global thought can inform local action 
(1995 : 179). However, Wendell Berry is of the view that "globalism" is too 
abstract and such ab'stractions are responsible for the worlds problems and 
instead of helping people orientate to the larger picture they are actually 
removing people from the local contexts in which they are most effective (ibid. 
1995: 179). Alan At Kisson disagreed with this position and is of the view that 
individual actions have an effect on the global and therefore abstractions are 
useful because they deepen understanding and inspire benevolent visions (ibid. 
1995: 179). Therefore, globalism requires a vocabulary that is inclusive of the 
notions of equality, diversity, respect, peace, and care which is applied 
universally (ibid. 1995: 179). 
It is noted that Ecumenism, which began among the Protestants, is starting to 
accept religious pluralism and the vision of the unity of humankind. Oliner 
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notes that we are entering an ecumenical age in w.hich the Christian, Muslim, 
Hindu Buddhist must contribute towards a Global Ethic which must serve as a , 
minimal ethical standard for all humankind (ibid. 1995: 182). It is noted that 
The Global Ethic Project was launched at the looth anniversary m~eting of the 
Parliament of World ' s Religions which met in Chicago in 1993 and adopted a 
preliminary document by Professor Hans Kung titled "Toward a Global Ethic" 
(Oliner, et al. 1995: 182). This document calls on all civilizations and cultures, 
including religious cultures to reject the age of monologue, isolation, 
domination and absorption of others and embrace the age of dialogue ( 1995 : 
183). It also calls for individuals and religious traditions to work for universal 
human rights, justice, peace and conservation of the earth and to assume 
responsibility to enhance human freedom, dignity, and value all living and non-
living things, conscience, relationships between women and men, and other 
related specifics (ibid. 1995: 183). Each group must wrestle with the problem 
of reconciling unity and diversity, pluralism and particularism and detecting, 
analyzing and distinguishing those elements which c ... P. be mutl~any enriching 
from those which are pernicious and destructive (ibid. 1995: 183). Such issues . 
can arise in the context of an abstract idea contributing to an alternate future 
(ibid. 1995: 183). 
As much as the phenomenon of globalism may have a challenging face to it, it 
nonetheless focuses on a progressive global resolution of the world's problems. 
The deeply integrated nature and character of global phenomenon is a totally 
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revolutionized idea for the 21 ( century and beyond. The world can no longer be 
seen as isolated communities but a global community living in relation to a 
Cosmic existence. 
5.23 Proposed Global Ethical Paradigms 
In the last section, this study probed into globalism as a phenomenon. 
However, in this section, this analysis will focus on proposed global ethical 
paradigms within the western discourse. 
Robert Muller, retired Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations, 
pointed out that there is a shift in the global interest from that which was deeply 
humanistic and interwoven in the human rights culture to that of placing the 
interests of the planet above that of man. 
(http://www.usao.edu/-facshaferiIBERKELEYHTML. pI). It must be noted 
that in 1992 the International Council on Human duties drew up an 
International Declaration of Ethics, Human Duties and Responsibilities and 
they used the government agency to take up ethical issues concerning the planet 
at the level of the United Nations (ibid. http://www.usao.edu/). It must be noted 
that the United ations is becoming the international agent of the globalization 
process. Muller is of the view that the notion of what is good and evil is 
changing and since we are in a global context, the global family or humanity 
must define what is good and bad in light of the wisdom of philosophy and 
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spirituality (ibid. http ://www.usao.edu/). He believed in the emergence of a 
global ethic towards the planet earth which must be protected by a world court 
of ethics and all this must be done for the sake of the human family (ibid. 
http ://www . usao. edu/). 
It must be noted that a clear definition of the minimum standards of ethics is 
necessary and it sho~ld emerge through the participation of t\1e global partners 
through the process of a consensus-generating dialogue (ibid. 
http ://www.usao.edu/). One of the notable characteristics of the 16th-century 
"Age of Discovery" was the dominating and colonizing of the rest of the world 
by Christendom and the ideological cultures of the West (ibid. 
http ://www.usao.edu/).This phase resulted in the ignoring and absorbing the 
other cultures and religions and a struggle for Colonial superiority (ibid. 
http://www.usao.edu/) . This was not satisfactory for the human interest and by 
the 20
th 
century there was evidence of the emergence from an Age of 
monologue to an Age of Dialogue (ibid. http ://www.usao.edu/). ft must be 
noted that this century is realizing that social sub-structures have a very limited 
grip on understanding the whole of reality. In fact, the different religions are 
coming to realise that they don' t have a total monopoly in un'derstanding 
Reality, therefore the urgent need for global dialogue in which people are able 
to di scern from others, that which will deepen their understanding (ibid. 
http://www.usao.edu/). The global dialogue needs to be interreligious, 
interideological and intercultural in nature and it must direct not only how 
257 
humans perceive and understand the world and its meaning, but also on how 
they should act in relationship to themselves, to other persons, and to nature 
(ibid. http://www.usao.edu/). It must be noted that a global ~onsensus on the 
fundamental attitude toward good and evil and the basic principles to put it into 
action is needed (ibid. http://www.usao.edu/). 
It is further noted that another level of ethics needs vital concentration and that 
is planetary or global ethics (http ://www.att.hu/ehs/ind). The ethical system is 
no longer an individual system, with its isolated thought structures, but it is also 
a shared system in which manifests public and universal morality (ibid . 
http://www.att.hu/ehs/ind). Allenby also notes that there is a need for a 
fundamental ethical base, which does not discriminate against groups, or 
individuals based on their stage of development, discourse, religion or culture 
(ibid. http://www.att.hu/ehslind) . It must be noted that if an ethical system only 
reflects one discourse ego market capitalism, environmentalism, culture or 
religion then it cannot be considered to be a global ethical system (ibid. 
http://www.att.hu/ehs/ind) . Allenby further notes that natural and human 
systems are intertwined and they cannot be separated, and environmental issues 
are linked with scientific, technological, cultural, social, institutional, and 
natural systems in such a way that the network of these relationships is relevant 
for the analytical and ethical whole (ibid . http://www.att.hu/ehs/ind) . He also 
notes that in complex systems one cannot expect everyone to behave the same 
because different people have different functions, constraints and cultural 
258 
values and therefore a Global ethic needs to recognize this complexity and must 
knit different kinds of activities into an ethical whole (ibid. 
http ://www.att.hu/ehslind). 
Rastan takes up the issue of global governance and suggests that the quality of 
such governance depend on the acceptance of a global ethic, which must guide 
and direct action at all levels of the global society 
(http ://www.nott.ac.ukllaw/hrlc) . In this regard he says: 
People have to see with new eyes and understand with new minds 
before they can truly turn to new ways of living. That is why global 
values must be the cornerstone of global governance 
(ibid.http ://ww.nott.ac.ukllaw/hrlc) . 
5.24 The Need for a Global Ethic 
Against the backdrop of the collapse of communi sr. . :md the resurgence of 
Islamic fundamentalism against secularism and the consequent acts of global 
terror, there is an urgent need for a global ethic (opcit. http://www.usao) . 
Scholars are recognizing that such an ethic cannot come into being haphazardly 
or willy nilly, but rather there should be a conscious focusing of energy and 
thought on such a development (ibid. http://www.usao). The engagement of 
scholarly institutions and scholarly efforts from various disciplines, inclusive of 
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religion must be utilized through dialogue and negotiations for the development 
of such an ethic (ibid. http ://www.usao). 
It must be noted that ethical systems of individual religious and cuitural groups 
carry with them certain standard values, which influence our attitude towards 
the world (ibid. http://www.usao). It must also be noted that not all-ethical 
systems are fixed in written form, there are some that are ingrained in many 
different forms and are transmitted from one generation to another. Another 
characteristic of ethical systems is that they are inextricably braided into the 
self-understanding and sense of belonging of the members of that community 
and they reflect the deepest and most stable value structures which hold the 
community together (ibid . http://www.usao) . It has been observed that ethical 
systems are resistant to change and at the point of contact with other systems 
there is bound to be some degree of conflict (ibid. http ://www.usao). 
John Hick notes that the survival and flourishing of the human family requires 
a basic ethical outlook, a set of ethical principles on which all streams of 
human culture can concur and which can be used to positively influence human 
behavior (http://astro.ocis.temple.edu/-dialogue/Center/hick.htm). He also 
advocates the need to uncover and cultivate the ground for human unity from 
the multiplicity of nations, cultures, social systems, religions and ideologies 
(ibid. http://astro). Hick observes that individualistic, democratic, liberal, 
historically minded, and a science-orientated outlook is what constitutes in a 
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very comprehensive way the ethos of modernity (ibid . http ://astro) . He advises 
us to take note of the significant variations within the global mind-set and the 
influence of these variations on the framework and structure of a global ethic as 
well as the presuppositions that are reflected in it (ibid. http ://astro). Hick 
observes that in the West the main voice of moral consciousness that 
formulates and propagates ethical principles remains with religions (ibid. 
http ://astro) . He therefore suggests that their teachings constitute the natural 
starting point for the search for a global ethic (ibid. http://astro). 
From observational experience it is evident that the West today is largely 
secular, with only a marginal religious influence, which has floated down 
through the culture. Much of the rest of the world is more strongly religiously 
influenced. But in the West, as well as elsewhere, the main voice of moral 
consciousness, formulating and propagating whatever ethical principles we 
recognize, remains that of the religions. Their teachings thus constitute the 
natural starting point for the search for a global ethic. Hick notes the 
introductory comment of Leonard Swidler that all the major traditions teach a 
form of the "Golden Rule" of treating others as one would oneself wish to be 
treated, be recognized as an important point of del')arture towards a global 
ethic (ibid. http://astro) . He concludes that to be a moral person is basically to 
regard, with a universal human insight, others as sharing the same value as 
oneself (ibid. http://astro). John Hick proposed a method for the formulation of 
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a framework for a Global ethic, which is a very interesting one, and in this 
regard he says: 
In this first stage of the search for a global ethic, rather than getting 
the peoples of other cultures to debate our Western draft, agreeing 
or disagreeing with it as the only document on the table, we should 
say: "Here is the kind of draft that comes naturally to us in the 
industrialized West. What kind of draft comes naturally to you, and 
to you, and to yoU?" And then the next stage beyond this should be 
to bring a plurality of drafts together and see what comes out of the 
interaction between them (ibid. http://astro). 
Lee Penn proposes that Hans Kung' s document "Toward a Global Ethic" , can 
serve as a basis for a new ethic (http://fatima.freehosting .net/Articles/htm). Lee 
notes that the notions of self-determinism and self realization can only be 
rendered legitimate if there is human self-responsibility and global 
responsibility (ibid. http://fatima) . Itis also noted that egoism in all its forms 
such as class thinking, nationalism, sexism must be rejected because they 
prevent authentic global humanhood (ibid . http://fatima) . Lee also points out 
that the present world context is saddled with the burden of endless lies and 
deceit, swindling and hypocrisy, ideology and demagoguery, which includes 
representatives of religions who dismiss members of other religions as of little 
value and who preach fanaticism and intolerance instead of respect, 
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understanding, and tolerance (ibid. http://fatima) . There is a need for religious 
respect, tolerance and understanding as the basis for the global ethic. Lee also 
notes that condemnable forms of patriarchy, of domination of one sex over 
another, of exploitation of women, of sexual misuse of children still constitute 
disposition of part of the current world order (ibid. http ://fatima) . Lee proposes 
that the new global order must constitute a language that must be socially 
beneficial, pluralist, partner sharing, peace-fostering, nature ' friendly and 
universal (ibid. http ://fatima) . Itis inevitable that the Gobal ethic would not be 
bound to any particular religious scripture or tradition. 
Lee also strongly recommends Kung' s proposal for respect for all life as a basic 
ethic of all humanity, however upon the suggestion of Kung disputed moral 
questions such as abortion and euthanasia should be excluded from this 
principle (ibid. http ://fatima) . Lee notes that any attempt to remove the "granite 
foundation of faith" from the moral order may lead societies to moral 
degradation and therefore into a moral crisis (ibid. http://fatima) . 
One of the serious challenges of forming a global ethic is the question of 
population control and the impact of overpopulation on the planet's resources 
and life support system (ibid. http://fatima). There are suggestions that 
governments should define how many people each nation can support (ibid. 
http://fatima) . There is also a call made to control the results of one ' s 
lovemaking (ibid. http://fatima) . 
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It is suggested that the Law of Rebirth be taught so that it would be able to 
bring about a profound change in the racial attitude to life and sex, to birth and 
parenthood (ibid . http://fatima) . Itis further noted that a lack of sexual control 
has brought into the world thousands of unwanted children whose appearance 
is solely the result of accidental and uncontrolled sexual relations, and in no 
way indicates the planned intention of the parents to offer experience to 
incarnating souls (ibid. http://fatima) . 
Lee notes that there is no place for inhumanity, fanaticism and social exclusion 
in a global society (ibid. hup ://fatima). Lee notes the prominence of Kantian 
notion that every human being is always to be treated as an end and never as a 
means (ibid. http://fatima) . 
UNESCO has suggested that there is a need for a fundamental change in 
perceptions and values and for a renewal of culture in order to address the 
challenges of the 21 st century in the form of unequal production and 
consumption patterns between the rich and the poor nations, ecological 
mismanagement (http://www.unesco.orgl) UNESCO notes that ethical values 
are the principal factor in social cohesion and they are the most effective agent 
of social change and transformation (ibid. http ://www.unesco) . UNESCO 
suggests that education in the broadest sense will playa pivotal role in social 
transformation (ibid. http ://www.unesco) . Itis noted that there is a need for an 
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integrated ethical concept which embraces thinking in terms of human rights 
and responsibility, intergenerational equity, solidarity, justice, democracy, 
freedom of expression, and tolerance (ibid. http://www.unesco) . UNESCO is of 
the view that the link between ethics and science will t; key to sclving many of 
the problems of the future and also noting the moral responsibility that 
humanity has for the future generations (ibid. http ://www.unesco). UNESCO 
suggested that scientific and technological progress should not be harmful to 
life on earth (ibid. http ://www.unesco) . 
Mae-Wan-Ho, a Chinese scholar, notes that the contemporary debates on 
technology are calling for the isolation of science from technology and ethics 
and to see it in isolation from society as a whole (http://www.i-
sis.orglnewethic.php). Mae-Waa Ho proposes that there is a need for a holistic 
ethic of science that can guide us in the safe and sustainlble use of mcreasingly 
powerful technologies (ibid. http://www.i.sis.org). It would be impossible to 
leave out science from the global ethical debate because it has been affecting 
every aspect of the daily lives of the global population (ibid. 
http ://www.i .sis.org). Mae-Wan Ho also notes scientific philosophers such as 
Descartes and Francis Bacon who proposed a philosophic-scientific paradigm 
that suggested a dualism of existence into matter and spirit which largely 
prompted the domination of humans over nature and the universe (ibid. 
http://www.i .sis.org). This view could be traced to the Judeo-Christian tradition 
in which human beings were considered to be created in the image of God and 
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have immortal souls, while animals and the rest of nature arc there to be used 
by human beings (ibid. http ://www.i.sis.org). Mae-Wan Ho concludes about the 
mechanistic tendency of science by saying that : 
Mechanistic science has created a dysfunctional social milieu and a 
globalized economy which is destroying our planet and failing to 
serve the physical and spiritual needs of the vast majority of 
humanity (ibid http://www.i.sis.org). 
Mae-Wan Ho notes that it is symbiotic and mutmJ:stic rela(;cp!:;hips that 
sustain life in total (ibid. http ://www.i .sis.org). He proposes Jim Lovelock ' s 
Gaia theory of the earth being one super-organism and the propositions of 
quantum theory that suggest that we are inseparably entangled with one another 
and with all nature (ibid . http://www.i.sis.org). Henotesthat .itis a holistic, 
organic perspective that permits us to provide a basis for a new ethic of science 
that can reshape society and transform the meaning of life (ibid. 
http ://www.i.sis.org). His final words are: 
Science can transcend the dominant status quo to reshape society 
for the public good, which is also the private gc·od. We 'c,egi:1 to 
appreciate how the purpose of each organism and species is 
entangled with that of every other. OUf humanity is a function of 
this entangled whole, and we cannot do arbitrary violence to one 
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another, nor to the nature of other species without violating our 
own. The ethic of science is no different from that of being human 
(ibid. http://www.i .sis.org). 
5.25 Principles for a Global Ethic 
It must be noted that in formulating the fundamental principles that can inform 
the development of a framework for a Global ethic the consideration of the 
global crisis in the economy, ecology and politics cannot be ignored 
(http ://www.weltethos.orgldat) . The problems of unemployment, poverty, 
hunger, destruction of families, death of children, corruption in politics and 
business, social and ethnic conflicts, abuse of drugs, organized crime and the 
collapse of the ecosystem are some of the challenges that must inform the 
shaping of a global ethic (ibid. http://www.weltethos) . It must also be noted 
that religion has also been misused for purely power-political goals in inciting 
aggression, fanaticism, hate and xenophobia (ibid. http://www.welt<.:Ihos) . Itis 
noted that there is a fundamental consensus among religions about minimum 
values, which can be the basis ofa global ethic (ibid. http://www.weltethos). 
It is important that every individual recognizes that he/she has a global 
responsibility for global order through human rights, freedom, justice, peace, 
and the preservation of Earth and through opposing all forms of inhumanity 
(ibid. http ://www.weltethos). Itis also noted that a Global ethic needs to be 
267 
based on the spiritual and religious convictions of people in which there is a 
recognition of an ultimate reality and there is depend~r (:e of pO'.¥f~r and hope 
through prayer for the preservation of planet earth and the enhancement of the 
welfare of humanity (ibid. http://www.weltethos). The Global ethic must be 
realized in the fundamental unity of humanity and the furtherance and 
commitment to the human rights culture in its principles of human dignity, 
freedom, justice and equality which is presumed by a consciousness of 
responsibility and duty (ibid. http://www.weltethos) . In developing a global 
ethic it cannot be based on an ideology of a unified religion but a consensus of 
binding values, standards and personal attitudes (ibid. http ://www.weltethos) . 
One of the fundamental principles of the global etruc is that every human being 
must be treated humanely and therefore there must be the dis!T.antling of 
mutual arrogance, mistrust, prejudice, and even hostile images, and thus 
demonstrate greater respect for the traditions, holy places, feasts, and rituals of 
people who believe differently. (ibid. htlp ://www.weJtethos) . This principle 
also suggests that what you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others 
(ibid. http://www.weltethos).Furthermore. this principle urges us to reject all 
forms of egoism, selfishness, whether individual or collective, whether in the 
form of class thinking, raCism, nationalism or sexism (ibid . 
http ://www.weltethos) . 
Another principle that needs to be considered is the commitment to a culture of 
non-violence and respect for life (ibid. http ://www.weltethos) . This principle is 
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not limited to humans alone but is extended to include the plants and the 
animals as well as living in harmony with nature and the cosmos. (ibid. 
http://www.weltethos) . The principle of commitment to a culture of solidarity 
and a just economic order is also vital for a Global ethic (ibid. 
http ://www.weltethos) . This principle is underpinned with the assumption that 
the economic and political power be utilized for the service of humanity in a 
spirit of compassion and care for the children, the aged, the poor, the disabled 
and the lonely (ibid. http://www.weltethos) . Furthermore, there is a need for 
mutual respect, moderation and modesty in which there is cor.1posure and inner 
peace instead of greed and lust for prestige (ibid. http ://www.weltethos) . The 
framework for a global ethic must be informed by the principle of tolerance and 
a Life of Truthfulness (ibid. http://www.weltethos). This principle implores 
every individual to cultivate truthfulness, to constantly seek the Truth and serve 
the interests of Truth (ibid. http://www.weltethos). The principle of equal 
rights and partnership between men and women must form the basis of the 
framework of a Global ethic (ibid. http://www.weltethos). This principle 
fosters the idea that there is no domination of one sex over the other or any 
form of sexual exploitation (ibid. http://www.weltethos) . This principle fosters 
a meaningful social relationship in the form of marriage and family life based 
on love and which is worthy of human beings (ibid. http ://www.weltethos) . 
Finally, there is a need for the transformation of both individual and collective 
consciousness and also transformation in the area of ethics and values for there 
to be a common Global ethic (ibid. http://www.weltethos). 
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5.26 Conclusion 
The western ethical discourse is largely influenced by empirical analytical 
thinking which largely shapes the human perspective of what is good., free and 
responsible. The empirical methodology is largely objectivist in its approach 
and attempt to develop a moral basis that can be conceptualized within human 
reason. The ethical theories proposed within the western ethical discourse 
suggests that there is a variety of ways in which the individual arrives at what is 
good. Although some of the theories may appear to contradict each other but 
they represent in very broad sense the aspirations for the good. The proposals 
for the global ethical discourse suggest that no perspective can achieve the 
objective of developing a global ethic on its own. The development of a global 
ethic requires a multi-disciplinary approach and an integration of thought 
systems. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE GLOBAL ETHICAL DISCOURSE 
The main focus of this thesis has been to explore the contribution that Hindu 
metaphysics and ethics could make to the global ethical discourse, which can 
constitute the foundational framework for the evolution of a global ethic. This 
study focussed on the notion of the ultimate reality (Brahman) , the status of the 
world and individual personhood (Atman) as the foundation of the metaphysical 
investigation. Furthermore, it also examined the traditional ethical concepts of 
dharma and karma in Hindu thought In the last chapter, this study explored 
the trends in nineteenth and twentieth century ethics and also examined 
proposals for a global ethic. In this chapter, this study shall aim at constructing 
a conceptual framework for the global ethical discourse with contributions 
made mainly from Hindu metaphysics and ethics. 
The Prasthana Traya, which includes the Vedanta Sutra, Upanishads, and the 
Bhagavad Gila, are the essential sources for understanding traditional Hindu 
metaphysical and ethical concepts. Although their exact dates cannot be fixed, 
their metaphysical and ethical thinking is dominantly pre-Christian. Its main 
subject matter is to examine the nature of reality and h~ nature and essence of 
the world and the human condition. These categories are critical to the global 
ethical discourse. It became apparent that the metaphysical and ethical thought 
from the Upanishads to the Bhagavad Gila was developmental and flexible in 
interpretation. These concepts were very easily translated for the purposes and 
271 
times in which the translators lived. It also became clear that scholars used 
these traditional texts as a source of reference for developing ethical ideas and 
practices. 
6.1 Expanding Moral Value 
While noting that the traditional metaphysical conceptual-methodological 
framework rested on the understanding that man is a moral being and agent, the 
global ethical discourse must develop and expand this framework to include 
moral value to non-human objects and realities such as animals, nature and the 
planet. There is a need to revolutionize this traditional framework because its 
ethical formulations are largely based on the assumption that man alone is a 
moral being and that the context for such a morality is founded on the religious, 
rational and social nature of man as a reality . The global ethical discourse, 
which forms the basis for evolving the principles of a .?,Iobal etilic, cannot be 
solely humanistic. Those that held the view that metaphysics is purely about 
human life need to develop a hermenuetical setting in which such an approach 
to metaphysics is changed. The hermenuetical setting must allow for traditional 
metaphysics to analyze non-human categories as ethical categories. 
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6.2 The Theory of "Essence" 
The global ethical discourse cannot adopt the position of the existentialists that 
suggest the absence of "essences", as a paradigm of thought, to be integrated 
into ethical thinking. In fact, it is by the notion of "essences" that the mutual 
identity of man, the world and the divine can be incorporated into an ethical 
dialogue. This means that the conceptual-methodological framework of the 
global ethical discourse must incorporate the notion of "essences" as a part of 
the hypothetical paradigm to develop a global ethic. Furthermore, such a 
paradigm cannot rely on the methodology of the reductionists, which prescribe 
pure intellectualism, as a means of understanding the~ ~ ~ssences but must also 
incorporate pure subjective experience as well. 
Furthermore, the traditional conceptual-methodological theory of essences has 
recognized that the core of man is good, although there is variation in the 
expression of what is this "good". To some, it is reason, to others, it is pure 
consciousness, human nature, obedience to a Divine will etc. It is quite clear 
that the categories of reason, human nature and obedience to divine will cannot 
be universally applied to sustain its qualification of attributing goodness. The 
application of the notion of "go0dness", it seems, was limited to man and failed 
to incorporate other realities. It is possible to expand the interpret"tion of the 
notion of pure consciousness as a universal category, incorporated into the 
273 
essence of all manifest reality that could contribute to a universal goodness in 
all manifest realities. 
6.3 The Theory of Inward-Outward Nature 
The conceptual-methodologica! framework of the global ethical discourse 
needs to embody the inward and outward nature of realil ies in order ~o attribute 
ethical value. The idea of limiting the inward-outward context solely to man is 
insufficient to the global ethical discourse and it needs to include all manifest 
realities. The global society have developed the methodology to understanding 
the essence of the inward nature of man, however, their methodology have 
limited them only to such a reality. The neo-hermenuetical framework must 
accord inward existence to all manifest realities in order to attribute ethical 
value. This thesis suggests that the traditional notion of Brahman and Atman of 
Hindu metaphysics can make a vital contribution in this regard. 
The traditional ethical and metaphysical discourse has made one very 
subjective, yet a spiritually objective suggestion is that there is an inward 
nature to human existence. Hindu metaphysics have suggested that the essence 
of this inward nature is the soul, which is common to all humans and therefore 
serves as a justification for ethical action. The principle that can be evolved 
from the traditional metaphysical and ethical model is that ethical action can be 
justified on the inward essence or nature of the objects of reality. This principle 
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can be useful to the global ethical discourse in that it suggests an inherent unity 
of mankind based on the commonness of the inward essence. That human 
beings can respond more positively towards each other in the spirit of love 
based on the character of their inward selves. This perhaps will formulate itself 
as a global ethic that is directed to produce the outcome of global peace and co-
operation. 
The theory of the inward nature is also founded on the idea that God is 
immanent in all living things. This idea deeply suggests that there is a common 
humanity based on the principle of the immanence of God in all. Therefore, the 
global ethical vision of a human rights culture based on the principle of 
equality and human dignity can be enhanced through this contribution. 
Furthermore, this theory also suggests that the doctrine of inherent divinity is 
an integral part to it. Notwithstanding the fact that the doctrine of inherent 
divinity may pose practical problems to empirical ethics, suggesting that there 
is no need for ethical improvement. However, this is a challenge for Hindu 
hermeneutics. It is suggested that the doctrine of inherent divinity proposes that 
God is potential for man to become perfect. The doctrine of inherent divinity 
assumes the position that all mankind are fundamentally the same, therefore 
this principle can serve as a powerful presupposition tl ~~e huma'J. rights notion 
of equality and human dignity. 
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This theory of inwardness correlates with the Kantian idea of the human 
serving as the end in itself. In fact, the theory of inwardness goes beyond the 
Kantian ethic of the human being an end in-itself and suggests that all manifest 
realities must be seen as an end in itself. Therefore, this theory makes an ideal 
contribution to the formulation of the global ethic. So the notion of human 
dignity is not simply derived from the Kantian proposal that man is a rational 
being, but it can be derived from the proposal that suggests that man and 
objects of nature are inherently divine irrespective of their rational status. 
6.4 The Concept of Environment 
The notion of "environment" is important to the global ethical di~course . In the 
traditional conceptual-methodological framework, the notion of environment 
was segmented into isolated categories of social, natural and the divine with 
man being the controller of this environment. The problem with such a 
conceptualization is that it led to domination of purpose and eventual 
exploitation. The conceptual-methodological framework of the global ethical 
discourse needs to integrate these isolated categories with the intention of 
seeing a common purpose. It is suggested that the notion of divine or sacred 
space, which is the subtlest of all environments, be expanded into an all-
pervading reality . This will ait:"ibute sacredness to the social and the natural 
environment as well and therefore render them as ethically substantive. It is on 
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the basis of this understanding that man ' s relationship with nature and the 
planet will be one of co-existence rather than domination. 
6.5 Global Ethical Epistemology 
One of the central issues that underpin the conceptual-methodological 
paradigm of the global ethical discourse is its epistemology. Within the 
traditional conceptual-methodological paradigm, the source of knowledge was 
deeply subjective, scriptural and hermenuetical. However, the global 
perspectives of knowledge also include objectivist approaches. The ultimate 
guiding principle cannot just be subjected to an objectivist enquiry. For the 
ultimate guiding principle to locate itself within the conceptual-methodological 
paradigm of the global ethical discourse, it must also be the object of a 
subjective hermeneutic. While the objectivist rely mainly on sense knowledge, 
the role of intuition cannot be ignored. While religious texts contain intuitive 
knowledge, they cannot become absolute sources of knowledge. The process of 
verification and validation cannot just be objective, there is a need for personal 
experience as a means of verifying and validating. As much as these may 
operate the subjectivist model, such a model is necessary to enhance the global 
substance of knowledge. It is suggested that the notion of Brahman can provide 
a theoretical pre-suppositional framework for the ultimate guiding principle. 
Furthermore, it is also suggested that the theory of a global ethical 
epistemology be developed. Such a theory must incorporate both the objectivist 
277 
and the subjectivist methods of knowing, verifying and validating. It must also 
expand to incorporate not just the human reality, but also the realities of nature 
and divine space as objects of knowing. 
6.6 The Position of Theism 
The idea of reality is also important to the conceptual-methodological paradigm 
of the global ethical discourse. Traditionally, the notions of reality were 
separated into objective and subjective spheres. The subjective sphere generally 
reflected a theistic outlook while the objective sphere of reality rested on a 
deeply empirical and worldly foundation . The theistic expression of reality 
conceptualized a Personal God, which was the focus of morality. The problem 
with such an assertion is that there was plenty of intellectual movement in the 
exact moral meaning and purpose of God and this theistic reality varied in 
outlook from one community to the next. The global ethical discourse needs to 
develop a concept of reality that embraces both the subjective and objective 
spheres and also reflect a profoundly universal moral status. It is suggested that 
the Upanishadic notion of "sat' can make a vital contribution to the theoretical 
formulations of this reality. It is further suggested that a transcendent 
independent reality, which is the essential character of "sat', be the basis of the 
universal moral order. The universal moral order is a permanent unchanging 
order and a transcendent source for the Guiding principle. Furthermore, this 
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universal moral reality must be all-pervading reality and as such must be both 
transcendent and immanent in nature. 
6.7 The Nature and Character of World 
One of the important considerations of the traditional conceptual-
methodological paradigm was the nature and character of the world. Through 
the years, various ideological and teleological views have been expressed on 
the nature and the character of the world, which includes theistic, pantheistic 
and idealistic views as well. Furthermore, fundamertRI questions have been 
raised about the precise purpose of the world-creation. The idealists propound 
a view that suggests that there is only one absolute reality, and the world, 
therefore, is a mere illusion in relation to this reality. While idealism creates a 
kind of abstract cosmic vacuum, it is unable, at the same time, to generate place 
for moral and ethical value. The denial of the existence of the world is the basis 
for there being no justification to ethical and moral values. Therefore, idealistic 
thinking seems to be of very little significance to the conceptual-
methodological framework of the global ethical discourse. Theistic views may 
have some relevance; however, there is much disagreement about what is the 
precise nature and character of God. There are also chc..l ~cnges to th0 nature and 
purpose of God ' s intent in the world-creation process. So theistic views cannot 
be adopted, as they currently are, into the conceptual-methodological paradigm 
of the global ethical discourse because of their sectarian bias. 
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It has already been suggested that a Supreme Guiding principle is necessary in 
the context of the global ethical discourse, however, such a guiding principle 
cannot be translated into a Personal God. Therefore, the nature of such a 
guiding principle needs to be absolute and abstract so that, individuals may 
construct perceptive realities of it for their specific and c011ective purposes. The 
nature of Brahman is an ideal construct for this purpose. As much as the nature 
of Brahman is abstract, different people conceptualize it differently and 
therefore it serves the individual interest as well as collectively binds everyone 
and everything into a cosmic unity. As much as the Indian realist may project 
this Brahman as an absolute abstract without purpose for a world-creation, 
Indian theists have suggested that such an absolute abstract have purpose for a 
world-creation and therefore constitute moral and ethical relevance. The idea of 
the connection of the world-creation to an absolute moral Principle is essential 
for the conceptual-methodolog~cal paradigm of the global ethical discourse. 
This connection suggests that there is moral purpose and value in the world-
creation process. Therefore the world, together with its natural and sacred 
environments has moral value. 
6.8 Universal nature of Personhood 
One of the central ideas postulated by the Indian idealists, mainly Shankara, is 
the notion of the oneness of the Alman (soul) and the Ultimate principle 
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(Brahman) . This postulation is connected to the link between the psychical and 
the cosmic principles. However, the main purpose of such a link is tu sublimate 
the identity of the egocentric .self into the identity of the cosmic self. Such an 
interpretation will be of very little significance to the global ethical discourse. 
The conceptual-methodological framework of the global ethical discourse 
requires the link of the psychical and the cosmical principles for the purposes 
of developing ethical relevance. However, the essential principle that underpins 
the metaphysical connection between the individual self and the cosmic self is 
the substantive and qualitative oneness of the individual self. This means that 
the essential nature of all human beings is the same and therefore, their moral 
and ethical value will also be the same. Furthermore, the notion of the self in 
Hindu metaphysics is not confined to the bodily self of h~mans but it also 
extends to cover all living entities in nature. 
Apart from Hindu metaphysics concentrating in analyzing the notion of the 
ultimate principle, it also proposes a view of the egocentric self or the empirical 
self. Hindu metaphysics largely followed the methodology of understanding the 
nature of personhood from the physiological, psychological and spiritual 
dimensions. The theory of the "koshas" provides sufficient insight into the 
traditional understanding of the nature of personhood. However, this 
metaphysical understanding is based on a purely subjectivist cognition and may 
create challenges to the objectivist investigation. Notwithstanding this, it is 
concluded that ethical positions cannot be absolutely based on objectivist 
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notions but must also incorporate subjectivists views, which are not sectarian 
but mainly universal in outlook. So from this perspective, it is suggested that 
the conceptual-methodological framework of the global-ethical discourse 
classify the nature of an individual into three main categories for ethical 
purposes viz. the physiological, the psychological and the spiritual. It is also 
suggested that these three dimensions be seen as co-existing for the purpose of 
ethical functioning and is given universal relevance. 
It cannot be denied that the main objective of the Indian realists, under the 
direction of Shankara, was to establish a notion of personhood that transcended 
all empirical connections and which aimed at constructing a "pure self' that 
was beyond the prospect of any ethical discourse. Such an idealistic 
construction would have very little significance for the global ethical discourse. 
The notion of an "empirical self', cannot rest on the foundation of an 
illusionary making. On the contrary, it is central to the global ethical discourse. 
Therefore, the body-mind-inte1lect relationship is pivotal to the notion of 
personhood and it embodies ethical relevance in th, ~ context of the global 
ethical discourse. Furthermore, Shankara proposed the idea of a universal self, 
which was devoid of activity and enjoyment, therefore, beyond the categories 
of ethical application. However, the notion of Shankara' s universal self needs 
to be interpreted in the context of its empirical relevance and it is suggested that 
it serve as a model to unite the world community into a common humanity. 
Therefore, the notion of a universal self must follow Shankara's method of 
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transcending categories; however, it must transcend those categories that 
attribute distinction to it rather than transcend phenomenal categories in total. 
The traditional theistic conceptual paradigms, as articulated by Sri Ramanuja 
and Madhva may present challenges to the contemporary global ethical 
discourse. The acceptance of the notion of a transcendent guiding principle can 
be agreed upon. However, the abstract nature of such a guiding principle may 
be justification for a varied interpretation and for global recognition. Moreover, 
the interpretation of this abstract guiding principle into a personal reality with 
divine attributes must also gain universal acceptance. Although, such a 
contribution may be increasingly relevant for the theist, its recognition by the 
global community has always been a challenge. The qualification of the 
guiding principle with universal values such as love, peace, truth etc. are the 
basis for ethical relevance. The important contribution that the traditional 
Indian theists have proposed is the notion of "dependence" on such a guiding 
principle. For there to be any ethical grounding for the global ethical discourse, 
it is suggested that there be a "dependence" relationship between "personhood" 
and an ultimate guiding principle irrespective of whether the guiding principle 
is understood as an abstract or a personal entity. 
Furthermore, the notion of the eternity of the soul is also vital to the ethical 
discourse. In the traditional theistic proposal, the idea that the soul continues to 
exist after death provides the space for the continuation of the moral scheme. 
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However, the global community has not recognized the notion of soul in a 
uniform way. In Hindu metaphysics, the notion of soul and its eternal character 
are central to the traditional ethical discourse. The idea of justice as an ethical 
ideal can only be articulated in its true sense within the theory of the eternity of 
the soul. Therefore, it is proposed that the global ethical discourse must 
incorporate this vision of the eternity of the soul into its conceptual paradigm. 
Moreover, the conception that the soul can enter into IT'.atter positively suggests 
the unity of the objective and subjective spheres of reality. The material 
dualistic scheme of thought generally suggests that matter is distinct from spirit 
and this theory has resulted in the domination of nature by man. However, the 
traditional conception of the unity of the spirit and matter, is essential for the 
global ethical discourse from the standpoint that it recognizes the essential 
synthesis of nature and spirit. 
6.9 Theory of Inherent Ethical Value 
In the traditional Hindu ethical discourse the notions ot",-La and satya suggested 
a theory of the essential nature of things with ethical value. Both these notions 
applied to the empirical and Cosmic level of existence. This means that the 
entire manifested order embodies ethical value based on the principle of rIa and 
satya. Furthermore, the traditional Hindu ethical discourse identified the finite 
and the infinite as embodying ethical value. It must also be noted that both 
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these notions are used in a very universal sense in the Hindu discourse and this 
is a vital contribution to the global ethical conceptual paradigm. This thesis 
proposes that the global ethic must attribute ethical value to all finite and 
infinite categories through the method of recognizint:; the essential. nature as 
ethical. The notion of an inherent ethical value is an importan~ contribution that 
the traditional Hindu ethical discourse can make to the conceptual paradigm of 
the global ethical discourse. 
6.10 The Means - End Theory 
Another interesting feature of the Hindu traditional ethical discourse is its 
notion of ethics being subsidiary to the ultimate goal. This idea suggests that 
ethics is the means to some transcendental end. The structure of this idea 
propounds the view that ethical values must be associated with a transcendent 
end. Within the global ethical discourse it is very difficult to arrive at the 
precise nature of this ultimate end. However, the notion of the ultimate guiding 
principle serving as an ultimate end may be useful. The structure of the global 
ethic must assume the character of serving as a means towards a universal end. 
The universal end may not necessarily be a God or an Absolute abstract entity; 
it can also be that which provides common fulfillment to the global community. 
In the traditional ethical discourse, the notion of dharma served as a global 
ethic towards the ultimate realization of the Brahman. Such a construction may 
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serve a limited interest. For the purpose of the global ethical discourse, the 
ultimate reality must translate into a centre of common fulfillment. This 
suggests that ethical action should culminate in a kind of universal satisfaction 
that is realizable by the global community within empirical experience. 
6.11 Absolute empirical freedom 
Within the Hindu traditional ethical discourse there arr ~everal suggestions that 
direct that ethical action be governed by a trans-empirical reality . This means 
that action was restricted and limited to a proposed framework within which 
spiritual actualization was made possible. The principle that underpins this 
notion is that of "control" and "limited freedom". In the traditional ethical 
discourse, the notion of dharma in its various translations served as a spiritual, 
legal and social regulator. This did not mean that human freedom was curbed, it 
merely propounded that human freedom must function within agreed limits. 
This principle is a vital contribution to the global ethical discourse, because the 
structure of global ethics cann0~ allow for unlimited freedom to human action. 
On the contrary, the traditional ethical model rightfud:1 suggests !h.lt various 
agencies of regulations should be in place to ensure that the global interest of 
man, nature and the universe is protected. 
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Furthermore, Indian theists have suggested that this transcendent Absolute is an 
immanent reality both as a "world soul" and "individual soul" and therefore 
serves as an " inner controller" . This suggests that an individual ' s existence is 
not by chance but is governed by a higher intellectual and moral purpose. 
Although, the notion of "inner controller" may suggrst that the individual be 
bereft of individual freedom, it also proposes that the individual does not have 
absolute freedom in the empirical context. This notion of "controlled freedom" 
is an important contribution to the conceptual-methodological paradigm of the 
global ethical discourse. Furthermore, the Divine found in all things adds equal 
moral value to all created objects. This notion of the immanence of the Divine 
within the world-creation also negates the position of philosophic materialism 
that attests to the world being the only absolute reality . The notion of the 
Absolute guiding principle cannot be structured as just an abstract reality but it 
also must project a qualitative reality, which can serve as a perfect source of 
moral values for the global ethical discourse. 
6.12 The Theory of Duty and Responsibility 
Although the traditional ethical discourse was not rooted in a profound human 
rights vision, it never failed to construct a vision for individual and social duties 
and responsibilities. This theory of duty and responsibility is based on the 
principle of what is in the best interest of the collective and therefore it 
assumed ethical value. The notions of ashrama dharma, svadharma etc. were 
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constructed with the view of improving the status Qi' the individuc.l through 
ethical fulfillment and for the purpose of maintaining socia! stability. In the 
traditional constructs of Hindu metaphysics, it became clear that duty and 
responsibility was extended to the individual, to nature and the environment 
and to the realm of divine space. Man was conceptualized as part of the Cosmic 
ecosystem and therefore had to perform his individual duty so that order and 
stability in the Cosmos was maintained. This theory is not based on the notion 
of choice but on the law of necessity, what needs to be done in order for there 
to be preservation of order and stability. Although this theory of duty and 
responsibility stands above the culture of human rights, it is not opposed to the 
spirit of it. This construction is a vital contribution to the gloDal ethical 
discourse because it suggests that global ethical action must be based on duty 
and responsibility, it must be motivated by what is necessary for human and 
global existence. Therefore this theory forms an ideal basis for global action 
and collective responsibility towards the global crisis. 
6.13 Theory of Ethical Justification and Accountability 
The traditional metaphysical and ethical model is constructed on the paradigm 
that suggests that the Divine is the ultimate ground on which ~oral justification 
and accountability rests. This model is riddled with various metaphysical and 
theoretical problems. There is no doubt that the principle of justification and 
accountability are essential to the ethical discourse, however, it needs to be 
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founded on a more reliable and universal ground. The traditional metaphysical 
paradigm has conceptualized the idea of Sat or satya that means "truth". This 
principle of an ultimate truth and an immanent truth is proposed as the basic 
ground on which the process of ethical justification a.l:i accoun~ability should 
rest. This means that a global ethical action can be justified and accounted for 
on the principle of Truth, since truth is common to all . Furthermore, the 
compatibility of human action towards an ethical goal can be enhanced, 
basically based on the principle of truth. 
6.14 The Theory of Selflessness 
The traditional ethical discourse suggested that human action, in the form of 
individual duty and social responsibility must be based on the standard of 
selflessness. This simply meant that an action is considered ethical jf one does 
not seek personal benefits from the action. The ethical essence of the action 
was largely determined by the inner motive of the action. The inner motive of 
the action must transcend all levels of personal gain. This is a vital theory for 
the global ethical discourse because man' s duty and responsibility to the planet 
and the environment requires an attitude of selflessness. It is also assumed that 
selfless action formulates a basis for "action in unity" without regard for issues 
of gender, race, religion etc. 
289 
6.15 The Theory of Equanimity 
In the traditional ethical discourse, the notion of "samatva" was fostered with 
the understanding that all things must be perceived with the vision of 
"sameness" or equanimity. This proposition rests on the metaphysical 
assumption that the essential nature of all things is the same. This theory 
therefore suggests that there is fundamentally no difference in the moral value 
of an animal, plant and a human being. This theory will be a vital contribution 
to the global ethical discourse because it suggests that there exist a fundamental 
unity in existence. This theory, therefore, allows all levels of racism, sexism 
and tensions between feminists and animal rights action groups to be resolved 
on the basis of the commonness of their essential nature. It also directs human 
action with an attitude of respect towards all manifested realities. 
6.16 Universal Moral Action 
In the traditional Hindu discourse the notion of karma conveyed the basis of 
moral action at the individual and societal level. The structural features of this 
idea were underpinned with a universal character ::hat suggested that it 
fundamentally is a "moral law". The principle of a moral I.aw is rare in an 
ethical discourse because ethical values are mostly relative. The notion. of 
karma assumed that all forms of action (verbal, physical and mental) are 
underpinned by an ethical premise. Therefore, it accounted for universal justice 
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through a metaphysical method. The principle of "intentionality" was central to 
this moral law and it suggested that the effect of any action is based on the 
intent of the action. This is similar to the Kantian position and therefore allows 
for the correlation of the Hindu and western ethical discourse on this point. For 
the purpose of the global ethical discourse, the intent 0'; ~thical action should be 
founded on the basis of what is good for the global community and not what is 
just suited to individual communities. 
This law also proposed a metaphysical continuity of births, in which, the 
individual accounts for all his actions. The ultimate objective was to transcend 
this cycle of empirical action. This law is universal from the point that it can 
stand independent of a personal god. It is based on the notion of "as you sow, 
so shall you reap". This is a universal principle; therefore the theoretical 
assumptions of this law can make an important contribution in constructing a 
framework for a universal moral action. Furthermore, these theoretical 
assumptions can serve as a basis for modeling a hermeneutica~ scheme in which 
the issue of moral reflection and judgement can be understood in a global 
sense. The notion of karma can contribute to the global moral tradition as a 
rule of conduct. The propositions of the law of karma can also contribute to the 
conceptual framework that explains aspects of ethical transgressions. The cause 
effect theory of the law of karma can adequately explain the way in which 
ethical transgressions will be dealt with. The law of karma is compatible with 
the Kantian ideal of "the freedom of will". Being associated with the notion of 
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dharma, it regulates the freedom of will or choice 10 the context of the 
universal guiding principle. 
6.17 Objective of Hindu Metaphysics 
As much as Hindu metaphysics is deeply rooted in mystical and speculative 
thought, which in turn is rooted in the subjective human experience, it is 
constructed to guide human thought and action. The objective of Hindu 
metaphysics is not to limit its speculations on the unique religious experience 
of individuals but rather to establish the connection f)f the cosmic unity that 
underlies reality. Therefore, Hindu metaphysics can make a vital contribution 
to the global ethical discourse in that it projects an awareness of a reality that 
transcends all cultural limitations and boundaries. Furthermore, the nature of 
the reality in which human thought and experience is erected largely influences 
the character of the moral and ethical values and principles that it develops. In 
this regard a global, cosmic reality which transcends all limitations and narrow 
interpretations is an ideal context for the expansion of global principles and 
values. 
Indian Metaphysical thinking was not just rooted in re,.wn and si-'er.ulation but 
also in deep experience. It is interesting to learn that Indian metaphysics not 
only strives to grasp the nature of ultimate reality, it also attempted to solve 
problems within a changing society. Globalization is part of social change and 
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will inevitably give nse to problems and challenges. However, Indian 
metaphysics can be used to make an important contribution to the resolution of 
these problems. One of the problems that arise from globalization is the need to 
formulate a global ethic and in this regard, Indian metaphysics can make a vital 
contribution. The traditional conceptual-methodological framework in which 
ethical thinking rested, revolved around the categories of the ultimate reality, 
the inner nature of man, the society and the world. It is not aimed, in this study, 
to integrate this conceptual-methodological framework to the factual discourse 
of the postmodern society. On the contrary, it is important to recognize that this 
conceptual-methodological framework can form an essential basis for the 
structuring of the global ethical discourse. As much as metaphysics may seem 
to present a widely speculative approach, such speculations in Indian thought 
was more positive and life affirming. Although science and metaphysics cannot 
be integrated due to their differential conceptual-methodological frameworks, 
metaphysics has the role of serving as a guiding principle to scientific 
endeavour. 
6.18 The Concept of Brahman - Ultimate Guiding Principle 
In examining the meamng of Brahman both etymologically and from the 
survey of the Upanishads, it is conclusive that the concept of Brahman is 
rooted in multiple of meanings. It is also significant to note that this notion of 
Brahman is evolutionary in character and it allows itself to expand in meaning. 
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Its meaning contributes towards understanding the nature of Reality, which is 
not only empirical, as the objectivist scientists project it, but it is also 
transcendent and infinite. The notion of Brahman is un~que in that it does not 
close itself to interpretation and therefore can be classified as a functional 
Reality as much as it is an abstract reality. As a functional reality, it serves as 
an ultimate object of reference for justifying a basis for ethical behavior. The 
foundation of a Global ethic needs a construct of reality that is unlimited to 
interpretation, both to the theological and empirical communities and the notion 
of Brahman whose meaning is evolutionary in character serves as an ideal 
conceptual reference. 
It is also necessary to note that the idea of Brahman being the Cosmic Guiding 
principle is very crucial. The conceptual-methodological framework for a 
global ethic must rest on the notion of an ultimate guiding principle. For 
centuries human beings have evolved their system of ethical behavior from 
some Divine source. The problem that is connected with such a source is that it 
was not the ultimate source of reference for all people. People generally 
divided themselves on the basis that they differed about what the precise nature 
and character of the ultimate source was. But among religions, there is a 
common denominator that whatever the ultimate source was, it was the source 
of Absolute Good and therefore the ultimate guiding principle. There may also 
be differences in the view as to how the uitimate principle guided and precisely 
what it guided on, however, there is agreement that it did serve as the source of 
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guidance. The notion of Brahman, whose meaning stands above any sectarian 
notion or ideological classification, may be an ideal reference for the 
construction of a reality that can serve as an ultimate guiding principle. 
One of the limiting facts about Brahman is that the traditionalists relied deeply 
on the scriptures for the source of understanding it. However, there was also 
room for transcending the scriptures and resting one' s knowing of Brahman on 
spiritual experience. The problem of spiritual experie,ce is that it is a deeply 
subjective category. However, the ultimate guiding principle for a global ethic 
needs to be beyond any individual set of scriptures and it must belong to a 
practical tradition that allows not only for a subjective experience but also for 
an objective interpretation. The fact that Brahman cannot be and is not 
confined to the interpretation of the scriptures suggests that it can be rendered 
as a global concept defining the framework of the ultimateness of reality. The 
construction of such a reality may be useful for the global religious community. 
6.19 Dharma - The Basis for a Global Ethic 
In the traditional ethical discourse it became evident that the notion of dharma 
was used in a variety of senses and contexts. It also became apparent that the 
notion of dharma represented an inner value or universal value of that which is 
right in various contexts. Therefore, the notion of dharma was applied in the 
social, political, economic, religious and moral contexts. The concept of 
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dharma also served as a regulatory principle in situations of power such as the 
state, family etc. It also applied to people of different classes and races. So in 
essence, the notion of dharma, in the context of the Hindu worldview is a 
global ethical concept. It is also evident that the not.(I11 of dharma has been 
interpreted in traditional Hindu medical ethics and environmental ethics. It can 
be used ideally as a global applied ethical concept. It is also suggested that the 
global ethical framework evolve a concept that is similar to the notion of 
dharma, which can serve as a global ethical concept, which binds all 
perspectives of living with an ethical foundation. The continuation of the use of 
the notion of dharma as a global ethical concept needs to be negotiated. 
The proposal that the concept of dharma be the foundation of a global ethic 
rests on the following motivation. Firstly, the notion of dharma as Sanatana 
Dharma assumes the character of international law. This system of law is based 
on fundamental ethical standpoints that are common to the giobal community. 
International law need not presume only a political sense but can be interpreted 
to represent the general ethical sense of the global community. This 
incorporates what is common to the global community. Therefore values such 
as Truth, Love, Peace, Non-violence etc., while serving as individual ethics can 
also be characterized as universal ethics or global ethics. The concept sanatana 
dharma embodies these values as its main framework . 
296 
Furthermore, the notion of dharma as an ethical construct is not derived from a 
single exclusionist's contribution, on the contrary, it develops from a variety of 
sources viz. custom, usage, practices etc. which, although may vary from 
community to community, can be evolved into a common good. This is a 
categorical strength of the concept of the notion of dharma. From this 
perspective, it will be able to construct global customs and practices from the 
contribution of individual customs and practices therefore uniting the global 
customs into a common ethical vision. 
The real capacity of the notion of dharma is that it is dynamic and not limited 
to a single definition or ideology. It is constantly evolving in meaning and 
meeting the needs of a changing society. The notion of dharma is not resilient 
to change and it can be truly described as a "developmental concept". 
Furthermore, it is compatible with the pluralistic vision in accommodating 
diversity. Like pluralism it is able to formulate itself as a principle of unity 
amidst the diversity. Moreover, this pluralistic foundation to dharma allows for 
value tradeoffs towards an ultimate transcendent end. This is the precise nature 
that is required of a global ethical concept, therefore, it is proposed that the 
concept of dharma be negotiated as a global ethical cO'lcept 
Furthermore, the concept of dharma is also compatible to the human rights 
culture because it advocates the idea of choice. Being based on the principle of 
relativity, it can be interpreted for various situations and contribute to the 
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ethical relativistic theory. The issue of social justice can be very easily 
reconciled with the notion of dharma. It has a unique ability of reconciling all 
ethical goods into a universal absolute. Being based on a functionalist model, it 
can be useful in developing the global ethical duties and responsibilities 
towards the world. 
As svadharma, it can define the character of individual duty and professional 
ethics for a global community. Therefore, it is not in conflict with the notion of 
individualism, which suggests a culture of individual rights. However, it guards 
against individual rights being interpreted as an open mandate for a person to 
do as he pleases. Because the principle of dharma is linked to Brahman, the 
universal guiding principle, and it suggests that individual choice must fall 
within the framework of a universal guiding principle. 
As sadharana dharma, it can formulate itself into uni'lersal individual ethics 
that serves as a common morality, based on rationality, for the global 
community. It also incorporates the cardinal virtues of (1) respect for life (ii) 
prohibition of adultery (iii) non-violence etc, which are common moral values 
for the global society. 
As sanatana dharma or universal dhatma, this traditional paradigm does not 
allow the concept of the particular to be dominant over the principle of the 
universal. Therefore, the universal guiding principle also serves as the ultimate 
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background against which the individual or particularistic ideas are interpreted. 
Furthermore, the notion of sanatana dharma is directly correlated with the 
Kantian position that moral action must be based on what is commonly good. 
As ashrama dharma, it can suggest the scheme for a productive lifestyle. As 
caturvarna dharma, it can propose the unity of the global temperaments within 
specific paradigms of productive action. Finally, as Purusharta dharma, it can 
define universal ethical values that are common to the human nature. 
6.20 Conclusion 
The notions of Brahman and dharma and their relations to the world and 
individual can make an important contribution to the conceptual framework of 
the global ethical discourse. However, the traditional methodology needs to be 
re-evaluated in the context of the global methodological trend that attempts to 
unify the world and the academic thought systems. The interpretation scheme 
cannot be rested on a pure metaphysical plane but must be able to translate 
itself to a profoundly empirical scheme, which is the foundation of the global 
ethical discourse. The specific principles of the global methodology and 
hermeneutic has not been the main focus of this thesis. However, the theoretical 
contribution of the Hindu metaphysical and ethical ri~course will be able to 
expand the framework of the developing global ethical discourse which can 
serve as a framework for evolving a global ethic. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
In chapter One of this study, the research design focussed on the key critical 
issue of the contribution that Hindu metaphysics and ethics can make to the 
global ethical discourse. This thesis proposed that Hindu metaphysics, through 
the notion of Brahman in relation to individual and the \l:!xld and th~ notions of 
karma and dharma can make theoretical contributions to the expansion of the 
global ethical discourse. The research design identified a serious gap in the 
traditional Hindu metaphysical discourse, which reflected the absence of 
traditional Hindu metaphysics and ethics participating in the postmodern global 
dialogue. 
In chapter two a background of the Hindu scriptures which served as the 
primary source for Hindu metaphysical and ethical thinking. It also took up the 
issue of Hindu metaphysics, in the context of the Vedantic systems of 
Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva. Furthermore, this study also presented a 
background to the post-modern challenges to metaphysical thinking and 
designed a framework on the nature of man from a global perspective. 
In chapter three, this study explored the pnmary propositions of Hindu 
metaphysics from the Vedantic perspective. It examined the development of the 
notion of Brahman in the Prasthana Traya by probing and analyzing specific 
textual references and the interpretations of classical thinkers such as Shankara , 
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Ramanuja and Madhva and contemporary western and eastern scholars. This 
study also investigated the conception of the world and tile nature of 
personhood from the Prasthana Iraya, the classical and contemporary thinkers. 
In the Chapter four, this study explored the notion of dharma and karma in the 
traditional Hindu ethical discourse. The various levels of the meaning of 
dharma and karma was surveyed and a conceptual analysis of these concepts 
was constructed. Focus was given to the notion of duty and responsibility, 
selfless action, individual and social ethics, the traditional Hindu scheme of life 
and the theoretical aspects of the law of karma. 
In chapter five, this study explored the contemporary post -modern global 
ethical discourse. This analysis constructed a framework of 19th and 20th 
century ethical trends and the proposals made for a global ethic. The central 
focus of this analysis was based on the western discourse on ethics. 
Finally in chapter six, this study proposed a conceptual theoretical framework 
from traditional Hindu metaphysics and ethics towards the global ethical 
discourse. It proposed the notions of Brahman as an ultimate guiding principle 
for the global ethical discourse and suggested that the concept of dharma be 
negotiated as a global ethic. 
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It became evident that the global ethical discourse shifted its primary concern 
from man to the planet as a whole. It also became evident that the development 
of the global ethic cannot be the effort of any single thought system or 
community but requires the contribution of the global community. The global 
ethical discourse needs to reconcile metaphysical, ethical and scientific 
discourses. Although these three discourses cannot be integrated, it became 
evident that they share a mutual interest for global ethics. One of the central 
methods that became identifiable through this study is the incorporation of the 
various ideas. In order for there to be a justification for a global ethic, this study 
did not attempt to establish a single standpoint but assimilated all relevant ideas 
into the global ethical dialogue because the global ethical system cannot be 
constructed as an individual system but a shared system. 
It also became apparent that the traditional hermenuetical principles and 
methodological approaches can serve as essential tools for the analysis of 
empirical and philosophic global phenomena. The modernistic methodological 
approaches in global ethical studies can truly be advanced by the dialectic 
systems of Indian metaphysics. Hindu metaphysics and ethics reveal a 
generally universalist ic foundation, which enhances dialogue with worldviews 
of the global society. 
The principles of collectivity, integration and universalism, which underpinned 
this thesis, were genuinely evident in Hindu metaphysics and ethics. It also 
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became evident that the contemporary ethical discourse, together with the 
ethical discourse of the 19th and 20th century can integrate itself with the Hindu 
traditional metaphysics and ethics for the purpose of developing the post-
modern global ethical discourse. 
It also became evident that the global ethic rested on fundamental values such 
as respect, tolerance, non-violence, life of truthfulness, human rights, duty and 
responsibility towards which both Hindu metaphysics and ethics made a vital 
conceptual and theoretical contribution. 
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